

I.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΟΤΙ ΟΤ ΔΕΙ ΠΟΛΛΑΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΣΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΝ
ΠΡΑΓΜΑ ΧΡΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ.

- 5 Λόγου δέ ποτε γενομένου περὶ ἀποδείξεων, ἃς χρὴ ἀκούειν τοὺς
νέους παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων πρὸς κατάληψιν ὧν μανθάνουσιν, ἔφη
ὁ Μουσώνιος οὐχὶ πολλὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστου πράγματος ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις
προσθήκειν, ἀλλ' ἀνυσίμους καὶ ἐναργεῖς. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἐκεῖνος,
ἔφη, ἐπαινετὸς ὁ φάρμακα πολλὰ προσφέρων τοῖς νοσοῦσιν, ἀλλ'
10 ὁ δι' ὀλίγων ὧν προσφέρει λόγου ἀξίως ὠφελῶν. οὔτε φιλόσοφος
ὁ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδείξεων διδάσκων τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἀλλ' ὁ δι'
ὀλίγων ἐπάγων αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ὃ μέντοι βούλεται· καὶ ὁ ἀκουστής
ὅσῳ περ ἂν ᾖ συνετώτερος, τοσούτῳ μειόνων δεῖσεται τῶν ἀποδεί-
ξεων καὶ τοσούτῳ θάττον συναινέσει τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τοῦ λόγου, ὅντι
15 γε ὑγιεῖ. ὅστις δὲ πανταχοῦ δεῖται ἀποδείξεως καὶ ὅπου σαφὴ τὰ
πράγματα ἐστίν, ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδεικνύσθαι βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰ
δι' ὀλίγων δυνάμενα, παντάπασιν ἄτοπος καὶ δυσμαθής. θεοὺς
μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀποδείξεως δεῖσθαι πρὸς οὐδέν, ὅτι μήτε
ἄσαφές μήτε ἄδηλόν ἐστίν αὐτοῖς μηδέν, πρὸς <οἷα> μόνον δεῖ τῶν
20 ἀποδείξεων· τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἀνάγκη τὰ μὴ φανερά μὴδ' αὐτόθεν
γνώριμα διὰ τῶν φανερῶν καὶ προδηλῶν ζητεῖν ἀνευρίσκειν, ὅπερ
ἔργον ἀποδείξεώς ἐστιν. οἶον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, αὐτόθεν
μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι γνώριμον, ἐπεὶ περ ἔργῳ προσκαλεῖται ἡμᾶς ὡς
ἀγαθὸν οὖσα ἢ ἡδονή· λαβόντος δὲ τινος λήμμα γνώριμον τὸ πᾶν
25 ἀγαθὸν αἰρετὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβόντος ἑτερον γνώριμον τούτῳ
τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς οὐχ αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἀποδεικνύμεν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὰ τῶν γνωρίμων τὸ μὴ γνώριμον. πάλιν ὡς ὁ
πόνος οὐκ ἐστὶ κακόν, αὐτόθεν μὲν οὐ φαίνεται πιθανόν· τοῦναντίον
γὰρ τούτου δοκεῖ πιθανώτερον, τὸ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον· τεθέντος
30 δὲ φανεροῦ λήμματος, τοῦ πᾶν τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν εἶναι, καὶ προστε-
θέντος αὐτῷ φανερωτέρου τοῦ πόνου πολλοὺς οὐκ εἶναι φευκτοὺς,
περαίνεται τὸ μὴ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ
γένους τοῦ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὀξύτεροι οἱ
δ' ἀμβλύτεροί εἰσι καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν ἔθεσι κρείττωσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐν χείροσι
35 τετραμμένοι, οἱ μὲν ἥθους ἢ φύσεως ὄντες χείρονος πλειόνων

I

THAT THERE IS NO NEED OF GIVING MANY PROOFS
FOR ONE PROBLEM

Once when discussion turned upon proofs or demonstrations, such as beginners must learn from their teachers of philosophy in gaining a mastery of whatever they are studying, Musonius said that there was no sense in seeking many proofs for each point, but rather cogent and lucid ones. Thus just as the physician who prescribes many drugs for his patients deserves less praise than the one who succeeds in helping them with a few, so the philosopher who teaches his pupils with the use of many proofs is less effective than the one who leads them to the desired goal with few. And the pupil too, the quicker his intelligence, the fewer proofs he will require, and the sooner he will assent to the conclusion of the argument in question, provided it be sound. But those who require proofs at every point, even where the matter is perfectly clear, or demand to have demonstrated at length things which could be explained briefly are completely inept and dull-witted.

The gods, we may assume, need no proof of anything inasmuch as nothing to them lacks clearness or is obscure, and it is only in reference to obscurity that there is any need of proof. Man, however, must needs seek to find out that which is not plain nor self-evident through the medium of the plain and obvious. That is the function of proof. Take for example the proposition that pleasure is not a good. At first sight we do not recognize it as true, since in fact pleasure appeals to us as a good. But starting from the generally accepted premise that every good is desirable and adding to it a second equally accepted that some pleasures are not desirable, we succeed in proving that pleasure is not a good: that is we prove the unknown or unrecognized by means of the known or recognized. Or again, that toil is not an evil is not on the face of it a persuasive proposition, while its opposite, that toil is an evil, seems much more persuasive. But starting from the known and accepted premise that every evil is a thing to be avoided, and adding to it another obvious one, namely that many forms of toil are not in the category of things to be avoided, we conclude that toil is not an evil. Since this, then, is the nature of proof, when we consider that some men are quicker of wit and others duller, that some are reared in better environment, others

δέονται ἂν ἀποδείξω καὶ πραγματείας μείζονος, ὥστε δέξασθαι ταυτὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τυπωθῆναι κατὰ ταῦτα, καθάπερ οἶμαι καὶ τὰ ποιητὰ τῶν σωματίων, ὅποταν μέλλῃ καλῶς ἔξειν, πάντῃ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ τῶν νέων εὐφυέστεροι καὶ ἀγωγῆς μετεσχηκότες κρείττονος, οὗτοι ῥᾶδόν τε καὶ θάπτον καὶ δι' ὀλίγων ἀποδείξεων συναινοῦν ἂν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀκολουθοῦν. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα, γινώσκω ἂν ῥαδίως, εἰ νοήσαιμεν μειράκιον ἢ νεανίαν, τὸν μὲν ἐν τρυφῇ πάσῃ τεθραμμένον καὶ τό τε σῶμα τεθλυμμένον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκλελυμένον ὑπὸ ἐθῶν ἀγόντων εἰς 10 μαλακίαν, ἔτι δὲ νοσή παρεχόμενον καὶ δυσμαθὴ τὴν φύσιν· τὸν δ' αὖ Λακωνικῶς πως ἡγμένον καὶ τρυφᾶν οὐκ εἰθισμένον καὶ καρτερεῖν μεμελετηκότα καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ὀρθῶς εὐήκοον ὄντα· εἴτα τοὺς δύο τούτους νεανίας εἰ θείημεν ἀκούοντας φιλοσόφου λέγοντος περὶ θανάτου, περὶ πόνου, περὶ πενίας, περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, 15 ὡς οὐ κακῶν ὄντων, πάλιν δ' αὖ περὶ ζωῆς, περὶ ἡδονῆς, περὶ πλούτου, περὶ τῶν παραπλησίων τούτοις ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἄρα γε ὁμοίως ἄμφω προσήκονται τοὺς λόγους καὶ παραπλησίως ἐκάτερος <αὐ> πίθοιτο τοῖς λεγομένοις; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μόγις καὶ βραδέως καὶ ὥσπερ μοχλευόμενος ὑπὸ μυρίων λόγων 20 τάχ' ἂν ἐπινεύσειεν, ὁ νοθέστερος· ὁ δ' αὖ ταχέως καὶ ἐτοίμως δέξεται τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οἰκεία καὶ προσήκοντα αὐτῷ, μήτε ἀποδείξεων δεόμενος πολλῶν μήτε πραγματείας μείζονος. ἢ οὐ τοιοῦτος παῖς ἐκεῖνος ὁ Λάκων, ὃς Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἡρώτησεν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόνος ἐστίν; οὕτω γὰρ ἐκεῖνος φαίνεται φύσει πεφυκῶς 25 καλῶς καὶ τεθραμμένος εὖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ὥστε ἐγγύτερον εἶναι νομίζειν τὸν πόνον τῆς ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ· ὅς γε ὡς ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ μὴ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὢν, ἐπυνθάνετο. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἀγασθεὶς τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν ἄρα πρὸς αὐτόν·

30 αἵματος εἰς ἀγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος, οἷ' ἀγορεύεις.

πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐ ῥαδίως ἐπίσθη ἂν μήτε πένιαν μήτε θάνατον δεδιέναι μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων φοβερῶν, μηδ' αὖ διώκειν πλούτον ἢ ζῶην ἢ ἡδονήν;

Ἴνα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθω τοῦ λόγου, φημι δεῖν τὸν διδά- 35 σκαλον τὸν φιλόσοφον μὴ λόγων πλήθος μηδ' ἀποδείξεων ζητεῖν

35 τὸν φιλόσοφον Wachsmuth τοῦ φιλοσόφου Hense

22 The incident is related in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* VII, 5 (172).

30 *Odyssey* IV, 611.

in worse, those of the latter class being inferior in character and native disposition will require more proofs and more diligent attention to be led to master the teachings in question and to be moulded by them; just as defective physiques, when the goal is to restore perfect health, require very diligent and prolonged treatment. On the other hand such pupils as are of a finer nature and have enjoyed better training will more easily and more quickly, and with few proofs, assent to sound reasoning and put it into practice. How true this is we may readily recognize if we chance to know two lads or young men, of whom one has been reared in luxury, his body effeminate, his spirit weakened by soft living, and having besides a dull and torpid disposition; the other reared somewhat in the Spartan manner, unaccustomed to luxury, practiced in self-restraint, and ready to listen to sound reasoning. If then we place these two young men in the position of pupils of a philosopher arguing that death, toil, poverty, and the like are not evils, or again that life, pleasure, wealth, and the like are not goods, do you imagine that both will give heed to the argument in the same fashion, and that one will be persuaded by it in the same degree as the other? Far from it. The one reluctantly and slowly, and fairly pried loose by a thousand arguments, will perhaps in the end give sign of assent—I mean of course the dullard. The other quickly and readily will accept the argument as cogent and relevant to himself, and will not require many proofs nor a fuller treatment. Was not just such a lad that Spartan boy who asked Cleanthes the philosopher if toil was not a good? He made it plain that he was so well-endowed by nature and by training for the practice of virtue as to consider toil closer to the nature of good than of evil, in that he asked whether toil was not perchance a good, as if it were conceded that it was not an evil. Thereupon Cleanthes in surprise and admiration of the boy replied, 'Thou art of noble blood, dear child, so noble the words thou speakest.' Can you doubt that such a lad would have been readily persuaded not to fear poverty nor death nor any of the things which seem terrible, and again, not to seek after wealth nor life nor pleasure?

To come back to the starting point of my discussion, I repeat that it is mistaken zeal for the teacher, if he be a true philosopher, to rehearse a multitude of arguments and proofs to his pupils. He should rather touch upon each one with just measure, seek to penetrate to the very intellect of his hearer, and present persuasive arguments and such as cannot easily be refuted. But most of all his treatment should consist in showing himself not

διεξιέναι πρὸς τοὺς μανθάνοντας, ἀλλὰ καιρίως περὶ ἐκάστου λέγειν καὶ καθικνεῖσθαι τῆς διανοίας τοῦ ἀκούοντος, καὶ <ᾧ . . . πει>στικά εἶναι λέγειν καὶ ἀνατραπήναι μὴ ῥάδια, καὶ μάλιστα γε τῷ παρέχειν αὐτὸν περὶ τε τῶν χρησιμωτάτων λέγοντα καὶ ὁμολο-
 5 γούμενα οἷς λέγει πράττοντα, τούτῳ μεταχειριζόμενον τοὺς ἀκούον-
 τας· τὸν δὲ μαθητὴν ἐντετάσθαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σκοπεῖν μὲν ὅπως μὴ λάθῃ ψεύδος τι παραδεξάμενος· τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν μὴ μὰ Δία πολλὰς ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ἐναργεῖς· καὶ ἅπερ
 10 ἂν πεισθῇ τῶν παραινυμένων ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῇ, τούτοις ἐπακολουθεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἔσται τις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὠφελημένος, ἂν οἷς παραδέδεκται λόγοις οἷσιν ὑγίεσι τὰ ἔργα παρέχῃται συνφδά.

II.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

<ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

15 ΟΤΙ ΠΡΟΣ ἈΡΕΤΗΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΕ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ>

Πάντες, ἔφη, φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως, ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ δ' οὐ καὶ τούτου μέγα τεκμήριον ὅτι
 πᾶσιν ὁμοίως οἱ νομοθέται καὶ προστάττουσιν ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ
 ἀπαγορεύουσιν ἃ μὴ χρὴ, οὐχ ὑπεξαιρούμενοι οὐδένα τῶν ἀπει-
 20 θούντων ἢ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων, ὥστε ἀτιμώρητον εἶναι, οὐ νέον, οὐ
 πρεσβύτερον, οὐκ ἰσχυρόν, οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, οὐχ ὄντιναοῦν. καίτοι ἐχρήν,
 εἰ ὅλον ἐπέισακτον τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἦν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ φύσει ἡμῖν
 μετῆν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οἷσιν ἔργοις
 οὐδεὶς ἀπαιτεῖται εἶναι ἀναμάρτητος, μὴ μεμαθηκὼς τὴν τέχνην,
 25 οὕτως μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον μηδένα ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εἶναι ἀναμάρ-
 τητον, ὅστις ἀρετὴν μὴ ἐξέμαθεν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀρετὴ μόνῃ ποιεῖ μὴ
 ἀμαρτάνειν ἐν βίῳ. νῦν δὲ ἐν μὲν θεραπείᾳ καμνόντων οὐδεὶς
 ἀναμάρτητον ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἄλλον ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ ἐν χρήσει λύρας
 οὐδένα ἄλλον ἢ τὸν μουσικὸν <καὶ> ἐν χρήσει πηδαλίων οὐδένα
 30 ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κυβερνήτην· ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ οὐκέτι μόνον ἀναμάρτητον
 εἶναι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἀξιοῦσιν, ὅς δοκεῖ μόνος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς,
 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτης πεποιτη-

14 f. This is the only one of the treatises for which a title is lacking.
 A satisfactory heading may be supplied from the text at 38, 1-2.

only as one who utters words which are most helpful, but as one who acts consistently with them. As for the pupil, it is his duty to attend diligently to what is said and to be on his guard lest he accept unwittingly something false. But of what he accepts as truth, his effort should not be directed toward learning numbers of proofs—far from it—but only such as are plain and lucid. Finally whatever precepts enjoined upon him he is persuaded are true, these must he follow out in his daily life. For only in this way will philosophy be of profit to anyone, if to sound teaching he adds conduct in harmony with it.

II

<THAT MAN IS BORN WITH AN INCLINATION
TOWARD VIRTUE>

All of us, he used to say, are so fashioned by nature that we can live our lives free from error and nobly; not that one can and another cannot, but all. The clearest evidence of this is the fact that lawgivers lay down for all alike what may be done and forbid what may not be done, exempting from punishment no one who disobeys or does wrong, not the young nor the old, not the strong nor the weak, not anyone whomsoever. And yet if the whole notion of virtue were something that came to us from without, and we shared no part of it by birth, just as in activities pertaining to the other arts no one who has not learned the art is expected to be free from error, so in like manner in things pertaining to the conduct of life it would not be reasonable to expect anyone to be free from error who had not learned virtue, seeing that virtue is the only thing that saves us from error in daily living. Now in the care of the sick we demand no one but the physician to be free from error, and in handling the lyre no one but the musician, and in managing the helm no one but the pilot, but in the conduct of life it is no longer only the philosopher whom we expect to be free from error, though he alone would seem to be the only one concerned with the study of virtue, but all men alike, including those who have never given any attention to virtue. Clearly, then, there is no explanation for this other than that the human being is born with an inclination toward virtue. And this indeed is strong evidence of the presence of goodness in our nature, that all speak of themselves as having virtue and being good. For take the common man; when asked

μένους. δῆλον οὖν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἕτερον τούτου αἴτιον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. καὶ μὴν καὶ κέينو μέγα τεκμήριον τοῦ
μετεῖναι ἀρετῆς φύσει ἡμῖν, τὸ πάντας οὕτως διαλέγεσθαι περὶ
ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἀρετὴν καὶ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν. οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι
5 τῶν πολλῶν, ὃς ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄφρων ἢ φρόνιμος τυγχάνει
ᾧ, ἄφρων ὁμολογήσει εἶναι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄδικος ἢ
δίκαιος τυγχάνει ᾧ, φήσει ὅτι ἄδικος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐρωτᾷ τις
πότερον σώφρων ἢ ἀκόλαστος, † ἢ θ' οὕτως ἀποκρίνεται ἐρωτηθείς,
ὅτι σώφρων· καὶ ἀπλῶς ἂν ἐρωτᾷ τις πότερον ἀγαθὸς εἴη ἢ φαῦλος,
10 φαίη ἂν <ὅτι> ἀγαθός, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχων εἰπεῖν οὔτε διδά-
σκαλον αὐτοῦ καλοκάγαθίας, οὔτε μάθησιν ἀρετῆς ἢ ἀσκησιν ἣν
τυγχάνει πεποιημένος. τοῦτ' οὖν τίνος ἄλλου τεκμήριον ἐστὶν ἢ
τοῦ φυσικὴν εἶναι ὑποβολὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ πρὸς καλο-
κάγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐνείναι; διὰ δὲ τὸ
15 πάντως ἀγαθοὺς ὑπάρχειν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, οἱ μὲν ἀπατώμεθα ὡς
καὶ δὴ ὄντες ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ αἰσχυρόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν <ὅτι> οὐκ ἐσμέν.
ἐπεὶ διὰ τί, πρὸς θεῶν, γράμματα μὲν ἢ μουσικὴν ἢ παλαιστρικὴν
οὐδεὶς μὴ μαθὼν εἰδέναι φησὶν, οὐδὲ ἔχειν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας
προσποιεῖται, μὴ καὶ διδάσκαλον παρ' ὃν ἐφοῖτα ἔχων εἰπεῖν,
20 ἀρετὴν δὲ ἔχειν πᾶς ὑπισχνεῖται; ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδενὸς φύσει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ ἥκει <τις> εἰς τὸν βίον ἔχων ὑποβολὰς
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III.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΤΕΟΝ.

25 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπύθετό τις αὐτοῦ, εἰ καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον, οὕτω
πῶς ἤρξατο διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφητέον αὐταῖς. Λόγον μὲν, ἔφη,
τὸν αὐτὸν εἰλήφασιν παρὰ θεῶν αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ᾧ
τε χρώμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ καθ' ὃν διανοούμεθα περὶ
ἐκάστου πράγματος, <εἰ> ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ καλὸν ἢ
30 αἰσχυρόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει τὸ θῆλυ τῷ
ἄρρενι, ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
μέρη σώματος τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ οὐδὲν θατέρῳ πλέον.

8 πότερον codd. Peerlkamp πότερα Hense

9 ἐρωτᾷ F.P. ἐρωτᾶται Wachsmuth, Hense

whether he is stupid or intelligent, not one will confess to being
stupid; or again, when asked whether he is just or unjust, not one
will say that he is unjust. In the same way, if one asks him
whether he is temperate or intemperate, he replies at once that
he is temperate; and finally, if one asks whether he is good or bad,
he would say that he is good, even though he can name no teacher
of virtue or mention any study or practice of virtue he has ever
made. Of what, then, is this evidence if not of the existence of
an innate inclination of the human soul toward goodness and
nobleness, and of the presence of the seeds of virtue in each one
of us? Moreover, because it is entirely to our advantage to be
good, some of us deceive ourselves into thinking that we are
really good, while others of us are ashamed to admit that we are
not. Why then pray, when one who has not learned letters or
music or gymnastics never claims to have knowledge of these arts
nor makes any pretence of knowing them, and is quite unable
even to name a teacher to whom he went, why, I say, does every-
one profess that he has virtue? It is because none of those other
skills is natural to man, and no human being is born with a
natural faculty <for them, whereas an inclination toward virtue is
inborn in each one of us.>

III

THAT WOMEN TOO SHOULD STUDY PHILOSOPHY

When someone asked him if women too should study phil-
osophy, he began to discourse on the theme that they should, in
somewhat the following manner. Women as well as men, he said,
have received from the gods the gift of reason, which we use in
our dealings with one another and by which we judge whether a
thing is good or bad, right or wrong. Likewise the female has the
same senses as the male; namely sight, hearing, smell, and the
others. Also both have the same parts of the body, and one has
nothing more than the other. Moreover, not men alone, but

10 ἂν ὅτι Elter cf. Hense addenda

11 ἢν F Elter, Peerlkamp τῖνα Hense

14 Cicero also used this metaphor of the seeds of virtue which exists in every human being. Cf. *De Finibus* V, 15, 43 and *Tusc. Disp.* III, 1, 2.
21 The text breaks off in the middle of a sentence, but one can easily supply the conclusion to his thought.24 The Stoics as a group advocated the study of philosophy for women. Cf. Lactantius *Inst. Div.* III, 25.

ἔτι δὲ ὀρεῖς καὶ οἰκείωσις φύσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐ μόνον γίνεται τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναιξίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον αὐταὶ γε τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καὶ δικαίοις ἔργοις ἀρέσκεισθαι πεφύκασι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προβάλλεσθαι. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὖν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδράσι προσήκοι ἂν ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστὶ, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐ; πότερον ὅτι ἄνδρας μὲν προσήκει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, γυναῖκας δὲ οὐ; σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν προσηκόντων γυναικὶ τῇ ἐσομένῃ ἀγαθῇ· φανέεται γὰρ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τούτων ἕκαστον μάλιστα ἂν αὐτῇ περιγινόμενον. αὐτίκα δὲ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι τὴν γυναικα καὶ ἐκλογιστικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀρχικὴν τῶν οἰκετῶν. ταῦτα δ' ἐγὼ φημὶ τῇ φιλοσοφούσῃ ὑπάρξαι ἂν μάλιστα· εἴ γε ἕκαστον μὲν τούτων μέρος τοῦ βίου ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ περὶ βίου οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἢ φιλοσοφία ἐστί, καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὥσπερ ἔλεγε Σωκράτης, τοῦτο διατελεῖ σκοπῶν,

ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

ἀλλὰ δεῖ δὴ καὶ σῶφρονα εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα· οἷαν καθαρεύειν μὲν ἀφροδισίων παρανόμων, καθαρεύειν δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀκрасίας, μὴ δουλεύειν ἐπιθυμίαις, μὴδὲ φιλόνεικον εἶναι, μὴ πολυτελεῖν, μὴ καλλωπίστριαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἔργα τῆς σῶφρονος ἐστὶ· καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἐκεῖνα· κρατεῖν μὲν ὀργῆς, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δ' ὑπὸ λύπης, κρείττονα δὲ πάθους παντὸς εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος παρεγγυᾷ λόγος· ὁ δὲ μαθὼν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσας ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι ἂν κοσμιώτατος, εἴτ' ἀνὴρ εἴη εἴτε γυνή. τί οὖν; ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· δικαία δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη γυνὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα, οὐδ' ἄμεμπτος βίου κοινωνός, οὐδ' ὁμονοίας ἀγαθῇ συνεργός, οὐδ' ἀνδρός γε καὶ τέκνων ἐπιμελὲς κηδεμών, οὐδὲ φιλοκερδείας ἢ πλεονεξίας πάντῃ καθαρά; καὶ τίς ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου τοιαύτῃ γένοιτο ἢν γε ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, εἴπερ εἴη τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφος, τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι χεῖρον νομίζειν, ὥσπερ αἰσχίον, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττοῦσθαι τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν κρείττον ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τέκνα μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν ἢ τὸ ζῆν; τῆς δ' ἐχούσης οὕτω τίς ἂν εἴη γυνὴ δικαιότερα; καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀνδρειότεραν εἶναι προσήκει γυναικα τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου τὴν πεπαιδευμένην καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τῆς ἰδιώτιδος· ὥς μήτε θανάτου φόβῳ μήτε ὀκνῳ τῷ πρὸς πόνον

15 This saying of Socrates is preserved in Diogenes Laertius, *op. cit.* II, 6, 21.

16 *Odyssey* IV, 392.

29 Socrates' teaching that it is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong (Plato, *Gorg.* 509C) was taken over by the Stoics. Cf. Seneca *Ep.* 95, 52.

women too, have a natural inclination toward virtue and the capacity for acquiring it, and it is the nature of women no less than men to be pleased by good and just acts and to reject the opposite of these. If this is true, by what reasoning would it ever be appropriate for men to search out and consider how they may lead good lives, which is exactly the study of philosophy, but inappropriate for women? Could it be that it is fitting for men to be good, but not for women? Let us examine in detail the qualities which are suitable for a woman who would lead a good life, for it will appear that each one of them would accrue to her most readily from the study of philosophy. In the first place, a woman must be a good housekeeper; that is a careful accountant of all that pertains to the welfare of her house and capable of directing the household slaves. It is my contention that these are the very qualities which would be present particularly in the woman who studies philosophy, since obviously each of them is a part of life, and philosophy is nothing other than knowledge about life, and the philosopher, as Socrates said, quoting Homer, is constantly engaged in investigating precisely this: "Whatever of good and of evil is wrought in thy halls." But above all a woman must be chaste and self-controlled; she must, I mean, be pure in respect of unlawful love, exercise restraint in other pleasures, not be a slave to desire, not be contentious, not lavish in expense, nor extravagant in dress. Such are the works of a virtuous woman, and to them I would add yet these: to control her temper, not to be overcome by grief, and to be superior to uncontrolled emotion of every kind. Now these are the things which the teachings of philosophy transmit, and the person who has learned them and practices them would seem to me to have become a well-ordered and seemly character, whether man or woman. Well then, so much for self-control. As for justice, would not the woman who studies philosophy be just, would she not be a blameless life-partner, would she not be a sympathetic help-mate, would she not be an untiring defender of husband and children, and would she not be entirely free of greed and arrogance? And who better than the woman trained in philosophy—and she certainly of necessity if she has really acquired philosophy—would be disposed to look upon doing a wrong as worse than suffering one (as much worse as it is the baser), and to regard being worsted as better than gaining an unjust advantage? Moreover, who better than she would love her children more than life itself? What woman would be more just than such a one? Now as for courage, certainly it is to be expected that the educated woman will be more courageous than the uneducated, and one

ὑπομείναι τι αἰσχρόν, μηδ' ὑποπτῆξαι μηδενὶ ὅτι εὐγενὴς ἢ ὅτι
 δυνατὸς ἢ ὅτι πλούσιος ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία ὅτι τύραννος. ὑπάρχει γὰρ
 αὐτῇ μεμελετηκέναι μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἡγείσθαι μὴ
 κακόν, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν μὴ ἀγαθόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν μὲν πόνον μὴ
 5 ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπουσίαν μὴ διώκειν ἐξ ἅπαντος. ὅθεν εἰκὸς
 εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην καὶ αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον, οἷαν
 ἂ μὲν ἂν τέκῃ τρέφειν μαστῶ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ ὑπηρετεῖν
 χερσὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῆς· ἂ δὲ δουρικὰ νομίζουσιν ἔνιοι, ταῦτα ἀόκνως
 ποιεῖν. ἂρ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη γυνὴ μέγα μὲν ὄφελος εἴῃ τῷ γεγαμη-
 10 κότι, κόσμος δὲ τοῖς προσήκουσι γένει, παράδειγμα δὲ χρηστὸν
 ταῖς ἐπισταμέναις αὐτῇ; ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, φασὶ τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις
 ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς
 φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας, ὅταν ἀφέμεναι τοῦ οἴκου εἶναι ἐν μέσοις
 15 ἀναστρέφονται τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ μελετῶσι λόγους καὶ σοφίζονται
 καὶ ἀναλύωσι συλλογισμούς, δέον οἴκοι καθημένους ταλασιουργεῖν.
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐχ ὅπως τὰς γυναῖκας τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς
 ἀνδρας ἀξιῶσαιμ' ἂν ἀφεμένους τῶν προσηκόντων ἔργων εἶναι περὶ
 λόγους μόνον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσους μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἔργων
 20 φημὶ δεῖν ἔνεκα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικοῦ
 λόγου ὄφελος οὐδέν, ἔαν μὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρῃ σώματος ἀνθρω-
 πίνου, οὕτως οὐδ' εἴ τινα φιλόσοφος ἔχει ἢ διδάσκει λόγον, οὐδέν
 ὄφελος αὐτοῦ, ἔαν μὴ φέρῃ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης. πρὸ
 παντὸς δὲ σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον χρή, ᾧ ἔπεσθαι τὰς φιλοσοφούσας
 25 ἀξιούμεν, εἰ δύναται θρασείας ποιεῖν ὁ τὴν αἰδῶ μέγιστον ἀπο-
 φαίνων ἀγαθόν· εἰ ζῆν ἱταμώτερον ἐθίζει ὁ καταστολὴν πλείστην
 ὑψηλοῦμενος· εἰ μὴ διδάσκει σωφρονεῖν ὁ κακὸν ἀποδεικνύς
 ἔσχατον τὴν ἀκολασίαν· εἰ μὴ προτρέπει οἰκονομεῖν ὁ παριστάς
 ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν οἰκονομικὴν. καὶ στέργειν δὲ . . . καὶ αὐτουργεῖν
 ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγος παρακαλεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα.

IV.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΕΙ ΠΑΡΑΠΑΗΣΙΩΣ ΠΑΙΔΕΤΤΕΟΝ ΤΑΣ

ΘΥΓΑΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΤΙΟΙΣ.

Λόγου δὲ ποτὲ τινος ἐμπροσθέντος, εἰ τὴν αὐτὴν παιδείαν παιδευ-
 35 τέον τοὺς υἱέας καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας, ἵππους μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ κύνας ὁμοῦ

who has studied philosophy than one who has not; and she will
 not therefore submit to anything shameful because of fear of
 death or unwillingness to face hardship, and she will not be
 intimidated by anyone because he is of noble birth, or powerful,
 or wealthy, no, not even if he be the tyrant of her city. For in
 fact she has schooled herself to be high-minded and to think of
 death not as an evil and life not as a good, and likewise not to
 shun hardship and never for a moment to seek ease and indolence.
 So it is that such a woman is likely to be energetic, strong to
 endure pain, prepared to nourish her children at her own breast,
 and to serve her husband with her own hands, and willing to do
 things which some would consider no better than slaves' work.
 Would not such a woman be a great help to the man who married
 her, an ornament to her relatives, and a good example for all who
 know her? Yes, but I assure you, some will say, that women who
 associate with philosophers are bound to be arrogant for the most
 part and presumptuous, in that abandoning their own households
 and turning to the company of men they practice speeches, talk
 like sophists, and analyze syllogisms, when they ought to be sit-
 ting at home spinning. I should not expect the women who study
 philosophy to shirk their appointed tasks for mere talk any more
 than men, but I maintain that their discussions should be con-
 ducted for the sake of their practical application. For as there
 is no merit in the science of medicine unless it conduces to the
 healing of man's body, so if a philosopher has or teaches reason,
 it is of no use if it does not contribute to the virtue of man's soul.
 Above all, we ought to examine the doctrine which we think
 women who study philosophy ought to follow; we ought to see
 if the study which presents modesty as the greatest good can
 make them presumptuous, if the study which is a guide to the
 greatest self-restraint accustoms them to live heedlessly, if what
 sets forth intemperance as the greatest evil does not teach self-
 control, if what represents the management of a household as a
 virtue does not impel them to manage well their homes. Finally,
 the teachings of philosophy exhort the woman to be content
 with her lot and to work with her own hands.

IV

SHOULD DAUGHTERS RECEIVE THE SAME
EDUCATION AS SONS?

Once when the question arose as to whether or not sons and
 daughters ought to be given the same education, he remarked

οὐδὲν διαφερόντως παιδεύουσιν οἱ τε ἵπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ κυνηγετικοὶ τοὺς ἄρρενας τῶν θηλειῶν· ἀλλ' αἱ τε κύνες αἱ θήλειαι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄρρεσι διδάσκονται θηρᾶν· ἵππους τε θηλείας ἂν τις θέλῃ τὰ ἵππων ἔργα ἀποτελεῖν καλῶς, οὐ διάφορον τῶν ἄρρένων διδασκα-
 5 λίαν διδασκομένας ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἐξαί-
 ρητόν τι ἄρα δεήσει ἔχειν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ παρὰ τὰς
 θηλείας, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ τὰς αὐτὰς παραγίνεσθαι δέον ἀρετὰς ἀμφοῖν
 ὁμοίως ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρετὰς μὴ διὰ τῶν
 αὐτῶν παιδευμάτων ἀλλὰ δι' ἐτέρων οἷόν τε ὅν ἐλθεῖν. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ
 10 ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἀνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥᾶδιον μαθεῖν. αὐτίκα,
 φρονεῖν δεῖ μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναικα· ἢ τί ὄφελος εἴη
 ἂν ἄφρονος ἀνδρός ἢ γυναικός; εἴτα <δεῖ> δικαίως βιοῦν οὐδέ-
 τερον ἥττον θατέρον· ἀλλ' ὅ τε ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολίτης ἀγαθὸς
 ἄδικος ὢν, ἢ τε γυνή οὐκ ἂν οἰκονομοίη χρηστῶς, εἰ μὴ δικαίως·
 15 ἄλλ' ἄδικος οὖσα περὶ αὐτὸν ἀδικήσῃ τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὴν
 Ἐριφύλην φασί. σωφρονεῖν μὲν αὖ καλὸν τὴν γυναικα, καλὸν δ'
 ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα· τὸ γοῦν μοιχεύειν τῷ μοιχεύεσθαι ἐπ' ἴσης
 κολάζουσιν οἱ νόμοι. καὶ λιχνεῖαι καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαι καὶ ἄλλα
 παραπλησία κακά, ἀκολαστήματα ὄντα καὶ καταισχύνοντα μεγά-
 20 λως τοὺς ἐνεχομένους αὐτοῖς, ἀποφαίνει τὴν σωφροσύνην ἀναγκαιο-
 τάτην οὖσαν ἀνθρώπῳ παντί, τῷ τε θήλει καὶ τῷ ἄρρενι· διὰ γὰρ
 σωφροσύνης μόνης ἐκφεύγομεν ἀκολασίαν, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς.
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως μόνοις προσήκειν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν.
 ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταύτη. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναικα
 25 <καὶ> καθαρεῖν δειλίας τὴν γε ἀρίστην, ὥς μήθ' ὑπὸ πόνου
 μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβου κάμπτεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς ἔτι σωφρονήσῃ, ἔάν
 τις ἢ φοβῶν ἢ προσάγων πόνους βιάσασθαι δύνηται αὐτὴν
 ὑπομεῖναι <τι> τῶν αἰσχρῶν; δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀμυντικῶς ἔχειν τὰς
 γυναικας, εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία φαίνεσθαι μέλλουσι κακίους ἀλεκτορίδων
 30 καὶ ἄλλων ὀρνίθων θηλειῶν, αἱ πολὺ μείζοσι ζῴοις ἐαυτῶν ὑπὲρ
 τῶν νεοττῶν διαμάχονται. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀνδρείας αἱ γυναικες
 δέοιντο; ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀλκῆς τῆς δι' ὅπλων μέτεστιν αὐταῖς, ἐδήλωσε
 τὸ Ἀμαζόνων γένος ἔθνη πολλὰ δι' ὅπλων καταστρεφάμενον· ὥστ'
 εἴ τι ἐνδεὲς πρὸς τοῦτο ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἀνασκησῖα μᾶλλον
 35 ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι <πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αἰτία ἂν εἴη. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν> coniecit
 Wachsmuth

that trainers of horses and dogs make no distinction in the train-
 ing of the male and the female; for female dogs are taught to
 hunt just as the males are, and one can see no difference in the
 training of mares, if they are expected to do a horse's work, and
 the training of stallions. In the case of man, however, it would
 seem to be felt necessary to employ some special and exceptional
 training and education for males over females, as if it were not
 essential that the same virtues should be present in both alike,
 in man and woman, or as if it were possible to arrive at the
 same virtues, not through the same, but through different instruc-
 tion. And yet that there is not one set of virtues for a man and
 another for a woman is easy to perceive. In the first place, a
 man must have understanding and so must a woman, or what
 pray would be the use of a foolish man or woman? Then it is
 essential for one no less than the other to live justly, since the
 man who is not just would not be a good citizen, and the woman
 would not manage her household well if she did not do it justly;
 but if she is unjust she will wrong her husband like Eriphyle in
 the story. Again, it is recognized as right for a woman in wed-
 lock to be chaste, and so is it likewise for a man; the law, at all
 events, decrees the same punishment for committing adultery as
 for being taken in adultery. Gluttony, drunkenness, and other
 related vices, which are vices of excess and bring disgrace upon
 those guilty of them, show that self-control is most necessary for
 every human being, male and female alike; for the only way of
 escape from wantonness is through self-control; there is no other.
 Perhaps someone may say that courage is a virtue appropriate
 to men only. That is not so. For a woman too of the right sort
 must have courage and be wholly free of cowardice, so that she
 will neither be swayed by hardships nor by fear; otherwise, how
 will she be said to have self-control, if by threat or force she can
 be constrained to yield to shame? Nay more, it is necessary for
 women to be able to repel attack, unless indeed they are willing
 to appear more cowardly than hens and other female birds which
 fight with creatures much larger than themselves to defend their
 young. How then should women not need courage? That women
 have some prowess in arms the race of the Amazons demon-
 strated when they defeated many tribes in war. If, therefore,
 something of this courage is lacking in other women, it is due
 to lack of use and practice rather than because they were not

16 The story of Eriphyle, who betrayed her husband Amphiaras for the sake of a necklace, was commonly cited by the Stoic-Cynic philosophers as the supreme example of treachery. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* II, 22, 32 f.
 22 The Greek word for courage (*ἀνδρεία*) means manliness. Apparently Musonius' attempt to justify its appropriate application to women is not

mere rhetoric, for Plutarch in his long treatise on the *Bravery of Women* (*Moralia* III, pp. 474-580 ed. Babbitt) 242E consistently avoids using the word, and is obliged to use the general word for virtue (*ἀρετή*).

33 He may have in mind a passage from Plato, *De Leg.* VII, 804D.

αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν ἀρετὰς ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα
καὶ τροφήν καὶ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν προσήκειν ἀμφοῖν. παντὶ γὰρ
δὴ ζῷον καὶ φυτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τὴν προσαγομένην ὁρθῶς ἐμποιεῖν
χρὴ τὴν ἐκείνῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἔδει αὐλεῖν δύνασθαι
5 παραπλησίως ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' ἐκατέρῳ αὐτοῖν
ἀναγκαῖον ἦν πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀμφοτέροισι ἂν ἐπ' ἴσον τὴν αὐλητικὴν
τέχνην ἐξεδιδάσκομεν, καὶ εἰ κιθαρίζειν ἔδει ἐκάτερον ἀμφοτέροισι
δὲ εἰ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν
καὶ φρονεῖν ὁμοίως δύνασθαι καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀνδρείας μετέχειν
10 καὶ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲν ἥττον θατέρου θάτερον, οὐκ ἄρ' ὁμοίως
ἐκάτερον παιδεύσομεν οὐδὲ τὴν τέχνην, ἀφ' ἧς γένοιτ' ἂν ἄνθρωπος
ἀγαθός, ἐπ' ἴσον ἀμφοτέροισι διδάξομεν; ἀλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν
καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρως. τί οὖν; καὶ ταλασίαν; φησὶ τις ἴσως ἄξιόις
σύ παραπλησίως ἐκμανθάνειν ταῖς γυναιξίν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ
15 γυμναστικὴν μετέρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίως τὰς γυναικάς;
τοῦτο μὲν οὐκέτι ἀξιῶσω ἐγώ. φημὶ δὲ ὅτι οὔσης ἐν τῷ γένει <τῷ>
ἀνθρωπίνῳ τῆς μὲν ἰσχυροτέρας φύσεως τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, τῆς δ'
ἀσθενοτέρας τῆς τῶν θηλειῶν, ἐκατέρᾳ φύσει τῶν ἔργων ἀπονεμη-
τέον τὰ προσφορώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις
20 ἀποδοτέον, τὰ δὲ ἐλαφρότερα τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις· διὰ τοῦτο ταλασία
μὲν ταῖς γυναιξὶ μᾶλλον πρόποι ἂν ἥπερ ἀνδράσιν, ὥσπερ <καὶ>
οἰκουρία· γυμναστικὴ δὲ ἀνδράσι μᾶλλον ἢ γυναιξίν, ὥσπερ καὶ
θυραυλία· ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ ἄνδρες τινὲς τῶν ἐλαφροτέρων ἔργων
ἕνια καὶ δοκούντων γυναικείων μεταχειρίζονται ἂν εἰκότως, καὶ
25 γυναικες αὖ τῶν σκληροτέρων καὶ δοκούντων μᾶλλον προσήκειν
ἀνδράσιν ἐργάζασθαι ἂν, ὅταν ἢ τὰ τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ὑψηγῇται
ἢ τὰ τῆς χρείας ἢ τὰ τοῦ καιροῦ. πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἐν κοινῷ
κεῖται τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἔργα καὶ ἔστι κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποτακτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ἑτέρῳ· ἕνια δὲ δὴ ἐπιτηδειότερα
30 τὰ μὲν τῇδε τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ τῇδε· δι' ὃ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεία καλεῖται,
τὰ δὲ γυναικεία· ὅσα μέντοι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει εἰς ἀρετὴν, ταῦτα
φαίη τις ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐπ' ἴσον ἐκατέρᾳ προσήκειν φύσει, εἴ γε καὶ
τὰς ἀρετὰς προσήκειν φάμεν οὐδὲν τοῖς ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
ἑτέροις. ὅθεν εἰκότως οἶμαι καὶ παιδευτέον ὅσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν
35 παραπλησίως τό τε θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ νηπίων
εὐθὺς διδάκτεον, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δὲ κακὸν καὶ ταῦτόν
ἀμφοῖν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ τότε μὲν

endowed with it. If then men and women are born with the same virtues, the same type of training and education must, of necessity, befit both men and women. For with every animal and plant whatsoever, proper care must be bestowed upon it to produce the excellence appropriate to it. Is it not true that, if it were necessary under like circumstances for a man and a woman to be able to play the flute, and if, furthermore, both had to do so in order to earn a living, we should give them both exactly the same thorough training in flute playing; and similarly if it were necessary for either to play the harp? Well then, if it is necessary for both to be proficient in the virtue which is appropriate to a human being, that is for both to be able to have understanding, and self-control, and courage, and justice, the one no less than the other, shall we not teach them both alike the art by which a human being becomes good? Yes, certainly we must do that and nothing else. "Come now," I suppose someone will say, "do you expect that men should learn spinning the same as women, and that women should take part in gymnastic exercises the same as men?" No, that I should not demand. But I do say that, since in the human race man's constitution is stronger and woman's weaker, tasks should be assigned which are suited to the nature of each; that is the heavier tasks should be given to the stronger and lighter ones to the weaker. Thus spinning and indoor work would be more fitting for women than for men, while gymnastics and outdoor work would be more suitable for men. Occasionally, however, some men might more fittingly handle certain of the lighter tasks and what is generally considered women's work, and again, women might do heavier tasks which seem more appropriate for men whenever conditions of strength, need, or circumstance warranted. For all human tasks, I am inclined to believe, are a common obligation and are common for men and women, and none is necessarily appointed for either one exclusively, but some pursuits are more suited to the nature of one, some to the other, and for this reason some are called men's work and some women's. But whatever things have reference to virtue, these one would properly say are equally appropriate to the nature of both, inasmuch as we agree that virtues are in no respect more fitting for the one than the other. Hence I hold it reasonable that the things which have reference to virtue ought to be taught to male and female alike; and furthermore that straight from infancy they ought to be taught that this is right and that is wrong, and that it is the same for both alike; that this is helpful, that is harmful, that one must do this, one must not do that. From this training understanding

πρακτέον, τότε δὲ οὐ· ἐξ ὧν περιγίνεται φρόνησις τοῖς μανθά-
 νουσιν ὁμοίως κόραις καὶ κόροις, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφορώτερον τοῖς
 ἑτέροις· εἴτα δὲ ἐμποιητέον αἰδῶ πρὸς ἅπαν αἰσχρόν· ὧν ἐγγενομέ-
 νων ἀνάγκη σώφρονας εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. καὶ μὴν τὸν
 5 παιδευόμενον ὀρθῶς, ὅστις ἂν ᾗ, εἴτε ἄρρην εἴτε θήλειαν, ἐθιστέον
 μὲν ἀνέχεσθαι πόνου, ἐθιστέον δὲ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θάνατον, ἐθιστέον
 δὲ μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι πρὸς συμφορὰν μηδεμίαν δι' ὅσων ἂν τις
 εἴη ἀνδρείος. ἀνδρείας δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείχθη δεῖν μετεῖναι
 καὶ γυναιξίν. ἔτι τοίνυν πλεονεξίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἰσότητά δὲ τιμᾶν,
 10 καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα
 ἀνθρώπους, ἔστι μὲν δίδαγμα κάλλιστον καὶ δικαίους ἐπιτελεῖ τοὺς
 μανθάνοντας· τί δὲ μᾶλλον ἄνδρα μεμαθηκέναι χρή ταῦτα; εἰ γὰρ
 νῆ Δία πρέπει δικαίως εἶναι γυναῖκας, καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ μεμαθηκέναι
 ἅμω τά γε κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα. εἰ γὰρ τί πον καὶ μικρὸν ὁ
 15 μὲν εἴσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐ, ἡ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ μὲν εἴσεται, ὁ δὲ οὐ, τεχνίτου
 τινὸς ἐχόμενον, οὕτω τοῦτο διάφορον ἀποφαίνει τὴν ἑκατέρου
 παιδείαν· μόνον περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἕτερος ἕτερα μεμαθη-
 κέτω, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά. ἂν δὲ τις ἐρωτᾷ με, τίς ἐπιστήμη τῆς παιδείας
 ταύτης ἐπιστατεῖ, λέξω πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι φιλοσοφίας ἀνευ ὥσπερ
 20 ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν οὐδέις, οὕτως οὐδ' ἂν γυνὴ παιδευθεῖη ὀρθῶς. καὶ οὐ
 τοῦτο βούλομαι λέγειν, ὅτι τρανότητά περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότητά
 τινα περιττὴν χρή προσεῖναι ταῖς γυναιξίν, εἴπερ φιλοσοφήσουσιν
 ὡς γυναῖκες· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐγὼ πάνυ τι τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ·
 25 ἄλλ' ὅτι ἥθους χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκάγαθίαν τρόπου κτητέον ταῖς
 γυναιξίν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκάγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτηδέυσις
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

V.

ΛΤΚΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΩΝ

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΤ ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΘΟΣ

Η ΛΟΓΟΣ.

30

Αὐθις ἐνέπεσεν ἡμῖν ζήτησις πότερον ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς
 κτήσιν ἀρετῆς ἔθος ἢ λόγος, εἰ ὁ μὲν λόγος διδάσκει ὀρθῶς τί εἴη

32 λόγος <εἴη> Hense

27 The name of the editor, Lucius, appears in the title of this treatise alone. Cf. Introduction note 15.

is developed in those who learn, boys and girls alike, with no difference. Then they must be inspired with a feeling of shame toward all that is base. When these two qualities have been created within them, man and woman are of necessity self-controlled. And most of all the child who is trained properly, whether boy or girl, must be accustomed to endure hardship, not to fear death, not to be disheartened in the face of any misfortune; he must in short be accustomed to every situation which calls for courage. Now courage, it was demonstrated above, should be present in women too. Furthermore to shun selfishness and to have high regard for fairness and, being a human being, to wish to help and to be unwilling to harm one's fellow men is the noblest lesson, and it makes those who learn it just. What reason is there why it is more appropriate for a man to learn this? Certainly if it is fitting for women to be just, it is necessary for both to learn the same lessons which are in the highest degree appropriate to the character of each and supremely important. If it happens that a man knows a little something about a certain skill and a woman not, or again she knows something and he not, that suggests no difference in the education of either. But about the all-important things let not one know and the other not, but let them know the same things. If you ask me what doctrine produces such an education, I shall reply that as without philosophy no man would be properly educated, so no woman would be. I do not mean that women should possess technical skill and acuteness in argument. It would be quite superfluous, since they will use philosophy for the ends of their life as women. Even in men I do not prize this accomplishment too highly. I only urge that they should acquire from philosophy goodness in conduct and nobility of character. Now in very truth philosophy is training in nobility of character and nothing else.

V

WHICH IS MORE EFFECTIVE, THEORY OR PRACTICE?

At another time the problem arose among us whether for the acquisition of virtue practice or theory is more effective, under-

32 The word ἔθος which has been translated 'practice' is puzzling. Musonius seems to have in mind some practical school exercise as contrasted with pure theory (λόγος); for conduct in daily life he generally uses πράξις.

ποιητέον, τὸ δὲ ἔθος γίνουτο κατὰ τοιοῦτον λόγον πράττειν ἐθιζομένων. τῷ δὲ Μουσωνίῳ τὸ ἔθος ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνυσιμώτερον, καὶ συνηγορῶν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἤρετο τῶν παρόντων τινὰ οὕτως· Δυοῖν ὄντων ἰατροῖν, τοῦ μὲν ἱκανοῦ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱατρικῶν ὡς
 5 ὅτι ἐμπειρότατα, περὶ δὲ θεραπείαν τῶν καμνόντων μηδὲν τετριμμένου, τοῦ δ' εἰπεῖν μὲν ἀδυνάτου, θεραπεύειν δ' εἰθισμένου κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἱατρικόν, πότερον, ἔφη, μᾶλλον ἔλοιο ἂν παρῆναι σοι νοσοῦντι; Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο, <ὅτι> τὸν θεραπεύειν εἰθισμένον. Καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος· Τί δέ; δυοῖν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ μὲν πέπλευκός τις
 10 πολλάκις καὶ κυβερνήσαντος ἤδη πλοῖα ἱκανά, τοῦ δὲ ὀλιγάκις μὲν πέπλευκός τις, κυβερνήσαντος δὲ μηδέποτε· ἂν οὗτος ὁ μὴ κυβερνήσας ἱκανώτατα λέγῃ ὅν τρόπον χρὴ κυβερνᾶν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἐνδεῶς καὶ παντάπασιν ἀσθενῶς, ποτέρῳ ἂν πλέων χρήσαιο κυβερνήτῃ; Καὶ ὁς εἶπεν, ὅτι τῷ κυβερνήσαντι πολλάκις. Πάλιν
 15 ὁ Μουσώνιος· Μουσικῶν δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ἐπισταμένου τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ λέγοντος αὐτοὺς πιθανώτατα, ἄδειν δὲ ἢ κιθαρίζειν ἢ λυρίζειν ἀδυνατοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ περὶ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ὄντος ἡττονος, κιθαρίζοντος δὲ καλῶς καὶ λυρίζοντος, ἔτι δὲ ἄδοντος· ποτέρῳ ἂν ἐπιτρέψαις ἔργον μουσικόν, ἢ πότερον ἂν
 20 ἐθέλοις γενέσθαι διδάσκαλον τῶν μουσικῶν παιδὸς οὐκ εἰδότης; Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι τὸν ἐκ τοῖς <ἔργοις> ἱκανόν. Τί οὖν; εἶπεν ὁ Μουσώνιος, ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῇ ἔχει· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης ἢ ἐγκρατείας τοῦ ἂ χρὴ δύνασθαι λέγειν οὐ πολὺ κρεῖττον τὸ ἐγκρατῆ γενέσθαι καὶ σώφρονα περὶ τὰ πραττόμενα πάντα; Συνεχώρει
 25 κἀνταῦθα ὁ νεανίσκος, ἡττον καὶ φαυλότερον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονέειν ἔργῳ τὸ λέγειν περὶ σωφροσύνης ἱκανῶς. Ὅθεν ὁ Μουσώνιος συνάπτων τοῖς προειρημένους, πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔφη, τὸ τὸν ἐκάστου λόγον ἐπίστασθαι πράγματος κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐθίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τοῦ λόγου;
 30 ἐπεὶπερ τὸ μὲν ἔθος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πράττειν ἄγει, τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι λέγειν. συνεργεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῇ πράξει ὁ λόγος διδάσκων ὅπως πρακτέον

21 Unless one bears in mind the background against which they are told, these examples seem altogether too simple and obvious to be worthy of Musonius. Apparently he has developed the thesis that theory is more effective than practice to combat the influence of the older sophists who professed to talk better on any subject than the experts in that field. Cicero (*De Oratore* II, 75) illustrates the pretentious claims of the sophists by his story of the philosopher Phormio. The presumptuous fellow had the temerity to give a discourse on military strategy, though he had never even seen an army or a camp, before the exiled Hannibal

standing that theory teaches what is right conduct, while practice represents the habit of those accustomed to act in accordance with such theory. To Musonius, practice seemed to be more effective, and speaking in support of his opinion, he asked one of those present the following question: "Suppose that there are two physicians, one able to discourse very brilliantly about the art of medicine but having no experience in taking care of the sick, and the other quite incapable of speaking but experienced in treating his patients according to correct medical theory. Which one," he asked, "would you choose to attend you if you were ill?" He replied that he would choose the doctor who had experience in healing. Musonius then continued, "Well, then, let us take another example of two men. One has sailed a great deal and served as pilot on many boats, the other one has sailed very little and has never acted as pilot. If the one who had never piloted a ship should speak most ably on the methods of navigation, and the other very poorly and ineffectively, which one would you employ as pilot if you were going on a voyage?" The man said he would take the experienced pilot. Again Musonius said, "Take the case of two musicians. One knows the theory of music and discourses on it most convincingly but is unable to sing or play the harp or the lyre; the other is inferior in theory but is proficient in playing the harp and the lyre and in singing as well. To which one would you give a position as musician, or which one would you like to have as teacher for a child who does not know music?" The man answered that he would choose the one who was skilled in practice. "Well, then," said Musonius, "that being the case, in the matter of temperance and self-control, is it not much better to be self-controlled and temperate in all one's actions than to be able to say what one ought to do?" Here too the young man agreed that it is of less significance and importance to speak well about self-control than to practice self-control. Thereupon Musonius, drawing together what had been said, asked, "How, now, in view of these conclusions, could knowledge of the theory of anything be better than becoming accustomed to act according to the principles of the theory, if we understand that application enables one to act, but theory makes one capable of speaking about it? Theory which teaches how one should act is related to application, and comes first, since it is not possible to do anything really well unless its practical execution be in

in Ephesus. The rest of the audience was thoroughly delighted, but Hannibal remarked that he had seen a good many crazy people in his life, but never any one crazier than Phormio.

καὶ ἔστι τῇ τάξει πρότερος τοῦ ἔθους· οὐ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναί τι καλὸν οἶόν τε μὴ κατὰ λόγον ἐθιζόμενον· δυνάμει μέντοι τὸ ἔθος προτερεῖ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἔστι κυριώτερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἄγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ περὶ ὁ λόγος.

VI.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΣΚΗΣΕΩΣ.

Παρώρμα δὲ πρὸς ἄσκησιν τοὺς συνόντας ἐντεταμένως ἀεὶ τοιοῦσδὲ τισι λόγοις χρώμενος. Ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἔφη, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν οὐ θεωρητικὴ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρακτικὴ καθάπερ ἢ τε ἰατρικὴ καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ. δεῖ οὖν ὥσπερ τὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν μὴ μόνον ἀνειληφέναι τὰ θεωρήματα τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γεγυμνάσθαι πράττειν κατὰ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μὴ μόνον ἐκμανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήματα φέρει πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι κατὰ ταῦτα φιλοτίμως καὶ φιλό-
 15 πόνως. ἐπεὶ πῶς μὲν ἂν εὐθὺς γένοιτό τις σώφρων, εἰ μόνον εἰδείη ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἡττάσθαι ἡδονῶν, ἀγύμναστος δ' εἴη ἀντέχειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς; πῶς δ' ἂν δίκαιός τις γένοιτο, μεμαθηκὼς μὲν ὅτι χρὴ τὸ ἴσον ἀγαπᾶν, μὴ μεμελετηκὼς δὲ φεύγειν τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν; πῶς δ' ἂν ἀνδρείαν κτησαίμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι μὴ φοβερὰ τὰ δοκούντα τοῖς
 20 πολλοῖς δεινὰ κατανενοηκότες, ἄφοβοι δ' εἶναι εἰς αὐτὰ μὴ μεμελετηκότες; πῶς δ' ἂν φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τίνα ἐστὶν ἐγνωκότες, μὴ γεγυμνασμένοι δὲ καταφρονεῖν τῶν δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν; διὸ χρὴ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν προσηκόντων ἀρετῇ ἐκάστη μαθημάτων καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπακολουθεῖν πάντως,
 25 εἴ γε μέλλει καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μαθήσεως ὄφελός τι γενήσεσθαι ἡμῖν. καὶ τοσοῦτω γε χρὴ μᾶλλον ἀσκεῖν τὸν φιλοσοφεῖν ἀξιοῦντα ἢ περ τὸν ἰατρικῆς ἢ τινος τέχνης ὁμοίας ἐφιέμενον, ὅσω μείζον καὶ δυσκατεργαστότερον φιλοσοφία παντὸς ἐπιτηδύματος ἐτέρου. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας † εἶναι οἱ ἐφιέμενοι αὐτῶν, οὐ
 30 προδιεφθαρμένοι τὰς ψυχὰς οὐδ' ἐναντία μεμαθηκότες οἷς μαθήσεσθαι μέλλουσιν· οἱ δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντες, ἐν διαφθορᾷ γεγεννημένοι πρότερον πολλῇ καὶ ἐμπεπλησμένοι κακίας, οὕτω

8 Musonius here identifies himself with the philosophers who, following the example of Plato, believe that virtue can be taught.

harmony with theory. In effectiveness, however, practice takes precedence over theory as being more influential in leading men to action."

VI

ON TRAINING

He was always earnestly urging those who were associated with him to make practical application of his teachings, using some such arguments as the following. Virtue, he said, is not simply theoretical knowledge, but it is practical application as well, just like the arts of medicine and music. Therefore, as the physician and the musician not only must master the theoretical side of their respective arts but must also train themselves to act according to their principles, so a man who wishes to become good not only must be thoroughly familiar with the precepts which are conducive to virtue but must also be earnest and zealous in applying these principles. How, indeed, could a person immediately become temperate if he only knew that one must not be overcome by pleasures, but was quite unpracticed in withstanding pleasures? How could one become just when he had learned that one must love fairness but had never exercised himself in avoidance of selfishness and greed? How could we acquire courage if we had merely learned that the things which seem dreadful to the average person are not to be feared, but had no experience in showing courage in the face of such things? How could we become prudent if we had come to recognize what things are truly good and what evil, but had never had practice in despising things which only seem good? Therefore upon the learning of the lessons appropriate to each and every excellence, practical training must follow invariably, if indeed from the lessons we have learned we hope to derive any benefit. And moreover such practical exercise is the more important for the student of philosophy than for the student of medicine or any similar art, the more philosophy claims to be a greater and more difficult discipline than any other study. The reason for this is that men who enter the other professions have not had their souls corrupted beforehand and have not learned the opposite of what they are going to be taught, but the ones who start out to study philosophy have been born and reared in an environment filled with corruption and evil, and therefore turn to virtue in such a state that they need a longer and more thorough training. How, then, and in what manner should they receive such training? Since it so happens that the human being is not soul alone, nor

μετίασι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ πλείονος δεηθῆναι τῆς ἀσκήσεως. πῶς οὖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον τούτοις ἀσκητέον; ἐπεὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ψυχὴν μόνον εἶναι συμβέβηκεν οὔτε σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι σύνθετον ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν τούτων, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀσκούντα
 5 ἀμφοῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τοῦ μὲν κρείττονος μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἄξιον, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ θατέρου δέ, εἴ γε μέλλει μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα παρεσκευάσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τὰ σώματος ἔργα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφούντος, ὅτι πολλάκις αἱ ἀρεταὶ καταχρῶνται τούτῳ ὄντι ὀργάνῳ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ
 10 βίου πράξεις. τῆς οὖν ἀσκήσεως ἡ μὲν τις ἰδία τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης γίνουσι· ἂν ὀρθῶς, ἡ δέ τις κοινὴ ταύτης τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος. κοινὴ μὲν οὖν ἀσκησις ἀμφοῖν γενήσεται, συννεθιζομένων ἡμῶν ῥίγει, θάλπει, δίδκει, λιμῶ, τροφῆς λιτότητι, κοίτης σκληρότητι, ἀποχῇ τῶν ἡδέων, ὑπομονῇ τῶν ἐπιπόνων. διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τῶν
 15 τοιούτων ῥώννυται μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γίνεται δυσπαθές τε καὶ στερεὸν καὶ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον, ῥώννυται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ γυμναζομένη διὰ μὲν τῆς ὑπομονῆς τῶν ἐπιπόνων πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀποχῆς τῶν ἡδέων πρὸς σωφροσύνην. ἰδία δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσκήσις ἐστὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἀποδείξεις προχείρους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς τε περὶ
 20 τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δοκούντων ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν κακῶν τῶν δοκούντων ὡς οὐ κακά, καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ γνωρίζειν τε καὶ διακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀληθῶς ἐθίζεσθαι· εἰτα δὲ μελετᾶν μήτε φεύγειν μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν μήτε διώκειν μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῶς κακὰ πάσῃ μηχανῇ
 25 ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ μετέρχεσθαι.

Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν εἴρηται, ὁποῖος ἑκάτερος τρόπος ἀσκήσεως· οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ὡς ποιητέον ἕκαστα, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν, οὐ διακρίνων οὐδὲ χωρίζων οὐκέτι τὰ τε κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀσκήματα καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ
 30 ἀναμιξὶ τὰ ἑκάτερον μέρους διεξιῶν. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μὲν τυγχάνομεν ἀκηκοότες τε καὶ ὑπειληφότες, ὅσοι γε φιλοσόφου διατριβῆς μετεσχέκαμεν, ὡς οὔτε πόνος οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε πενία κακὸν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένων, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος, ζωὴ, ἡδονή, ἢ τι ἕτερον τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων
 35 ἀρετῆς· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ταῦθ' ὑπειληφότες διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ παίδων εὐθὺς γεγонуῖαν ἡμῖν διαφθορὰν καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς διαφθορᾶς συνήθειαν πονηρὰν πόνου μὲν προσερχομένου κακὸν ἡγούμεθα προσέρχεσθαι

4-18 Unlike his pupil Epictetus, who showed contempt for the body, Musonius emphasizes the interdependence of soul and body. This view,

body alone, but a kind of synthesis of the two, the person in training must take care of both, the better part, the soul, more zealously, as is fitting, but also of the other, if he shall not be found lacking in any part that constitutes man. For obviously the philosopher's body should be well prepared for physical activity, because often the virtues make use of this as a necessary instrument for the affairs of life. Now there are two kinds of training, one which is appropriate for the soul alone, and the other which is common to both soul and body. We use the training common to both when we discipline ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, meagre rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and patience under suffering. For by these things and others like them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring hardship, sturdy and ready for any task; the soul too is strengthened since it is trained for courage by patience under hardship and for self-control by abstinence from pleasures. Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing that the proofs pertaining to apparent goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand and likewise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils, and in learning to recognize the things which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish them from what are not truly good. In the next place it consists of practice in not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil, and in not pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in shunning by every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by every means those which are truly good.

In summary, then, I have tried to tell what the nature of each type of training is. I shall not, however, endeavor to discuss how the training should be carried out in detail, by analyzing and distinguishing what is appropriate for the soul and the body in common and what is appropriate for the soul alone, but by presenting without fixed order what is proper for each. It is true that all of us who have participated in philosophic discussion have heard and apprehended that neither pain nor death nor poverty nor anything else which is free from wrong is an evil, and again that wealth, life, pleasure, or anything else which does not partake of virtue is not a good. And yet, in spite of understanding this, because of the depravity which has become implanted in us straight from childhood and because of evil habits engendered by this depravity, when hardship comes we think an evil has come upon us, and when pleasure comes our way we

wholly consistent with the true Stoic pantheism, is not alien to Neoplatonic thought.

ἐαυτοῖς, ἡδονῆς δὲ παραγινόμενης ἀγαθὸν ἡγούμεθα παραγίνεσθαι
 ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ὡς ἐσχάτην συμφορὰν πεφρίκαμεν, τὴν
 δὲ ζωὴν ὡς τῶν ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον ἀσπαζόμεθα, καὶ διδόντες
 μὲν ἀργύριον ὡς βλαπτόμενοι λυπούμεθα, λαμβάνοντες δὲ ὡς
 5 ὠφελοῦμενοι χαίρομεν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλείονων ἄλλων
 οὐκ ἀκολουθῶς ταῖς ὁρθαῖς ὑπολήψεσι τοῖς πράγμασι χρώμεθα,
 τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ ἔθει μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦμεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτα φημὶ
 ταύτῃ ἔχειν, δεῖ τὸν ἀσκοῦντα ζητεῖν περιγίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ τῇ
 μὲν ἡδονῇ μὴ ἀσμενίζειν, τὸν πόνον δὲ μὴ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, καὶ τῷ
 10 μὲν ζῆν μὴ φιληδεῖν, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μὴ δεδιέναι, καὶ ἐπὶ χρημάτων
 μὴ προτιμᾶν τοῦ προέσθαι τὸ λαμβάνειν.

VII.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΠΟΝΟΤ ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΕΟΝ.

15 Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ῥᾶον καὶ προθυμότερον ὑφίστασθαι τῶν πόνων
 ἐκείνους, οὓς ἂν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς καὶ καλοκάγαθίας μέλλωμεν πονεῖν,
 ταῦτα λελογίσθαι χρήσιμα· πόσα μὲν ποιοῦσιν ἔνιοι δι' ἐπιθυμίας
 κακὰς, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐρῶντες ἀκολάστως, πόσα δ' ὑπομένουσιν ἄλλοι
 τοῦ κερδαίνειν χάριν, πόσα δ' αὖτε κακοπαθοῦσιν ἔνιοι θηρώμενοι
 20 δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες ὑπομένουσιν αὐθαίρετοι πᾶσαν
 τάλαιπωρίαν. ἂρ' οὖν οὐχὶ δεινὸν ἐκείνους μὲν ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς τῶν
 καλῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ταῦτα πάσχοντας, ἡμᾶς δ' ὑπὲρ καλοκάγαθίας
 καὶ τοῦ κακίαν μὲν ἐκφυγεῖν τὴν λυμαινομένην ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, κτή-
 σασθαι δὲ ἀρετὴν, ἣ τις ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ χορηγός, μὴ
 25 πάντα πόνον ἐτοίμως ὑφίστασθαι; καίτοι οὐδ' ἂν εἴποι τις ὅσῳ
 κρεῖττον ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ πονεῖν ἵνα τύχη τις γυναικὸς ἀλλοτρίας, τὸ
 πονεῖν ἵνα παιδαγωγῇ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ
 περὶ χρημάτων τάλαιπωρεῖν τὸ ἀσκεῖν ὥστε ὀλίγων δέεσθαι· πρὸ
 δὲ τοῦ πράγματα ἔχειν ὑπὲρ δόξης τὸ παραγματεύεσθαι ὅπως μὴ

20 καὶ ὅτι codd. Wendland καίτοι Hense

18 Intemperate lovers furnish a great deal of the humor and suspense
 in the plays of the Greek New Comedy and in Plautus and Terence.

think that a good has befallen us; we dread death as the most
 extreme misfortune; we cling to life as the greatest blessing, and
 when we give away money we grieve as if we were injured, but
 upon receiving it we rejoice as if a benefit had been conferred.
 Similarly with the majority of other things, we do not meet cir-
 cumstances in accordance with right principles, but rather we
 follow wretched habit. Since, then, I repeat, all this is the case,
 the person who is in training must strive to habituate himself not
 to love pleasure, not to avoid hardship, not to be infatuated with
 living, not to fear death, and in the case of goods or money not
 to place receiving above giving.

VII

THAT ONE SHOULD DISDAIN HARDSHIPS

In order to support more easily and more cheerfully those
 hardships which we may expect to suffer in behalf of virtue and
 goodness, it is useful to recall what hardships people will endure
 for unworthy ends. Thus for example consider what intemperate
 lovers undergo for the sake of evil desires, and how much exertion
 others expend for the sake of making profit, and how much
 suffering those who are pursuing fame endure, and bear in mind
 that all of these people submit to all kinds of toil and hardship
 voluntarily. Is it not then monstrous that they for no honorable
 reward endure such things, while we for the sake of the ideal
 good—that is not only the avoidance of evil such as wrecks our
 lives, but also the acquisition of virtue, which we may call the
 provider of all goods—are not ready to bear every hardship?
 And yet would not anyone admit how much better it is, in place
 of exerting oneself to win someone else's wife, to exert oneself
 to discipline one's desires; in place of enduring hardships for the
 sake of money, to train oneself to want little; instead of giving
 oneself trouble about getting notoriety, to give oneself trouble
 how not to thirst for notoriety; instead of trying to find a way
 to injure an envied person, to inquire how not to envy anyone;

They are a target for the satirist. Cf. Horace, *Sat.* II, 3, 259-267; Persius
Sat. V, 161-175; Epictetus, *Disc.* IV, 1, 19-20.

19 Horace develops this theme in his first satire.

22 That there are some persons of noble nature who do willingly
 endure hardships to gain moral excellence is testified by Dio Chrysostom.
 Cf. *Orationes* VIII, 15.

δοξοκόπος ἢ· πρὸ δέ γε τοῦ ζητεῖν, ὅπως ᾧ φθονεῖ τις κακοποιήσῃ
 τοῦτον, τὸ σκοπεῖν ὅπως μηδὲν φθονήσῃ μηδενί· καὶ πρὸ γε τοῦ
 δουλεύειν τισὶ καλουμένοις φίλοις, ὥσπερ οἱ κόλακες, τὸ κακοπα-
 θεῖν ἵνα κτήσῃται φίλους ἀληθινούς. καθόλου δὲ τοῦ πονεῖν πᾶσιν
 5 ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαίου ὄντος, τοῖς τε τῶν κρειττόνων ὀρεγομένοις
 καὶ τοῖς τῶν χειρόνων, τὸ μὴ πολλῶ εἶναι προθυμότερους πονεῖν
 τοὺς τὰ κρείττω μετιόντας <ἢ> οἷς ἐλπίδες μικραὶ τῶν πόνων εἰσίν,
 ἀτοπώτατον. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρα θαυματοποιοὶ δύσκολα οὕτως
 ὑφίστανται πράγματα καὶ τὴν ζωὴν παραβάλλονται τὴν ἑαυτῶν,
 10 οἱ μὲν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστῶντες, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κάλων μέτῳροι βαδί-
 ζοντες, οἱ δ' ὥσπερ ὄρνεα πετόμενοι διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὧν τὸ σφάλμα
 θάνατός ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα πάντα δρῶσι μικροῦ χάριν μισθοῦ,
 ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ ἀνεξόμεθα ταλαιπωρεῖν ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ὅλης; οὐ
 γὰρ ἄλλο τί γε τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν
 15 καὶ ζῆν μακαρίως εἰς τὸ λοιπόν. εἰκότως δ' ἂν τις λογίζοιτο καὶ
 τὸ τῶν ζῴων ἐνίων ὁποῖόν ἐστι, πᾶν δὴ δυνάμενον ἐντρέπειν ἡμᾶς
 φιλοπόνους εἶναι. οἱ γοῦν ὀρτυγες καὶ ἀλεκτρύονες οὐτ' ἀρετῆς
 ἐπαίοντες οὐδὲν ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον
 εἰδότες οὐθ' ὑπὲρ τοιούτου πονοῦντες οὐθενός, ὅμως μαχόμενοι
 20 πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πηρούμενοι ἀνέχονται καὶ μέχρι θανάτου
 καρτεροῦσιν, ὥστε μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι θατέρου ὁ ἕτερος. πόσω δὴ
 μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνέχεσθαι τε καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὅταν ἐπιστώμεθα
 διὰ τι τῶν καλῶν κακοπαθοῦντες, ἢ ἵνα φίλοις βοηθήσωμεν ἢ
 πόλιν ὠφελήσωμεν ἢ ἵνα γυναικῶν ἢ τέκνων ὑπερμαχήσωμεν, τὸ
 25 δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ὦμεν καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ
 σώφρονες, ὃ δίχα πόνων οὐ παραγίνεται οὐδενί. ὅθεν ἔπεισί
 μοι λέγειν, ὡς ὁ μὴ θέλων πονεῖν σχεδὸν καταδικάζει αὐτὸς
 αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ ἄξιος, ὅτι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πόνῳ πάντα
 30 παρορμῶν τοὺς παρόντας πόνου καταφρονεῖν.

19 οὐθ' Elter οὐδ' Hense

7 Seneca corroborates the statement of the small remuneration which acrobats receive. Cf. *De ira* II, 12, 5.

8 Another picture of the hardships athletes suffer is drawn by Seneca. Cf. *Ep.* 78, 16.

10 Some of these performers are described by Athenaeus. Cf. *Deipnosophistae* IV, 129d.

and instead of slaving, as sycophants do, to win false friends, to undergo suffering in order to possess true friends? Now, since, in general, toil and hardship are a necessity for all men, both for those who seek the better ends and for those who seek the worse, it is preposterous that those who are pursuing the better are not much more eager in their efforts than those for whom there is small hope of reward for all their pains. Yet when we see acrobats face without concern their difficult tasks and risk their very lives in performing them, turning somersaults over up-turned swords or walking ropes set at a great height or flying through the air like birds, where one misstep means death, all of which they do for a miserably small recompense, shall we not be ready to endure hardship for the sake of complete happiness? For surely there is no other end in becoming good than to become happy and to live happily for the remainder of our lives. One might reasonably reflect upon characteristics even of certain animals which are very well calculated to shame us into endurance of hardships. At all events, cocks and quails, although they have no understanding of virtue as man has and know neither the good nor the just and strive for none of these things, nevertheless fight against each other and even when maimed stand up and endure until death so as not to submit the one to the other. How much more fitting, then, it is that we stand firm and endure, when we know that we are suffering for some good purpose, either to help our friends or to benefit our city, or to defend our wives and children, or, best and most imperative, to become good and just and self-controlled, a state which no man achieves without hardships. And so it remains for me to say that the man who is unwilling to exert himself almost always convicts himself as unworthy of good, since we gain every good by toil. These words and others like them he then spoke, exhorting and urging his listeners to look upon hardship with disdain.

17 Plutarch suggests that Nature has implanted fine instincts into animals with the express purpose of shaming man into goodness. Cf. *De Amore Proliis* (*Moralia* VI, p. 341 ed. Helmbold) 495A.

29 This epigram of Epicharmus is quoted by Xenophon, *Mem.* II, 1, 20.

VIII.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΤΕΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣΙΝ.

Εἰσελθόντος δέ ποτε ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν βασιλέων τινὸς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς
 5 Συρίας, ἦσαν γὰρ ἔτι τότε ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλεῖς Ῥωμαίων ὑπήκοοι,
 ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα. Μὴ οἴου, ἔφη,
 ἄλλω τινὶ μᾶλλον προσήκειν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ σοί, μὴδ' ἄλλου του
 χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι βασιλεὺς τυγχάνεις ὢν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δήπου
 10 δύνασθαι τὸν βασιλέα σφῆζειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ εὐεργετεῖν τὸν δέ
 γε σώσοντα καὶ εὐεργετήσοντα χρὴ ἐπίστασθαι τί μὲν ἀγαθὸν
 ἀνθρώπῳ τί δὲ κακόν, καὶ τί μὲν ὠφέλιμον τί δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ
 συμφέρον γε καὶ ἀσύμφορον· εἴ γε ἀπόλλυνται μὲν οἱ περιπίπτοντες
 τοῖς κακοῖς, σφῆζονται δὲ οἱ τυγχάνοντες τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εὐεργε-
 15 τοῦνται μὲν οἱ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ὠφελίμων καὶ συμφερόντων, κακο-
 ποιοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐμβαλλόμενοι τοῖς ἀσυμφόροις καὶ βλαβεροῖς.
 ἀγαθὸν μέντοι καὶ κακόν ἢ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον ἢ ὠφέλιμον
 καὶ βλαβερόν οὐκ ἄλλου του διαγινώσκειν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐστίν,
 20 ὃς αὐτὸ τοῦτο διατελεῖ πραγματευόμενος ὅπως μὴδὲ ἐν τούτων
 ἄγνοήσῃ, καὶ τέχνην πεποιήται ταύτην εἰδέναι τί φέρει πρὸς
 ἀνθρώπου εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ κακοδαιμονίαν. διὸ φαίνεται δεῖν τὸν
 βασιλέα φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ μὴν προσήκει μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ, μᾶλλον
 δ' ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τὰ δίκαια βραβεύειν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, ὡς
 μήτε πλεόν ἔχειν μήτε ἐλαττοῦσθαι μηδένα παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, ἀλλὰ
 25 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς ἀξίους. ταῦτα δὲ πῶς ποτε
 δυνήσεται ἂν τις δίκαιος οὐκ ὢν; δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ
 ἐπιστάμενος δικαιοσύνην, ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν; πάλιν οὖν καὶ ταύτῃ
 φιλοσοφητέον τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἂν
 30 ἄλλως φαίνοιτο γινούς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν. οὐ γὰρ οὐθ' ὡς οὐχ
 ὁ μαθὼν μᾶλλον εἰδήσει τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ μαθόντος ἔστιν εἰπεῖν,
 οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς εἰσι τῶν τοιούτων πάντες οἱ μὴ φιλοσοφή-
 σαντες. στασιάζουσι γοῦν καὶ πολεμοῦσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους, οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκοντες οἱ δὲ ἐκείνα δικαιότερα εἶναι.

4 The reference to the king from Syria furnishes a *terminus post quem* for the editing of the works of Musonius. There were no longer kings in Syria after 106 A. D.

VIII

THAT KINGS ALSO SHOULD STUDY PHILOSOPHY

When one of the kings from Syria once came to him (for at that time there were still kings in Syria, vassals of the Romans), amongst many other things he had to say to the man were the following words in particular. Do not imagine, he said, that it is more appropriate for anyone to study philosophy than for you, nor for any other reason than because you are a king. For the first duty of a king is to be able to protect and benefit his people, and a protector and benefactor must know what is good for a man and what is bad, what is helpful and what harmful, what advantageous and what disadvantageous, inasmuch as it is plain that those who ally themselves with evil come to harm, while those who cleave to good enjoy protection, and those who are deemed worthy of help and advantage enjoy benefits, while those who involve themselves in things disadvantageous and harmful suffer punishment. But to distinguish between good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, helpful and harmful is the part of none other than the philosopher, who constantly occupies himself with this very question, how not to be ignorant of any of these things, and has made it his art to understand what conduces to a man's happiness or unhappiness. Therefore it appears that the king should study philosophy. Furthermore it is fitting for a king, or rather it is an absolute necessity for him, to arbitrate justice as between subjects so that no one may have more or less than his just deserts, but may receive honor or punishment as he deserves. But how would anyone who was not just ever be able to manage this? And how would anyone ever be just if he did not understand the nature of justice? Here again is a reason the king should study philosophy, for without such study it would not be plain that he knew justice and the just. For one cannot deny either that the one who has learned it will understand justice better than the one who has not learned it, or that all who have not studied philosophy are ignorant of its nature. The truth of this statement appears from the fact that men disagree and contend with one another about justice, some saying that it is here, others that it is there. Yet about things of which men have knowledge there is no difference of opinion, as for example about white and black, or hot and cold, or soft and hard, but all think the same about them and use the same words. In just the same way they would agree about justice if they

καίτοι περί γε ὧν ἐπίστανται ἄνθρωποι, περὶ τούτων οὐ διαφέρονται· οὔτε περὶ λευκῶν ἢ μελάνων, ἢ θερμῶν ἢ ψυχρῶν, οὔτε περὶ μαλακῶν ἢ σκληρῶν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τούτων ἅπαντες φρονούσι τε καὶ λέγουσιν· ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ὁμονόουν 5 ἂν παραπλησίως, εἴπερ ἤδεσαν ἅ τινά ἐστιν· ἐν ᾧ δ' οὐχ ὁμο- νοούσιν, ἀγνοοῦντες φαίνονται. καὶ οὐδὲ σὺ ταύτης ἐκτὸς εἰ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ· ὅθεν ἐπιμελητέον σοι τῆς γνώσεως μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῶν, καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλον <ὅσῳ περ> αἷσχιον ἀνδρὶ βασιλεῖ ἢ ἰδιώτῃ εἶναι ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ δικαιοσύνης.

10 Ἐτι τοίνυν δεῖ μὲν τὸν βασιλέα σωφρονεῖν αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους σωφρονίζειν ἵν' ὁ μὲν ἄρχῃ σωφρόνως, οἱ δ' ἄρχωνται κοσμίως, μηδέτεροι δὲ τρυφῶσι· λυμαντικὸν γὰρ ἄρχοντός τε καὶ ἰδιώτου παντὸς ἡ τρυφή. πῶς δ' ἂν ἡ αὐτὸς σωφρονήσῃ τις μὴ μελετήσας κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὧν ἄλλους ποιήσῃ 15 σῶφρονας; τίς μέντοι ἐπιστήμη πρὸς σωφροσύνην ἄγει πλὴν φιλοσοφίας, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· αὕτη γὰρ διδάσκει μὲν ἐπάνω ἡδονῆς εἶναι, διδάσκει δ' ἐπάνω πλεονεξίας, διδάσκει δὲ ἀγαπᾶν εὐτέλειαν, διδάσκει δὲ φεύγειν πολυτέλειαν, ἐθίζει δ' αἰδῶ ἔχειν, ἐθίζει δὲ γλώττης κρατεῖν, τάξιν δὲ καὶ κόσμον καὶ εὐσχημοσύνην περιποιεῖ 20 καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν κινήσει καὶ σχέσει πρέπον. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ προσόντα παρέχεται σεμνὸν καὶ σῶφρονα αὐτόν. καὶ δὴ καὶ βασι- λεύς, ὅτῳ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, μάλιστα ἂν εἴη θεοπρεπής τε καὶ αἰδοῦς ἄξιος. τό γε μὴν ἄφοβον καὶ ἀνέκπληκτον καὶ θαρσαλέον ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρείας ἔργον, πῶς δ' ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξειεν 25 ἢ εἴ τις περὶ θανάτου καὶ πόνου λάβοι πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν ὡς οὐ κακοῖν ὄντοιν αὐτοῖν; ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐξιστάντα καὶ φοβούμεντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, ὃ τε θάνατος καὶ ὁ πόνος, ὅταν ὡς περὶ κακῶν πεπεισμένοι ᾧσιν αὐτῶν· μὴ κακὰ δ' εἶναι ταῦτα φιλοσοφία διδάσκει μόνη. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνδρείαν κτητέον τοῖς βασιλεῦσι, 30 κτητέον δὲ παντὸς <ότου> οὖν ἐτέρου μᾶλλον, ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐτέρως ἀνδρείοις γενομένοις. καὶ δὴ βασιλικὸν μὲν, εἴ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἀήττητον ἐν λόγῳ εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι κρατεῖν ὥσπερ ὅπλοις τῶν μαχομένων, οὕτω λόγοις <τῶν> διαλεγομένων ὡς ἂν γε ταύτῃ ἀσθενήσωσιν οἱ βασιλεῖς, 35 ἀνάγκη πολλάκις περιάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰ ψευδῆ ὡς ἀληθῆ προσέειπαι, ὅπερ ἀφροσύνης ἔργον καὶ ἀμαθίας τῆς ἐσχά- της. φιλοσοφία δ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τι <ἄλλο> μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτο παρέχειν τοῖς μετιούσιν αὐτὴν πέφυκεν, ὥστε περιεῖναι λόγῳ τῶν πλησίον καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχειν τὰ δὲ 40 βεβαιοῦν. οἱ γοῦν ῥήτορες ὁπόταν ἔλθωσιν εἰς ταῦτ' οἱς φιλο-

knew what it was, but in their very lack of agreement they reveal their ignorance. Indeed I am inclined to think that you are not far from such ignorance yourself, and you ought therefore more than anyone else to concern yourself with this knowledge, the more disgraceful it is for a king than for a private citizen to be ignorant about justice.

In the next place it is essential for the king to exercise self-control over himself and demand self-control of his subjects, to the end that with sober rule and seemly submission there shall be no wantonness on the part of either. For the ruin of the ruler and the citizen alike is wantonness. But how would anyone achieve self-control if he did not make an effort to curb his desires, or how could one who was undisciplined make others temperate? One can mention no study except philosophy that develops self-control. Certainly it teaches one to be above pleasure and greed, to admire thrift and to avoid extravagance; it trains one to have a sense of shame, and to control one's tongue, and it produces discipline, order, and courtesy, and in general what is fitting in action and in bearing. In an ordinary man when these qualities are present they give him dignity and self-command, but if they be present in a king they make him preeminently godlike and worthy of reverence.

Now, since fearlessness and intrepidity and boldness are the product of courage, how else would a man acquire them than by having a firm conviction that death and hardships are not evils? For these are the things, death and hardships, I repeat, which unbalance and frighten men when they believe that they are evils; that they are not evils philosophy is the only teacher. Consequently if kings ought to possess courage, and they more than anyone else should possess it, they must set themselves to the study of philosophy, since they cannot become courageous by any other means.

It is also the prerogative of kings (if they enjoy any whatever) to be invincible in reason and to be able to prevail over disputants by their arguments, just as over their enemies by their arms. Thus when kings are weak in this, it stands to reason that often they are misled and forced to accept the false as the true, which is the price of folly and dense ignorance. Now philosophy by its nature confers upon its devotees perhaps more than anything else the ability to remain superior to others in debate, to distinguish the false from the true, and to refute the one and to confirm the other. Professional speakers, at any rate, whenever they enter into the give and take of argument with philosophers one can see confused and confounded and obliged to contradict

- σοφοῖς καὶ διδῶσι καὶ λαμβάνωσι λόγον, ἔστιν ὁρᾶν αὐτοὺς συγκρουομένους ἀπορουμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαζομένους· καίτοι ὁπόταν οἱ ῥήτορες, οἱ τοῦτο πεποιημένοι ἔργον λόγους μελετᾶν, ἀσθενέστεροι περὶ λόγους ἀλίσκονται τῶν φιλοσόφων
- 5 ὄντες, τί χρὴ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνειν; ὅθεν εἴ τι νῦν βασιλεῖ ἔστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ κράτους, φιλοσοφητέον αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ δεδίη μηδὲ ταύτη μηδένα ὡς περιγενησόμενον αὐτοῦ, δέον ἀπανταχοῦ ἀδεῇ εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα καὶ θαρραλέον καὶ ἀήττητον.
- 10 Καθόλου δὲ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον καὶ τέλειον· εἴ περ δεῖ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει τοῖς παλαιοῖς, νόμον ἔμφυτον εἶναι, εὐνομίαν μὲν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν μηχανώμενον, ἀνομίαν δὲ καὶ στάσιν ἀπείργοντα, ζηλωτὴν δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ὄντα καὶ πατέρα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὥσπερ
- 15 ἐκείνον. τοιοῦτος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ φύσει τε διαφερούσης κεκρημένος παιδεῖαν τε τὴν ἀρίστην πεπαιδευμένος ἀρετὰς τε ἀπάσας ἔχων, ὅσαι περ ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσιν; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρα ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἢ ποδηγοῦσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν καὶ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μετιέναι τὰ καλὰ διδάσκουσα, παραβλητέον ἂν
- 20 εἴη καὶ συγκριτέον, εἴτε ἐκείνη εἴτε φιλοσοφία κρείττων καὶ ἀποχρῶσα μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἀποδείξαι βασιλέα· καὶ τῇ κρείττονι χρῶντ' ἂν εἰκότως ὁ βασιλεὺς βουλόμενός γε δὴ εἶναι ἀγαθός. εἰ δ' ἄλλη μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ὑπισχνέται τέχνη οὐδεμία παράδοσιν καὶ διδασκαλίαν ἀρετῆς, <ἀλλ' εἰσὶν> αἱ μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώ-
 25 πινον καὶ τὰ τούτῳ χρήσιμα πραγματευόμεναι μόνον, ὅσαι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφάπτονται, πάντα σκοπούμεναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅθεν αὐτῇ σωφρονήσῃ μόνῃ δὲ φιλοσοφία τοῦτο σκοπεῖται καὶ τοῦτο μηχανᾶται, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακίαν μὲν ἐκφύγοι, κτήσαιοτο δὲ ἀρετήν· εἰ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ἔχει, τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη βασιλεῖ τῷ γε ἀγαθῷ εἶναι
- 30 βουλομένῳ προνργιαίτερον τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν; μᾶλλον δὲ πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον δύναιτο ἂν τις βασιλεῦσαι ἢ βιῶναι καλῶς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὐθὺς καὶ φιλόσοφον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι καὶ τὸν γε φιλόσοφον εὐθὺς καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι.
- 35 Πρῶτον δὲ τὸ πρότερον θεασώμεθα. ἀρ' ἔσθ' ὅπως βασιλεὺς ἀγαθὸς εἴη τις ἂν μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς ὢν; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀγαθὸς δέ τις ἀνὴρ ὢν οὐ καὶ φιλόσοφος εἴη ἂν; νῆ Δία, εἴ γε

12 The concept of the king as the embodiment of Law is expressed in a number of writers, perhaps first in Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* VIII, 1, 22. Musonius' phrase νόμος ἐμψυχος 'living law' or 'law incarnate,' taken

themselves. And yet if such speakers, whose business it is to practice debate, are caught because they are inferior to the philosophers in argument, what is bound to happen to other men? Therefore if it is the ambition of anyone who is a king to be powerful in debate, he should study philosophy in order that he may not have to fear that anyone will prevail over him in this, for a king should be completely fearless and courageous and invincible.

In general it is of the greatest importance for the good king to be faultless and perfect in word and action, if, indeed, he is to be a "living law" as he seemed to the ancients, effecting good government and harmony, suppressing lawlessness and dissension, a true imitator of Zeus and, like him, father of his people. But how could anyone be such a king if he were not endowed with a superior nature, given the best possible education, and possessed of all the virtues which befit a man? If, then, there is any other knowledge which guides man's nature to virtue and teaches him to practice and associate with the good, it should be placed beside philosophy and compared with it to see whether it or philosophy is better and more capable of producing a good king. Then the man who wished to become a good king would be wise to use the better one. If, however, no other art professes the teaching and transmission of virtue, though there are some which are concerned solely with man's body and what is useful for it, while others which touch the mind aim at everything else but making it self-controlled, yet philosophy alone makes this its aim and occupies itself with this, how a man may avoid evil and acquire virtue, if this I say is so, what else would be more serviceable to a king who wished to be good than the study of philosophy? How better or how otherwise could a man be a good ruler or live a good life than by studying philosophy? For my part, I believe that the good king is straightway and of necessity a philosopher, and the philosopher a kingly person.

Of these two propositions let us examine the former: Is it possible for anyone to be a good king unless he is a good man? No, it is not possible. But given a good man, would he not be entitled to be called a philosopher? Most certainly, since philosophy is the pursuit of ideal good. Therefore a good king is found to be forthwith and of necessity a philosopher also. Now again that the philosopher is entirely kingly you may understand

possibly from Philo (*Moses* II, 1, 4, ed. Colson, VI, p. 452), was used later by Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* II, 438P).

26 He is probably referring to rhetoric.

τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλοκάγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις ἐστίν. ὥσθ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ
ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εὐθὺς καὶ φιλόσοφος εὐρίσκεται ὢν. καὶ μὴν
ὁ γε φιλόσοφος ὅτι πάντως καὶ βασιλικός, οὕτως ἂν μάθοις. τοῦ
γὰρ βασιλικοῦ δήπου ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐπιτροπεύειν ἔθνη
καὶ πόλεις καὶ εἶναι ἄξιον ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν. τίς δ' ἂν ἢ ἱκανώτερος
εἷη πόλεως προστάτης ἢ ἀξιώτερος ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν τοῦ φιλο-
σόφου; ᾧ γε προσήκει (ἂν περ ἢ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος) εἶναι φρονίμῳ,
σώφρονι, μεγαλόφρονι, τῶν δικαίων κριτικῷ καὶ τῶν πρεπόντων,
καταπρακτικῷ τῶν νοηθέντων, καρτερικῷ τῶν ἐπιπόνων· πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις θαρραλέος, ἀδεής, ὑποστατικὸς τῶν δοκούντων δεινῶν εἷη
ἂν, ἔτι δὲ εὐεργετικὸς, χρηστὸς, φιλάνθρωπος. τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου
τίς ἂν εὐρεθείη ἄρχειν ἐπιτηδειότερος ἢ δυνατώτερος; οὐδεὶς. ἂν
δὲ μὴ ἔχη πολλοὺς τοὺς ὑπακούοντας καὶ πειθομένους αὐτῷ, οὐπω
διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ βασιλικὸς εἶναι ἐστέρηται· ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τῶν
φίλων ἄρχειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ γυναικός τε καὶ παίδων, ἢ καὶ νῆ
Δία αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον. καὶ γὰρ ἱατρὸς οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῦ θερα-
πεύοντος πολλοὺς ὁ θεραπεύων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν ἐμπειρίαν
τὴν ἱατρικὴν· καὶ μουσικὸς οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῦ διδάσκοντος πολλοὺς
ὁ διδάσκων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν μουσικὴν· καὶ ἵππικὸς ὁμοίως
τῷ χρωμένῳ πολλοὺς ἵπποις ὁ χρώμενος ἐνὶ ἡ δυνοῖν, ἂν γε ἐπιστή-
μων τῆς ἵππικῆς ᾗ· καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλικὸς παραπλησίως τῷ κεκτη-
μένῳ πολλοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁ ἔχων ἓνα ἢ δύο τοὺς πειθομένους αὐτῷ·
μόνον ἔχέτω τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύειν ἐμπειρίαν, ὥστε καὶ βασιλικὸς εἷη
ἂν. διὰ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Σωκράτης τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν
τε καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὀνομάζειν, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἀναλαβὼν
εὐθὺς πολιτικός ἐστι. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Μουσωνίου εἰπόντος, ἡσθεὶς ὁ
βασιλεὺς τοῖς λόγοις χάριν τε ἔχειν ὡμολόγει τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτῷ,
καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων, ἔφη, αἴτησον ὅ τι βούλει με, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀντίποιμί
σοι περὶ οὐδενός. Ὁ οὖν Μουσώνιος, αἰτῶ σε, ἔφη, τούτοις στοι-
χεῖν καὶ ἐπεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, οὓς ἐπαινεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οὕτω
χαριεῖ μάλιστα καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ αὐτὸς οὐχ ἐτέρως μᾶλλον.

from this. The attribute of a kingly person is obviously the
ability to rule peoples and cities well and to be worthy to govern
men. Well, then, who would be a more capable head of a city or
more worthy to govern men than the philosopher? For it be-
hooves him (if he is truly a philosopher) to be intelligent,
disciplined, noble-minded, a good judge of what is just and of
what is seemly, efficient in putting his plans into effect, patient
under hardship. In addition to this, he should be courageous,
fearless, resolute in the face of things apparently disastrous, and
besides beneficent, helpful, and humane. Could anyone be
found more fit or better able to govern than such a man? No one.
Even if he does not have many subjects obedient to him, he is
not for that reason less kingly, for it is enough to rule one's
friends or one's wife and children or, for that matter, only oneself.
For, indeed, a physician who attends few patients is no less a
physician than the one who attends many if, to be sure, he has
skill and experience in healing. In the same way the musician
who teaches only a few pupils is no less a musician than the one
who teaches many, provided he knows the art of music. Likewise
the horseman who trains only one or two horses is just as much
a horseman as the one who trains many if he is skilled in horse-
manship. And so the title of kingly person belongs to the one
who has only one or two subjects just as well as to the one who
has many, only let him have the skill and ability to rule, so that
he may deserve the name of king. For this reason it seems to
me that Socrates too called philosophy the statesmanlike and
royal discipline, because one who masters it immediately becomes
a statesman. When Musonius said these things, the king was
glad at his words and told him that he was grateful for what he
said and added, "In return for this, ask of me whatever you wish
for I shall refuse you nothing." Then Musonius said, "The only
favor I ask of you is to remain faithful to this teaching, since you
find it commendable, for in this way and no other will you best
please me and benefit yourself."

IX.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΤ

ΟΤΙ ΟΤ ΚΑΚΟΝ Η ΦΤΓΗ.

Φυγάδος δέ τις οδυρομένου ὅτι φεύγει, οὕτω πως παρεμυθή-
 5 σατο αὐτόν. Φυγὴν γάρ, ἔφη, πῶς ἂν τις μὴ ἀνόητος ὢν βαρύνοιτο;
 ἥτις ὕδατος μὲν καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος, ἔτι δὲ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀστρῶν οὐκ ἀπείργει ἡμᾶς οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας,
 ἀπανταχοῦ γὰρ καὶ πάντῃ τούτων μετουσία ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ μέρους
 10 τινὸς τῆς γῆς ἀφαιρούμεθα καὶ τινῶν ἀνθρώπων συνουσίας, τί
 τοῦτο δεινόν; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴκοι ὄντες ἀπάσῃ τῇ γῇ ἐχρώμεθα, οὐδὲ
 ἀνθρώποις ἀπασιν συνῆμεν· τοῖς μέντοι φίλοις καὶ νῦν συνείημεν
 ἂν, τοῖς γε ἀληθινοῖς καὶ ὧν προσήκει ποιείσθαι τινα λόγον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν οὗτοι προδοίην ποτε ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἐγκαταλίποιν· εἰ δὲ τινες
 15 ἢ συνείναι αὐτοῖς. τί δ'; οὐχὶ κοινὴ πατρίς ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὁ
 κόσμος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡξίου Σωκράτης; ὥστ' οὐδὲ φεύγειν τῇ γε
 ἀληθείᾳ τὴν πατρίδα νομιστέον, ἂν ἀπέλθῃς ἐντεῦθεν ἔνθα ἔφυς τε
 καὶ ἐράφῃς, πόλεως δὲ μόνον ἐστερήσθαι τινος, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 20 αὐτῷ ἀτιμάζει οὕτως ὥς εὐδαιμονίας <ἢ κακοδαιμονίας> αἵτιον
 αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τίθεται τὸ πᾶν, καὶ νομίζει εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ
 Διὸς πόλεως, ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν. σύμφωνα δὲ
 τούτοις λέγει καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν οἷς φησιν

25 ἅπας μὲν ἀῆρ ἀετῷ περάσιμος,
 ἅπαντα δὲ χθὼν ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ πατρίς.

ὥσπερ οὖν εἴ τις ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ὢν καὶ ἐτέραν οἰκίαν οἰκῶν, οὐκ
 ἐν ἣ ἐτέχθη, δεινοπαθοίη διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀδύροιο, μάταιος ἂν εἴη
 καὶ καταγέλαστος· οὕτω καὶ ὅστις ἐτέραν πόλιν οἰκῶν, οὐκ ἐν ἣ
 30 τυγχάνει γεγονώς, συμφορὰν ἡγείται, ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰκότως ἂν ἄφρων
 νομίζοιτο καὶ ἀνόητος. καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν
 καὶ πρὸς κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς πῶς ἂν τὸ φεύγειν ἐνίστατο; ὁπότε γε

19 ἀξιοῖς τις Hense

1 This treatise seems to represent a letter. Cf. Introduction, note 8.
 6 Cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* II, 16, 33.

IX

THAT EXILE IS NOT AN EVIL

Hearing an exile lament because he was living in banishment, Musonius consoled him in somewhat the following way. Why, he asked, should anyone who was not devoid of understanding be oppressed by exile? It does not in any way deprive us of water, earth, air, or the sun and the other planets, or indeed, even of the society of men, for everywhere and in every way there is opportunity for association with them. What if we are kept from a certain part of the earth and from association with certain men, what is so dreadful about that? Why, when we were at home, we did not enjoy the whole earth, nor did we have contact with all men; but even now in exile we may associate with our friends, that is to say the true ones and those deserving of the name, for they would never betray or abandon us; but if some prove to be sham and not true friends, we are better off separated from them than being with them. Tell me, is not the universe the common fatherland of all men, as Socrates held? Well, then, you must not consider it really being banished from your fatherland if you go from where you were born and reared, but only being exiled from a certain city, that is if you claim to be a reasonable person. For such a man does not value or despise any place as the cause of his happiness or unhappiness, but he makes the whole matter depend upon himself and considers himself a citizen of the city of God which is made up of men and gods. Euripides speaks in harmony with this thought when he says,

“As all the heavens are open to the eagle's flight
 So all the earth is for a noble man his fatherland.”

Therefore, just as a man who was living in his own country but in a different house from the one where he was born would be thought silly and an object of laughter if he should weep and wail because of this, so whoever considers it a misfortune because he is living in another city and not the one where he happens to have been born would rightly be considered foolish and stupid. Furthermore, how should exile be an obstacle to the cultivation

16 Cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V, 37, 108.

24 f. *Frag.* 1034 (ed. Nauck). Ovid has an interesting Latin version:
 Omne solum forti patria est, ut piscibus aequor,
 Ut volucris, vacuo quidquid in orbe patet. (*Fasti* I, ll. 493 f.)

μήτε μαθήσεως μήτε ἀσκήσεως ὧν χρη εἴργεται τις διὰ τὴν φυγὴν. πῶς μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἡ φυγὴ καὶ συνεργοίη πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον, παρέχουσά γε σχολὴν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ μαυθάνειν τε τὰ καλὰ καὶ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, ἅτε μήθ' ὑπὸ πατρίδος τῆς δοκούσης περιελκο-
 5 μένοις εἰς ὑπηρεσίας πολιτικὰς μήτε ὑπὸ φίλων τῶν δοκούντων ἢ συγγενῶν ἐνοχλουμένοις, οἳ τινες ἐμποδίσαι δεινοὶ καὶ ἀποσπάσαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω ὁρμῆς; ἤδη δέ τισι καὶ παντάπασι τὸ φεύγειν συνήνεγκεν, ὥσπερ Διογένης, ὃς ἐκ μὲν ιδιώτου φιλόσοφος ἐγένετο φυχῶν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ καθῆσθαι εἰς Σινώπην διέτριψεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι,
 10 ἀσκήσει δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῶν φιλοσόφων διήνεγκεν. ἄλλοις δέ γε κακῶς τὰ σώματα διακειμένοις ὑπὸ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς ἔρρωσεν ἡ φυγὴ, βιασθεῖσιν ἀνδρικώτερον διατᾶσθαι καὶ ἴσμεν τινὰς χρονίων νοσημάτων ἐν τῷ φεύγειν ἀπολυθέντας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει Σπαρτιατικὸς οὗτος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, ὃς ἀπὸ πολλοῦ ἔχων
 15 τὸ πλευρὸν κακῶς κακὸν τούτου πολλάκις νοσῶν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπαύσατο τρυφῶν, ἐπαύσατο καὶ νοσηλευόμενος. ἄλλους δέ γε τῶν ἀβροδιαίτων ποδάγρας ἀπολυθῆναι φασι, πάνν δὴ κατατεινομένους πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ πάθους, οὓς ἡ φυγὴ σκληρότερον διατᾶσθαι συνεθίσασα κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑγιεῖς
 20 γενέσθαι παρεσκεύασεν. οὕτως ἄρα τῷ διακεῖσθαι κρείττον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ σώμα καὶ ψυχὴν συνεργεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντιπράττει ἡ φυγὴ.

Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἀπορεῖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων πάντως ὑπάρχει τοῖς φεύγουσιν. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἀργοὶ καὶ ἀμήχανοι καὶ οὐχ οἰοί τε ἀνδρί-
 25 ζεσθαι, οὗτοι μὲν καὶ τῇ πατρίδι ὄντες ἀποροῦσιν ὥς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀμήχανοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ γεννικοὶ καὶ φιλόπονοι καὶ συνετοί, καὶ ὅποι ποτὲ ἔλθωσιν, εὐποροῦσι καὶ διάγουσιν ἀνευδεῶς· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δεόμεθα πολλῶν, ἂν μὴ βουλόμεθα τρυφᾶν·

30 ἐπεὶ τί δὲ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνον,
 Διμήτρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὕδρηχόου,
 ἅπερ πάρεστι καὶ πέφυχ' ἡμᾶς τρέφειν;

λέγω δὲ τοὺς γε λόγου ἀξίους ἀνδρας οὐ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων μόνον πρὸς τὸν βίον ῥαδίως ἂν εὐπορεῖν ἔξω τῆς οἰκείας ὄντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ περιποιήσεσθαι χρήματα πολλάκις. ὁ γοῦν
 35 Ὀδυσσεὺς παντὸς φυγάδος ὥς ἂν τις εἴποι ἀθλιώτερον διακείμενος

8 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*. VI, 49.

24 Spartiacus, of whom Musonius speaks as a contemporary, was a conspicuous figure in the age of Nero. Hence the situation must refer to Musonius' first banishment. Cf. Introduction note 21.

of the things that are one's own and to the acquisition of virtue, when no one was ever hindered from the knowledge and practice of what is needful because of exile? May it not even be true that exile contributes to that end, since it furnishes men leisure and a greater opportunity for learning the good and practicing it than formerly, in that they are not forced by what only seems to be their fatherland into performing political duties, and they are not annoyed by their kinsmen nor by men who only seem to be their friends, who are skilful in fettering them and dragging them away from the pursuit of better things? In fact, there have been cases where exile was an absolute blessing as it was to Diogenes, who by his exile was transformed from an ordinary citizen into a philosopher, and instead of sitting idly in Sinope, he busied himself in Greece, and in the pursuit of virtue came to surpass the philosophers. To others who were in poor health as the result of overindulgence and high living, exile has been a source of strength because they were forced to live a more manly life. We even know of some who were cured of chronic ailments in exile, as for instance, in our day Spartiacus, the Lacedaemonian, who suffered long from a weak chest and for this reason was often ill from high living, but when he stopped living a life of luxury, he ceased to be ill. They say that others addicted to high living have got rid of gout, although they were previously completely bed-ridden by the disease—people whom exile compelled to become accustomed to living more simply and by this very thing were brought back to health. Thus it appears that by treating them better than they treat themselves, exile helps rather than hinders health both of body and of spirit.

It is not true, moreover, that exiles lack the very necessities of life. To be sure men who are idle and unresourceful and unable to play the part of a man are generally in want and without resources even when they are in their own country, but energetic and hard working and intelligent men, no matter where they go, fare well and live without want. We do not feel the lack of many things unless we wish to live luxuriously:

“For what do mortals need beside two things only,
 The bread of Demeter and a drink of the Water-carrier,
 Which are at hand and have been made to nourish us?”

Let me add that men who are worth anything not only easily manage well so far as the necessities of life are concerned, when they are in exile, but often acquire great fortunes. At any rate
 29-31 *Frag.* 884 (ed. Nauck).

καὶ μόνος ὦν καὶ γυμνὸς καὶ ναυαγός, ὅμως ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἀνθρώ-
 πους ἀγνώτας τοὺς Φαίακας ἐδυνήθη χρηματίζασθαι ἀφθόνως.
 Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' ἐπεὶ ἔφηνεν οἴκοθεν, οὐ παρὰ μὴ φίλους μόνον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ πολεμίους καὶ βαρβάρους ἔλθων τοὺς Πέρσας, τρεῖς
 5 ἔλαβε πόλεις δῶρον, Μυῦντα καὶ Μαγνησίαν καὶ Λάμψακον, ὥστ'
 ἀπὸ τούτων βιοῦν. Δίων δὲ ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἀφαιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ
 Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, ὅτ' ἐξέπιπτε τῆς πατρί-
 δος, οὕτως ἐν τῇ φυγῇ χρημάτων εὐπόρησεν, ὥστε καὶ ξενικὸν
 θρέψαι στράτευμα, μεθ' οὗ ἦλθεν ἐπὶ Σικελίαν καὶ ἡλευθέρωσεν
 10 αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου. τίς ἂν οὖν εὐ φρονῶν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀφορῶν, ἔτι
 τὴν φυγὴν ἀπορίας αἰτίαν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὑπολαμβάνοι;
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κακοδοξεῖν πάντως ἀνάγκη τοὺς φυγόντας διὰ τὴν φυγὴν,
 γνωρίμου γε πᾶσιν ὄντος, ὅτι καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ δικάζονται κακῶς,
 καὶ ἐκβάλλονται πολλοὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδίκως, καὶ ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς
 15 ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἐξηλάθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ὥσπερ Ἀθή-
 νηθεν μὲν Ἀριστείδης ὁ δίκαιος, ἐξ Ἑφέσου δὲ Ἑρμόδωρος, ἐφ'
 ᾧ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι ἔφηνεν ἡβηδὸν ἐκέλευεν Ἑφεσίους ἀπάγ-
 ξασθαι. ἔνιοι δέ γε καὶ ἐνδοξότατοι φεύγοντες ἐγένοντο, καθάπερ
 Διογένης ὁ Σινωπεὺς καὶ Κλέαρχος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὁ μετὰ Κύρου
 20 στρατεύσας ἐπ' Ἀρταξέρξη· καὶ ἄλλους <δ> ἂν τις ἔχοι βουλό-
 μενος λέγειν πολλοὺς. καίτοι πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο κακοδοξίας αἴτιον,
 ἐν ᾧ τινες ἐνδοξότεροι γεγονάσιν, ἢ πρότερον ἦσαν;
 Νῆ Δι' ἀλλ' Εὐριπίδης φησὶν ἐλευθερίας στέρεσθαι τοὺς
 φυγάδας, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρρησίας. πεποίηκε γὰρ τὴν μὲν Ἰοκάστην
 25 πυνθανομένην Πολυνείκους τοῦ υἱέος, τίνα δυσχερῇ τῷ φεύγοντί
 ἔστιν· ὁ δ' ἀποκρίνεται ὅτι

ἐν μὲν μέγιστον, οὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν,

ἢ δ' αὖ πρὸς αὐτὸν

δούλου τόδ' εἶπας, μὴ λέγειν ἅ τις φρονεῖ.

30 ἐγὼ δὲ φαίην ἂν πρὸς τὸν Εὐριπίδην ὅτι, ὦ Εὐριπίδη, τοῦτο μὲν
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὡς δούλου ἐστίν, ἃ φρονεῖ μὴ λέγειν, ὅταν
 γε δέῃ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὄντιν' οὐκ
 ἃ φρονοῦμεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εὖ εἰρηκέναι, τὸ μὴ μετεῖναι
 τοῖς φεύγουσι παρρησίας, εἴπερ παρρησία σοι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ σιγᾶν
 35 ἃ φρονῶν τυγχάνει τις. οὐ γὰρ οἱ φεύγοντες ὀκνοῦσι λέγειν ἃ

3 Cornelius Nepos testifies to this. Cf. *Themistocles* 10.3.

13 Cicero deplores this unfortunate fact in a letter of consolation to a friend in exile. Cf. *Ep. ad Fam.* V, 17, 3.

Odysseus, in worse plight than any exile one may say, since he was alone and naked and shipwrecked, when he arrived among strangers, the Phaeacians, was nevertheless able to enrich himself abundantly. And when Themistocles was banished from home, going to people who were not only not friendly, but actual enemies and barbarians, the Persians, he received a gift of three cities, Myus, Magnesia, and Lampsacus, as a source of livelihood. Dio of Syracuse too, deprived by Dionysius the tyrant of all his possessions, when he was banished from his country waxed so rich in exile that he raised a mercenary army, went with it to Sicily, and freed the island of the tyrant. Who, then, if he were in his right mind, looking at these cases would still maintain that banishment is the cause of want for all exiles? Furthermore, it is not at all necessary for exiles to suffer ill-repute because of their banishment, since everyone knows that many trials are badly judged and many people are unjustly banished from their country, and that in the past there have been cases of good men who have been exiled by their countrymen, as for example from Athens Aristides the Just and from Ephesus Hermodorus, because of whose banishment Heraclitus bade the Ephesians, every grown man of them, go hang themselves. In fact some exiles even became very famous, as Diogenes of Sinope and Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian, who with Cyrus marched against Artaxerxes, not to mention more. How, pray, could this condition in which some people have become more renowned than before be responsible for ill-repute?

But, you insist, Euripides says that exiles lose their personal liberty when they are deprived of their freedom of speech. For he represents Jocasta asking Polynices her son what misfortunes an exile has to bear. He answers,

"One greatest of all, that he has not freedom of speech."

She replies,

"You name the plight of a slave, not to be able to say what one thinks."

But I should say in rejoinder: "You are right, Euripides, when you say that it is the condition of a slave not to say what one thinks when one ought to speak, for it is not always, nor everywhere, nor before everyone that we should say what we think. But that one point, it seems to me, is not well-taken, that exiles do not have freedom of speech, if to you freedom of speech means not suppressing whatever one chances to think. For it is not as exiles that men fear to say what they think, but as men

20 Cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis* I, 1, 9.

27, 29 *Phoenissae* 391 f.

φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ δεδιότες μὴ ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν γένηται αὐτοῖς πόνος ἢ θάνατος ἢ ζημία ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δέος μὰ Δία οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ ποιεῖ. πολλοῖς γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ὄντων, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις, τὰ δοκοῦντα δεινὰ δεδιέναι. ὁ 5 δὲ ἀνδρείος οὐδὲν ἦττον φυγὰς ἢ ἡπερ οἴκοι. θαρρεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, διὸ καὶ λέγει ἃ φρονεῖ θαρρῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν ἦ μὴ φυγὰς, ὅταν φεύγων τύχη. ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς Εὐριπίδην εἶποι τις ἂν· σὺ δ' εἰπέ μοι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὅτε Διογένης φεύγων ἦν Ἀθήνησιν, ἢ ὅτε πραθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ληστῶν ἦλθεν εἰς Κόρινθον, ἅρα τότε πλείω 10 παρρησίαν ἄλλος τις ἐπεδείξατο Διογένους ἢ Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος; τί δ'; ἐλευθεριώτερος ἄλλος τις ἢ Διογένης τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων ἦν; ὅς καὶ Ξενιάδου τοῦ πριαμένου αὐτὸν ὡς δεσπότης δούλου ἦρχεν. καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ παλαιὰ λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι οὐ δοκῶ εἶναι φυγὰς; ἂρ' οὖν ἐστέρημαι παρρησίας; ἅρα ἀφήρημαι τὴν 15 ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἃ φρονῶ λέγειν; ἤδη δέ με εἶδες ἢ σὺ ἢ ἕτερος ὑποπτήσσουντά τῷ ὅτι φεύγω; ἢ χεῖρον ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα νομίζοντα νῦν ἢ πρότερον; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία λυπούμενον ἢ ἀθυμοῦντα διὰ τὴν φυγὴν φαίης ἂν ἑωρακέναι με. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὴν πατρίδα τις ἡμᾶς ἀφήρηται, τό γε δύνασθαι φέρειν φυγὴν οὐκ ἀφήρηται. 20 Οἷς δὲ λογισμοῖς χρώμαι πρὸς ἑμαυτόν, ὥστε μὴ ἄχθεσθαι τῇ φυγῇ, τούτους καὶ πρὸς σέ εἶποιμι ἂν. δοκεῖ μοι ἡ φυγὴ στερίσκει μὲν ἄνθρωπον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ὦν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ ἄρτι ἐδείκνυν. εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ στερίσκοι ἢ τινας ἢ πάντων τούτων, τῶν γε ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν οὐ στερίσκει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρείαν ἢ 25 δικαιοσύνην ὁ φεύγων ἔχειν κωλύεται, διὸ φεύγει, οὔτε σωφροσύνην ἢ φρόνησιν, οὐδ' αὖ ἀρετὴν ἄλλην ἡντιοῦν, αἱ παροῦσαί τε κοσμεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖν πεφύκασιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ἀποφαίνειν καὶ εὐκλεῇ, ἀποῦσαί τε βλάπτειν καὶ κατασχύνειν κακὸν ἀποφαίνουσαι καὶ ἀκλεῇ. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸς 30 εἰ οὗτος καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχεις, οὐκ ἂν σε βλάπτει ἡ φυγὴ οὐδ' ἂν ταπεινοίῃ, παρόντων γε τῶν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐπαίρειν μάλιστα δυναμένων· εἰ δὲ τυγχάνεις κακὸς ὢν, ἡ κακία σε βλάπτει καὶ οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ· καὶ τὴν γε λύπην ἡ κακία σοι ἐπάγει, οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ· διὸ

19 ἡμᾶς delevit Hense

10 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*, VI, 30.

13 Musonius was exiled to the barren island of Gyara, one of the Cyclades. Several writers have testified to his stoutheartedness in this trying situation. Cf. Introduction note 49.

18 f. Milton expressed a similar attitude when he said, "It is not so wretched to be blind, as it is not to be capable of enduring blindness."

afraid lest from speaking pain or death or punishment or some such other thing shall befall them. Fear is the cause of this, not exile. For to many people, nay to most, even though dwelling safely in their native city, fear of what seem to them dire consequences of free speech is present. However, the courageous man, in exile no less than at home, is dauntless in the face of all such fears; for that reason also he has the courage to say what he thinks equally at home or in exile." Such are the things one might reply to Euripides. But tell me, my friend, when Diogenes was in exile at Athens, or when he was sold by pirates and came to Corinth, did anyone, Athenian or Corinthian, ever exhibit greater freedom of speech than he? And again, were any of his contemporaries freer than Diogenes? Why, even Xenias, who bought him, he ruled as a master rules a slave. But why should I employ examples of long ago? Are you not aware that I am an exile? Well, then, have I been deprived of freedom of speech? Have I been bereft of the privilege of saying what I think? Have you or anyone else ever seen me cringing before anyone just because I am an exile, or thinking that my lot is worse now than formerly? No, I'll wager that you would say that you have never seen me complaining or disheartened because of my banishment, for if I have been deprived of my country, I have not been deprived of my ability to endure exile.

The reflections which I employ for my own benefit so as not to be irked by exile, I should like to repeat to you. It seems to me that exile does not strip a man entirely, not even of the things which the average man calls goods, as I have just shown. But if he is deprived of some or all of them, he is still not deprived of the things which are truly goods. Certainly the exile is not prevented from possessing courage and justice simply because he is banished, nor self-control, nor understanding, nor any of the other virtues which when present serve to bring honor and benefit to a man and show him to be praiseworthy and of good repute, but when absent, serve to cause him harm and dishonor and show him to be wicked and of ill-repute. Since this is true, if you are that good man and have his virtues, exile will not harm or degrade you, because the virtues are present in you which are most able to help and to sustain you. But if you are bad, it is the evil that harms you and not exile; and the misery you feel in exile is the product of evil, not of exile. It is from this you must hasten to secure release rather than from exile. These things I

(*Second Defence of the People of England*, *Prose Works of John Milton* ed. R. W. Griswold [Philadelphia, 1845] II, p. 489).

ταύτης ἀπολυθῆναι δεῖ σε σπεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς φυγῆς. ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἔλεγον ἀεὶ καὶ πρὸς σὲ λέγω νῦν. σὺ δ', ἂν σωφρονῆς, οὐ τὴν φυγὴν δεινὸν ἡγήσῃ εἶναι, ἣν γε φέρουσιν ἕτεροι εὐπετῶς, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἥς ἐνούσης ἄθλιος πᾶς ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ αὐτήν.
 5 καὶ γὰρ δὴ δυοῖν ἀνάγκη τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως σε φεύγειν· εἰ μὲν δὴ δικαίως, πῶς ποτε ὀρθὸν ἢ προσήκον ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς δικαίοις; εἰ δ' ἀδίκως, τῶν ἐξελασάντων τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κακόν, οὐχ ἡμέτερον· εἴπερ νῆ Δία τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν θεομισέστατόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἐκείνοις συμβέβηκε· τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν, καὶ
 10 παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἐπικουρίας, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ μίσους ἄξιον εἶναι ὑπέιληπται.

X.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΕΙ ΓΡΑΦΗΝ ΤΥΒΡΕΩΣ ΓΡΑΨΕΤΑΙ ΤΙΝΑ
Ο ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ.

15

“Τυβρεως δὲ γραφήν οὗτ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἔφη γράψασθαι τινὰ ποτε οὗτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ συμβουλευέσθαι οὐδενὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἀξιούντων. ἃ γὰρ πάσχοντές τινες ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, τούτων οὐδὲν εἶναι ὑβριν ἢ αἰσχύνην τοῖς πάσχουσιν· οἷον λοιδορηθῆναι ἢ πληγῆναι
 20 ἢ ἐμπτυσθῆναι, ὧν τὸ χαλεπώτατον πληγαί. ὥς δὲ οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε ὑβριστικὸν ἔχουσιν οὐδέν, δηλοῦν Λακεδαιμονίων παῖδας δημοσίᾳ μαστιγουμένους καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀγαλλομένους. ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος εἰ μὴ δύναιτο καταφρονεῖν πληγῶν ἢ λοιδορίας, τί ἂν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ εἴη, ὃν γε φαίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ θανάτου καταφρονούντα;
 25 νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' ἢ διάνοια τοῦ δρῶντος αὐτὰ δεινῇ, τὸ ἐπεγγελῶντα καὶ ὑβρίζειν νομίζοντα ράπισαι ἢ λοιδορῆσαι ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ποιῆσαι Δημοσθένους γοῦν καὶ τῷ βλέμματι ὑβρίζειν τινάς, καὶ ἀφόρητα εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἐξίστασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐκείνῃ οἴεται. ταῦτα δὲ οἱ μὲν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὃ τι τῇ
 30 ἀληθείᾳ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν κεχηγνότες, καὶ αὐτοὶ

14 This treatise seems to have been directed at the rude and ostentatious Cynics who invited ridicule and yet complained and threatened legal action when they were abused.

used to repeat to myself and I say them to you now. If you are wise, you will not consider that exile is a thing to be dreaded, since others bear it easily, but evil. It makes wretched every man in whom it is present. And neither of the two necessary alternatives is a just cause for repining. For either you were banished justly or unjustly. If justly, how can it be right or fitting to feel aggrieved at just punishment? If unjustly, the evil involved is not ours, but falls upon those who banished us,—if in fact you agree that doing a wrong (as they have done) is the most hateful thing in the world, while suffering a wrong (as has been our fate) in the eyes of the gods and of just men is held a ground not for hate but for help.

X

WILL THE PHILOSOPHER PROSECUTE ANYONE
FOR PERSONAL INJURY?

He said that he himself would never prosecute anyone for personal injury nor recommend it to anyone else who claimed to be a philosopher. For actually none of the things which people fancy they suffer as personal injuries are an injury or a disgrace to those who experience them, such as being reviled or struck or spit upon. Of these the hardest to bear are blows. That there is nothing shameful or insulting about them however is clear from the fact that Lacedaemonian boys are whipped publicly, and they exult in it. If, then, the philosopher cannot despise blows and insults, when he ought obviously to despise even death, what good would he be? Well and good, you say, but the spirit of the man who does such things is monstrous, executing his purpose to insult by jeering and a slap in the face, or by abusive language or by some other such action. You know, of course, that Demosthenes holds that people can insult even by a glance and that such things are intolerable and that men in one way or another are driven mad by them. So it is that men who do not know what is really good and what is shameful, having regard only for common opinion, think they are insulted if someone gives them a malignant glance or laughs or strikes them or reviles

22 The scourging of the Spartan boys before the altar of Artemis is referred to by Epictetus, *Disc.* I, 2, 2; Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* II, 20, 46; Plutarch *Instituta Laconica* 40 (239D) (*Moralia* III, pp. 442-4, ed. Babbitt)

27 Κατὰ Μειδίου 72

ὑβρίζεσθαι νομίζουσιν, εἴ τις ἢ προσβλέποι αὐτοὺς πικρότερον ἢ καταγελῶν αὐτῶν ἢ πλήττοι ἢ λοιδοροίη. ἀνὴρ δὲ εὖ φρονῶν καὶ νοῦν ἔχων, οἷον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὑπὸ οὐδενὸς τούτων ταράττεται, οὐδ' οἴεται τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὰ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν
 5 μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ τί καὶ ὁ πάσχων ἀμαρτάνει; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτάνων εὐθύς καὶ ἐν αἰσχύνη ἐστίν, ὁ μέντοι πάσχων ὥς οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει καθόσον πάσχει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐν αἰσχυρῷ οὐδενὶ γίνεται. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἐπὶ δίκας οὐδ' ἐπ' ἐγκλήματα προέλθοι ἂν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδ' ὑβρίσθαι ἂν δόξειεν· καὶ γὰρ μικρόψυχον τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν ἢ
 10 ἐπιτείνεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ἡσύχως οἴσει τὸ συμβάν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρέπον τοῦτο τῷ βουλομένῳ εἶναι μεγαλόφρονι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὕτω διακείμενος φανερός ἦν, ὃς δημοσίᾳ λοιδορηθεὶς ὑπ' Ἀριστοφάνους, οὐχ ὅπως ἡγανάκτησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντυχῶν ἡξίου αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον βούλοιο χρησθαι αὐτῷ.
 15 ταχύ γ' ἂν ἐκείνος ἐν ὀλίγοις λοιδορούμενος ἐχαλέπηεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἐν θεάτρῳ λοιδορηθεὶς ἡγανάκτει. Φωκίων δὲ ὁ χρηστός, τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ προπηλακισθείσης πρὸς τινος, τοσοῦτον ἐδέησεν ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ προπηλακίσαντι, ὥστε ἐπεὶ δέισας ἐκείνος προσῆλθέ τε καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἡξίου τὸν Φωκίωνα, φάσκων ἡγνοῦσθαι
 20 ὅτι ἦν ἐκείνου γυνή, εἰς ἣν ἐπλημμέλει· ἀλλὰ ἢ γε ἐμὴ γυνὴ οὐδέν' ἔφη· ὑπὸ σοῦ πέπονθεν, ἐτέρα δὲ τις ἴσως· ὥστε οὐδὲ χρὴ ἐμοὶ σὲ ἀπολογεῖσθαι. καὶ ἄλλους δὲ πολλοὺς ἀνδρας ἔχοιμ' ἂν λέγειν πειραθέντας ὕβρεως, τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τινων γλώσση πλημμεληθέντας, τοὺς δὲ χερσίν ὥστε αἰκισθῆναι τὸ σῶμα· καὶ οὔτε ἀμυνάμενοι
 25 φαίνονται τοὺς πλημμελήσαντας, οὔτε ἄλλον τρόπον ἐπεξελθόντες, ἀλλὰ πάννυ πρῶτος ἐνεγκόντες τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀντιδίδεται τις τὸν δακόντα, καὶ ἀντιποιήσει κακῶς τὸν ὑπάρξαντα, θηρίου τινὸς οὐκ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, ὥς οὐδὲ τοῦτο λογίσασθαι δύναται, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων ὑπ'
 30 ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀμαρτάνεται, ὧν ὁ μεταδιδαχθεὶς εὐθύς παύεται· τὸ δὲ δέχεσθαι τὰς ἀμαρτίας μὴ ἀγρίως, μηδὲ ἀνῆκεστον εἶναι τοῖς πλημμελήσασιν, ἀλλ' αἴτιον εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς, ἡμέρου τρόπου καὶ φιλανθρώπου ἐστίν. πόσῳ δὴ κρεῖττον οὕτως ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὥστε συγ-

12 Cf. Plutarch *De Liberis educandis* 10, C. D. (*Moralia* I, p. 48, ed. Babbitt).

18-22 Plutarch relates a similar incident about Peisistratus. Cf. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 189 (*Moralia* III, p. 117, ed. Babbitt). Plutarch's account of Phocion's unjust condemnation and his final message to his son that he should cherish no resentment against the Athenians

them. But the wise and sensible man, such as the philosopher ought to be, is not disturbed by any of these things. He does not think that disgrace lies in enduring them, but rather in doing them. For what does the man who submits to insult do that is wrong? It is the doer of wrong who forthwith puts himself to shame, while the sufferer, who does nothing but submit, has no reason whatever to feel shame or disgrace. Therefore the sensible man would not go to law nor bring indictments, since he would not even consider that he had been insulted. Besides, to be annoyed or racked about such things would be petty. Rather he will easily and silently bear what has happened, since this befits one whose purpose is to be noble-minded. Socrates, you remember, was clearly of this frame of mind who, though publicly ridiculed by Aristophanes, was not angry, but when he happened to meet him, asked him if he would like to use him for some other role. Can't you imagine how quickly he would have flared up in anger at some petty abuse, this man who showed no concern even when abused in the public theatre! And the good Phocion, when his wife had been reviled by someone, so far from prosecuting the fellow when he came in fear and asked forgiveness of Phocion, saying that he did not know it was his wife whom he had offended, merely replied, "But my wife has suffered nothing at your hands, though perhaps some other woman has, so you have no need to apologize to me." And I might mention many other men who have experienced insult, some wronged by word, others by violence and bodily harm, who do not appear to have defended their rights against their assailants nor to have proceeded against them in any other way, but very meekly bore their wrong. And in this they were quite right. For to scheme how to bite back the biter and to return evil for evil is the act not of a human being but of a wild beast, which is incapable of reasoning that the majority of wrongs are done to men through ignorance and misunderstanding, from which man will cease as soon as he has been taught. But to accept injury not in a spirit of savage resentment and to show ourselves not implacable toward those who wrong us, but rather to be a source of good hope to them is characteristic of a benevolent and civilized way of life. How much better a figure does the philosopher make so conducting himself as to deem worthy of forgiveness anyone who wrongs him, than to behave as if ready to defend himself with legal

bears out Musonius' estimate of his character. (*Phocion* XXXVI.)

30 Socrates' conviction that man does wrong because he does not know what is right is well expressed by Xenophon. Cf. *Cyropaedia* III, 1, 38.

γνώμης ἀξιοῦν εἴ τις πλημμελήσειεν εἰς αὐτόν, ἢ δοκεῖν μὲν
ἀμύνειν ἑαυτῷ δικάζομενον καὶ ἐγκαλοῦντα, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ ἀσχη-
μονεῖν, ἀνακόλουθα τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λόγοις πράττοντα. εἴ γε λέγει
μὲν, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἀδικηθείη ποτὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ κακοῦ ἀνδρός·
5 ἐγκαλεῖ δ' ὥς ἀδικούμενος ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πονηρῶν αὐτὸς ἀξίω
ἀγαθὸς εἶναι.

XI.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΤΙΣ Ο ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩ ΠΡΟΣΗΚΩΝ ΠΟΡΟΣ.

10 Ἔστι καὶ ἕτερος πόρος οὐδὲν τούτου κακίω, τάχα δὲ καὶ
ἀμείνων νομισθεὶς ἂν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἀνδρὶ γ' εὐρώστω τὸ σῶμα, ὁ
ἀπὸ γῆς, ἂν τ' οὖν ἰδίαν ἔχῃ τις ἂν τε καὶ μὴ. πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ
ἀλλοτρίαν γῆν γεωργοῦντες, ἢ δημοσίαν ἢ ἰδιωτικὴν, δύνανται
τρέφειν οὐ μόνον αὐτούς, καὶ τέκνα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας· ἐνιοὶ γε δὴ
15 καὶ εἰς ἄγαν ἀπὸ τούτου εὐποροῦσιν, αὐτουργοὶ καὶ φιλόπονοι
ὄντες. ἀμείβεται γὰρ ἡ γῆ κάλλιστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα τοὺς ἐπιμε-
λομένους αὐτῆς, πολλαπλάσια ὧν λαμβάνει διδοῦσα καὶ ἀφθονίαν
παρέχουσα πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς τὸν βίον τῷ βουλομένῳ
πονεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν σὺν τῷ πρέποντι, σὺν αἰσχύνῃ δ' οὐδὲν
20 αὐτῶν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς μὴ θρυπτικός γε μηδὲ
μαλακὸς ὧν, ὅς ἂν φαίη τῶν γεωργικῶν ἔργων <ὅτι> οὐν αἰσχροὺς
ἢ ἀνάρμοστον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. πῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐ καλὸν τὸ φυτεύ-
ειν; πῶς δὲ τὸ ἀροῦν; πῶς δὲ τὸ ἀμπελουργεῖν; τὸ δὲ σπείρειν, τὸ
δὲ θερίζειν, τὸ δὲ ἀλοᾶν, οὐ πάντ' ἐλευθέρια ταῦτα καὶ ἀνδράσι
25 ἀγαθοῖς πρέποντα; καὶ μὴν τὸ ποιμαίνειν ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδον οὐ
κατήσχυνεν οὐδ' ἐκώλυνεν εἶναι θεοφιλῇ τε καὶ μουσικόν, οὕτως
οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον οὐδένα κωλύσειεν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀρεστὸν τοῦτο
πάντων τῶν ἐν γεωργίαις ἔργων, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει σχολὴν
πλείονα διανοεῖσθαι τι καὶ ζητεῖν παιδείας ἐχόμενον. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ
30 ἔργα πάνν ἐντέλλει τὸ σῶμα καὶ κάμπτει, ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν

3 This, of course, is an echo of the famous saying of Socrates in Plato's *Apology* 30A.

10 The opening sentence indicates that this excerpt was taken from a larger discourse on the same subject. What the other occupations suitable

procedure and indictments, while in reality he is behaving in an unseemly manner and acting quite contrary to his own teaching. To be sure he says that a good man can never be wronged by a bad man; but nevertheless he draws up an indictment as having been wronged by bad men, while claiming to be accounted a good man himself.

XI

WHAT MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD IS APPROPRIATE FOR A PHILOSOPHER?

There is also another means of livelihood in no way inferior to this, indeed, perhaps it would not be unreasonable to consider it even better for a strong person, namely earning a living from the soil, whether one owns his own land or not. For many who are farming land owned either by the state or by other private individuals are yet able to support not only themselves but their wives and children as well; and some in fact attain even a high degree of prosperity by hard work with their own hands. For the earth repays most justly and well those who cultivate her, returning many times as much as she received and furnishing an abundance of all the necessities of life to anyone who is willing to work; and this she does without violating one's dignity or self-respect. You may be sure that no one who was not demoralized by soft living would say that the labor of the farmer was degrading or unfit for a good man. How, I ask, could planting trees or ploughing or pruning vines not be honorable? Are not sowing seed and harvesting and threshing all occupations for free men and befitting good men? Even keeping flocks, as it did not disgrace Hesiod nor prevent him from being a poet and beloved of the gods, so it would not prevent anyone else. In fact to me this is the most agreeable of all aspects of farming, because it gives the spirit more leisure to reflect on and to investigate the things that have to do with our own development and training. For while, to be sure, the occupations which strain and tire the whole body compel the mind to share in concentration upon

for a philosopher were may, perhaps, be found in Cicero, *De Officiis* I, 42, 151.

13 Horace (*Satire* II, 2) shows what satisfaction Ofellus, once owner of the land, now tenant farmer, derives from a life of farming.

20 Columella (*De Re Rustica*, Praef. 10-11) considers farming the only suitable life for a free man.

ἀναγκάζει πρὸς αὐτοῖς εἶναι μόνοις ἢ μάλιστα συνεντευνομένην τῷ σώματι ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἔργων ἐφίησι μὴ ἄγαν ἐντετάσθαι τὸ σῶμα, ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀπείργει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκλογίζεσθαι τι τῶν κρειττόνων κακ τῶν τοιούτων λογισμῶν αὐτὴν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι σοφωτέραν, οὐδ' ἡ καὶ μάλιστα πᾶς φιλόσοφος ἐφίεται. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ποιμενικὴν ἀσπάζομαι μάλιστα. εἴ γε μὴν ἅμα φιλοσοφεῖ τις καὶ γεωργεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλον ἢ παραβάλοιμι τούτῳ βίον οὐδὲ πορισμὸν ἕτερον προτιμήσασαι ἂν. πῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον ἀπὸ γῆς, ἢ τροφός τε καὶ μήτηρ ἐστὶν ἡμῶν, ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλου του τρέφεσθαι; 10 πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀνδρικώτερον τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἐν πόλει, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταί, τὸ ζῆν ἐν χωρίῳ; πῶς δ' οὐχ ὑγιεινότερον τοῦ σκιατροφεῖσθαι τὸ ἔξω διαιτᾶσθαι; τί δέ; ἐλευθεριώτερον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ μηχανᾶσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ παρ' ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν; ἀλλὰ φαίνεται τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ἄλλον πρὸς τὰς χρείας τὰς αὐτοῦ πολλὴν σεμνότερον ἢ τὸ 15 δεῖσθαι. οὕτως ἄρα καλὸν καὶ εὐδαιμονικὸν καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἐστὶ, σὺν γε τῷ καλοκάγαθίᾳ μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν, ὥστε Μύσωνα τὸν Χηναῖον ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλεπε σοφὸν καὶ τὸν Ψωφίδιον Ἀγλαὸν εὐδαίμονα προσηγόρευσε, χωριτικῶς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν βιούντα καὶ αὐτουργίᾳ χρώμενον καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄστει διατριβῆς 20 ἀπεχόμενον. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄξιον ζηλοῦν τε καὶ μιμεῖσθαι τούτους καὶ περιέχεσθαι σπουδῇ τοῦ γεωργεῖν;

Τί οὖν; οὐ δεινὸν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως ἄνδρα παιδευτικὸν καὶ δυνάμενον προβιβάζειν νέους εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἐργάζεσθαι γῆν καὶ τῷ σώματι πονεῖν τοῖς χωρίταις παραπλησίως; ναί. δεινὸν ἂν 25 τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι ἦν, εἴπερ ἐκώλυνεν ἡ ἐργασία τῆς γῆς φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ ἄλλους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ὠφελεῖν. νῦν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὠφελεῖσθαι οἱ νέοι οὐκ ἐν πόλει τῷ διδασκάλῳ συνόντες οὐδ' ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ἀκούοντες αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἐργαζόμενον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγροικίας ὁρῶντες καὶ ἔργῳ ἐνδεικνύμενον ἅπερ ὑψηλεῖται 30 ὁ λόγος, ὅτι χρὴ πονεῖν καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐτέρου δεῖσθαι τοῦ τρέφοντος. τί δὲ τὸ κωλύον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐργαζόμενον τοῦ διδασκάλου τὸν μαθητὴν ἀκούειν τι ἅμα περὶ σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἢ καρτερίας λέγοντος; πολλῶν μὲν γὰρ λόγων οὐ δεῖ τοῖς φιλοσοφῆσουσι καλῶς, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄχλον τοῦτον τῶν θεωρημάτων 35 τῶν ἀναληπτέων πάντως τοῖς νέοις, ἐφ' ᾧ φνσωμένους τοὺς σοφιστὰς ὁρῶμεν· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἱκανὰ κατατρῦσαι βίον ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ. τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ χρησιμώτατα μαθεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατον

17 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*. I, 9, 106.

18 Cf. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* VII, 46 (151).

them, or at all events, upon the body, yet the occupations which require not too much physical exertion do not hinder the mind from reflecting on some of the higher things and by such reasoning from increasing its own wisdom—a goal toward which every philosopher earnestly strives. For these reasons I recommend particularly the life of a shepherd. But, speaking generally, if one devotes himself to the life of philosophy and tills the land at the same time, I should not compare any other way of life to his nor prefer any other means of livelihood. For is it not “living more in accord with nature” to draw one’s sustenance directly from the earth, which is the nurse and mother of us all, rather than from some other source? Is it not more like the life of a man to live in the country than to sit idly in the city, like the sophists? Who will say that it is not more healthy to live out of doors than to shun the open air and the heat of the sun? Tell me, do you think it is more fitting for a free man by his own labor to procure for himself the necessities of life or to receive them from others? But surely it is plain that not to require another’s help for one’s need is more dignified than asking for it. How very good and happy and blessed of heaven is the life of the soil, when along with it the goods of the spirit are not neglected, the example of Myson of Chen may show, whom the god called “wise,” and Aglaus of Psophis whom he hailed as “happy,” both of whom lived on the land and tilled the soil with their own hands, and held aloof from the life of the town. Is not their example worthy of emulation and an incentive to follow in their footsteps and to embrace the life of husbandry with a zeal like theirs?

What, perhaps someone may say, is it not preposterous for an educated man who is able to influence the young to the study of philosophy to work the land and to do manual labor just like a peasant? Yes, that would be really too bad if working the land prevented him from the pursuit of philosophy or from helping others to its attainment. But since that is not so, pupils would seem to me rather benefited by not meeting with their teacher in the city nor listening to his formal lectures and discussions, but by seeing him at work in the fields, demonstrating by his own labor the lessons which philosophy inculcates—that one should endure hardships, and suffer the pains of labor with his own body, rather than depend upon another for sustenance. What is there to prevent a student while he is working from listening to a teacher speaking about self-control or justice or endurance? For those who teach philosophy well do not need many words, nor is there any need that pupils should try to master all this current

καὶ πρὸς ἐργασία γεωργικῇ ὄντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐ διὰ παντὸς
 ἐργασομένους, ἀλλὰ ἀναπαύλαις χρησομένους. ὀλίγοι μὲν οὖν τὸν
 τρόπον τοῦτον ἐβελήσουσι μαθάνειν, οἷδ' ἀκριβῶς ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ
 5 ἄμεινον μηδὲ προσιέναι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τοὺς πλείονας τῶν φιλο-
 σοφεῖν λεγόντων νέων, ὅσοι σαθροὶ τε καὶ μαλακοί, δι' οὓς
 προσιόντας ἀναπίμπλαται κηλίδων φιλοσοφία. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀλη-
 θινῶν ἐραστῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς, ὅς οὐκ ἂν ἐβελήσειε
 μετ' ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ διάγειν ἐν χωρίῳ, καὶ εἰ χαλεπώτατον τύχοι
 ὃν τὸ χωρίον, μέλλων γε ἀπολαύειν μεγάλα ταύτης τῆς διατριβῆς
 10 τῷ συνείναι τῷ διδασκάλῳ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τῷ ἀπείναι τῶν
 ἀστικῶν κακῶν, ἅπερ ἐμπόδιον τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι
 λανθάνειν εἴ ἢ κακῶς τι ποιῶν, ὃ δὴ μέγιστον τοῖς παιδευομένοις
 ὄφελος· καὶ ἐσθίειν δὲ καὶ πίνειν καὶ καθεύδειν ἐφορώμενον ὑπ'
 ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μέγα ὄφελος. ἃ δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῇ
 15 συνουσίᾳ τῇ κατ' ἀγρόν, ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖ καὶ Θεόγνις ἐν οἷς φησι

καὶ μετὰ τῶν σύ γε πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
 ἔζε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.

ὅτι γε μὴν οὐκ ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας λέγει μεγάλην
 ἔχειν δύναμιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλειαν, εἰ συνεσθίοι καὶ συμπίνοι
 20 τις αὐτοῖς καὶ συγκαθέζοιτο, δεδήλωκεν

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται· ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι
 † συμμιγῆς, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἔοντα νόον.

μὴ δὴ λεγέτω τις ὅτι τῷ μαθάνειν ἢ τῷ διδάσκειν ἃ χρὴ τὸ
 γεωργεῖν ἐμπόδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, εἰ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν
 25 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον ὃ μὲν μαθάνων συνείη τῷ διδάσκοντι, ὃ δὲ
 διδάσκων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοι τὸν μαθάνοντα. τούτου δὲ τοιούτου ὄντος,
 ὃ πόρος ἐκ γεωργίας φαίνεται ὧν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ πρεπωδέστατος.

XII.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΩΝ.

Μέρος μέντοι τρυφῆς οὐ μικρότατον κὰν τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις ἔστίν,
 ὅτι ποικίλων δέονται παιδικῶν οἱ τρυφῶντες οὐ νομίμων μόνον ἀλλὰ

20 <ὥδε> δεδήλωκεν Hense

mass of precepts on which we see our sophists pride themselves; they are enough to consume a whole life-time. But the most necessary and useful things it is not impossible for men to learn in addition to their farm work, especially if they are not kept at work constantly but have periods of rest. Now I know perfectly well that few will wish to learn in this way, yet it would be better if the majority of young men who say they are studying philosophy did not go near a philosopher, I mean those spoiled and effeminate fellows by whose presence the good name of philosophy is stained. For of the true lovers of philosophy, there is not one who would not be willing to live with a good man in the country, even if the place be very rude, since he would be bound to profit greatly from this sojourn by living with his teacher night and day, by being away from the evils of the city, which are an obstacle to the study of philosophy, and from the fact that his conduct, whether good or bad, cannot escape observation—a great advantage to those who are learning. Also to eat and drink and sleep under the supervision of a good man is a great benefit. All these things, which would come about inevitably from living together in the country, Theognis praised in the verses where he says,

“Drink and eat and sit down with good men, and win the approval of those whose influence and power is great.”

That he means that none others but good men have great power for the good of men, if one eats and drinks and sits down with them, he has shown in the following:

“From good men you will learn good, but if you mingle with the bad you will destroy even such soul as you had.”

Therefore let no one say that farming is an obstacle to learning or to teaching the lessons of duty, for it can scarcely be such an obstacle, if we realize that under these conditions the pupil lives in closest association with the teacher, and the teacher has the pupil constantly at hand. And where this is the case, earning a living by farming seems to be most suitable for a philosopher.

XII

ON SEXUAL INDULGENCE

Not the least significant part of the life of luxury and self-indulgence lies also in sexual excess; for example those who lead

16 f., 21 f. *Elegies* 33-36.

25 Persius' description of his very happy relationship with his teacher Cornutus bears out Musonius' contention. Cf. *Sat.* V, 41-44.

καὶ παρὰ νόμων, οὐδὲ θηλειῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρρένων, ἄλλοτε ἄλλους θηρώντες ἐρωμένους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν ἐτοίμῳ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀρκοῦμενοι, τῶν δὲ σπανίων ἐφιέμενοι, συμπλοκὰς δ' ἀσχήμονας ζητοῦντες, ἅπερ ἅπαντα μεγάλα ἐγκλήματα ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν. χρῆ
 5 δὲ τοὺς μὴ τρυφῶντας ἢ μὴ κακοὺς μόνον μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δὲ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικοι καὶ παράνομα, καὶ ἐν γάμῳ ἤ. συμπλοκαὶ δ' ἄλλαι αἱ μὲν κατὰ μοιχείαν παρὰ νόμους, καὶ μετριώτεροι τούτων οὐδὲν αἱ πρὸς ἄρρενας
 10 τοῖς ἄρρεσιν, ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ τόλμημα· ὅσαι δὲ μοιχείας ἐκτὸς συνουσίαι πρὸς θηλείας εἰσὶν ἐστερημέναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον, καὶ αὗται πᾶσαι αἰσχυραί, αἱ γὰρ πράττονται δι' ἀκολασίαν. ὥς μετὰ γε σωφροσύνης οὐτ' ἂν ἐταίρα πλησιάζειν ὑπομείναι τις, οὐτ' ἂν ἐλευθέρα γάμου χωρὶς οὔτε μὰ Δία θεραπεύειν τῇ αὐτοῦ.
 15 τὸ γὰρ μὴ νόμιμον μηδ' εὐπρεπὲς τῶν συνουσιῶν τούτων αἰσχρὸν τε καὶ ὄνειδος μέγα τοῖς θηρωμένοις αὐτάς· ὅθεν οὐδὲ πράττειν φανερώς οὐδὲν ἀνέχεται τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς, καὶ ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἐρυθριᾷ οἷός τε ἡ, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι δὲ καὶ λάθρα οἱ γὰρ μὴ τελῶς ἀπερρωγότες ταῦτα τολμῶσιν. καίτοι τό γε πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν
 20 ἐφ' οἷς πράττει τις ὁμολογούντος ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. νῆ Δία, φησὶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ μοιχεύων ἀδικεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς διεφθαρμένης γυναικός, οὐχ οὕτως καὶ ὁ τῇ ἐταίρᾳ συνῶν ἀδικεῖ τινὰ ἢ νῆ Δία τῇ μὴ ἐχούσῃ ἄνδρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλπίδα παίδων οὐδενὸς διαφθείρει οὗτος. ἐγὼ δ' ἐπέχω μὲν λέγειν, ὥς πᾶς ὅστις ἁμαρτάνει καὶ
 25 ἀδικεῖ εὐθύς, εἰ καὶ μηδένα τῶν πέλας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν γὰρ πάντως χείρονα ἀποφαίνων καὶ ἀτιμότερον· ὁ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνων, παρ' ὅσον ἁμαρτάνει, χείρων καὶ ἀτιμότερος. ἵνα οὖν ἐὼ τὴν ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' ἀκολασίαν γὰρ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πάντως προσεῖναι τῷ ἡττωμένῳ αἰσχυρᾷ ἡδονῇ καὶ χαίροντι τῷ μολύνεσθαι, ὥσπερ αἱ ὕες οἷος
 30 οὐχ ἡκιστα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δούλη ἰδίᾳ πλησιάζων, ὅπερ νομίζουσιν τινες μάλιστα πῶς εἶναι ἀνάτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ δεσπότης πᾶς αὐτεξούσιος εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι βούλεται χρῆσθαι δούλῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ. πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλοῦς μοι ὁ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τῷ δοκεῖ μὴ αἰσχρὸν μηδ' ἄτοπον εἶναι δούλῳ δεσπότην πλησιάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ τύχοι
 35 οὔσα χήρα, λογισάσθω πόσον τι καταφαίνεται αὐτῷ, εἰ δέσποινα δούλῳ πλησιάζοι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἀνεκτόν, οὐ μόνον εἰ κεκτημένη ἄνδρα νόμιμον ἢ γυνὴ προσοῖτο δούλον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἀνανδρος οὔσα τοῦτο πράττοι; καίτοι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐ δήπου τῶν γυναικῶν ἀξιώσει τις εἶναι χείρονας, οὐδ' ἥττον δύνασθαι τὰς
 40 ἐπιθυμίας παιδαγωγεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους τὴν γνώμην

such a life crave a variety of loves not only lawful but unlawful ones as well, not women alone but also men; sometimes they pursue one love and sometimes another, and not being satisfied with those which are available, pursue those which are rare and inaccessible, and invent shameful intimacies, all of which constitute a grave indictment of manhood. Men who are not wantons or immoral are bound to consider sexual intercourse justified only when it occurs in marriage and is indulged in for the purpose of begetting children, since that is lawful, but unjust and unlawful when it is mere pleasure-seeking, even in marriage. But of all sexual relations those involving adultery are most unlawful, and no more tolerable are those of men with men, because it is a monstrous thing and contrary to nature. But, furthermore, leaving out of consideration adultery, all intercourse with women which is without lawful character is shameful and is practiced from lack of self-restraint. So no one with any self-control would think of having relations with a courtesan or a free woman apart from marriage, no, nor even with his own maid-servant. The fact that those relationships are not lawful or seemly makes them a disgrace and a reproach to those seeking them; whence it is that no one dares to do any of these things openly, not even if he has all but lost the ability to blush, and those who are not completely degenerate dare to do these things only in hiding and in secret. And yet to attempt to cover up what one is doing is equivalent to a confession of guilt. "That's all very well," you say, "but unlike the adulterer who wrongs the husband of the woman he corrupts, the man who has relations with a courtesan or a woman who has no husband wrongs no one for he does not destroy anyone's hope of children." I continue to maintain that everyone who sins and does wrong, even if it affects none of the people about him, yet immediately reveals himself as a worse and a less honorable person; for the wrong-doer by the very fact of doing wrong is worse and less honorable. Not to mention the injustice of the thing, there must be sheer wantonness in anyone yielding to the temptation of shameful pleasure and like swine rejoicing in his own vileness. In this category belongs the man who has relations with his own slave-maid, a thing which some people consider quite without blame, since every master is held to have it in his power to use his slave as he wishes. In reply to this I have just one thing to say: if it seems neither shameful nor out of place for a master to have relations with his own slave, particularly if she happens to be unmarried, let him consider how he would like it if his wife had relations with a male slave. Would it not seem completely intolerable not only if the woman who

τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. πολὺ γὰρ κρείττονας εἶναι προσήκει τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἴπερ καὶ προεστάναι ἀξιούνται τῶν γυναικῶν ἂν μέντοι ἀκρατέστεροι φαίνονται ὄντες, <φανοῦνται ὄντες> καὶ κακίονες. ὅτι δ' ἀκρασίας ἔργον καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ δεσπότην δούλῃ πλησιάζειν, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; γνώριμον γάρ.

XIII^A.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΓΑΜΟΥ.

- 10 [Βίου καὶ γενέσεως παίδων κοινωνίαν κεφάλαιον εἶναι γάμου.]
Τὸν γὰρ γαμοῦντα, ἔφη, καὶ τὴν γαμουμένην ἐπὶ τούτῳ συνιέναι χρὴ ἑκάτερον θατέρῳ, ὥσθ' ἅμα μὲν ἀλλήλοις βιοῦν, ἅμα δὲ <παιδο>ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ κοινὰ δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἴδιον, μηδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. μεγάλη μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἀνθρώπου, ἣν ἀποτελεῖ
15 τοῦτο τὸ ζεύγος. ἀλλ' οὐπω τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τῷ γαμοῦντι, ὃ δὴ καὶ δίχα γάμου γένοιτ' ἂν συμπλεκομένων ἄλλως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῶα συμπλέκεται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ ἐν γάμῳ πάντως συμβιώσιν τε εἶναι καὶ κηδεμονίαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς περὶ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐρρωμένους καὶ ροσοῦντας καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, ἧς ἐφιέμενος ἑκάτερος ὥσπερ
20 καὶ παιδοποιίας εἰσιν ἐπὶ γάμον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἡ κηδεμονία αὕτη τέλειός ἐστι, καὶ τελέως αὐτὴν οἱ συνόντες ἀλλήλοις παρέχονται, ἀμιλλώμενοι νικᾶν ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον, οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ γάμος ἢ προσήκει ἔχει καὶ ἀξιοζήλωτός ἐστι· καλὴ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κοινωνία· ὅπου δ' ἑκάτερος σκοπεῖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμελῶν θατέρου, ἢ καὶ
25 νῇ Δί' ὁ ἕτερος οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οἰκίαν μὲν οἰκεῖ τὴν αὐτήν, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ βλέπει ἔξω, μὴ βουλόμενος τῷ ὁμόζυγι συντείνειν τε καὶ συμπνέειν, ἐνταῦθ' ἀνάγκη φθείρεσθαι μὲν τὴν κοινωνίαν, φαύλως δὲ ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα τοῖς συνοικοῦσιν, καὶ ἢ διαλύονται τέλεον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ τὴν συμμονὴν χεῖρω ἐρημίας ἔχουσιν.

4 φανοῦνται ὄντες coniecit Meineke

10 βίου . . . γάμου interpolatio mihi videtur

13 παιδοποιεῖσθαι coniecit Peerlkamp ποιεῖσθαι Hense

had a lawful husband had relations with a slave, but even if a woman without a husband should have? And yet surely one will not expect men to be less moral than women, nor less capable of disciplining their desires, thereby revealing the stronger in judgment inferior to the weaker, the rulers to the ruled. In fact, it behooves men to be much better if they expect to be superior to women, for surely if they appear to be less self-controlled they will also be baser characters. What need is there to say that it is an act of licentiousness and nothing less for a master to have relations with a slave? Everyone knows that.

XIIIA

WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE?

[That the primary end of marriage is community of life with a view to the procreation of children.] The husband and wife, he used to say, should come together for the purpose of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in health and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with desire for this as well as for having children that both entered upon marriage. Where, then, this love for each other is perfect and the two share it completely, each striving to outdo the other in devotion, the marriage is ideal and worthy of envy, for such a union is beautiful. But where each looks only to his own interests and neglects the other, or, what is worse, when one is so minded and lives in the same house but fixes his attention elsewhere and is not willing to pull together with his yoke-mate nor to agree, then the union is doomed to disaster and though they live together, yet their common interests fare badly; eventually they separate entirely or they remain together and suffer what is worse than loneliness.

10 The first sentence seems to be an interpolation.

22 This fine passage, reminiscent of the Pauline "in honour preferring one another" (*Rom. XII, 10*) recalls Tacitus' description of the relationship between Agricola and his wife. Cf. *Agricola* 6.

XIII^B.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΤΙ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΓΑΜΟΥ.

Διὸ χρὴ τοὺς γαμοῦντας οὐκ εἰς γένος ἀφορᾶν εἰ ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν,
 5 οὐδ' εἰς χρήματα εἰ πολλὰ κέκτηνται τινες, οὐδ' εἰς σώματα εἰ
 καλὰ ἔχουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος οὔτε κάλλος οὐτ' εὐγένεια
 κοινωνίαν μᾶλλον αὔξειν πέφυκεν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁμόνοιαν, οὐδ' αὖ
 τὴν παιδοποιίαν κρείττω ταῦτα ἀπεργάζεται. ἀλλὰ σώματα μὲν
 πρὸς γάμον ἀποχρῶντα τὰ ὑγιή καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν μέσα καὶ αὐτουργεῖν
 10 ἱκανά, ἀ δὲ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειτ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκολάστων ἦττον, καὶ
 ἐργάζοιτο μᾶλλον ὅσα σώματος ἔργα, καὶ παιδοποιεῖτο μὴ ενδεῶς.
 ψυχὰς δὲ ἐπιτηδειοτάτας εἶναι νομιστέον τὰς πρὸς σωφροσύνην
 καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφροσύνας. ποῖος μὲν
 γὰρ γάμος χωρὶς ὁμοιοῦς καλός; ποία δὲ κοινωνία χρηστή; πῶς
 15 δ' ἂν ὁμονοήσκειαν ἄνθρωποι πονηροὶ ὄντες ἀλλήλοις; ἢ πῶς ἀγαθὸς
 πονηρῷ ὁμονοήσκειν (ἀν); οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον ἢ ὀρθῶ ξύλῳ στρεβλὸν
 συναρμόσειεν ἂν, ἢ στρεβλὰ ἄμφω ὄντα ἀλλήλοις. τὸ γὰρ δὴ
 στρεβλὸν τῷ τε ὁμοίῳ τῷ στρεβλῷ ἀνάρμοστον καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τῷ
 εὐθείῳ ἔτι μᾶλλον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς τῷ τε πονηρῷ οὐ φίλος οὐδ'
 20 ὁμονοεῖ καὶ πολὺ ἦττον τῷ χρηστῷ.

XIV.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΤΙ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΟΝ ΤΩΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ ΓΑΜΟΣ.

Ἄλλου δὲ τινος φήσαντος, ὅτι ἐμπόδιον αὐτῷ δοκοίη εἶναι τῷ
 25 φιλοσοφεῖν γάμος καὶ ὁ σὺν γυναικὶ βίος, Πυθαγόρα μὲν, εἶπεν
 ὁ Μουσώνιος, οὐκ ἐμπόδιον ἦν, οὐδὲ Σωκράτει, οὐδὲ Κράτῃ, ὧν
 ἕκαστος συνῆκεν γυναικί· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον

16 ἄν Wendland

1 Undoubtedly this is a part of the same large discourse from which
 XIII^A was taken.

XIII^B

WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE?

Therefore those who contemplate marriage ought to have regard neither for family, whether either one be of high-born parents, nor for wealth, whether on either side there be great possessions, nor for physical traits, whether one or the other have beauty. For neither wealth nor beauty nor high birth is effective in promoting partnership of interest or sympathy, nor again are they significant for producing children. But as for the body it is enough for marriage that it be healthy, of normal appearance, and capable of hard work, such as would be less exposed to the snares of tempters, better adapted to perform physical labor, and not wanting in strength to beget or to bear children. With respect to character or soul one should expect that it be habituated to self-control and justice, and in a word, naturally disposed to virtue. <These qualities should be present in both man and wife.> For without sympathy of mind and character between husband and wife, what marriage can be good, what partnership advantageous? How could two human beings who are base have sympathy of spirit one with the other? Or how could one that is good be in harmony with one that is bad? No more than a crooked piece of wood could be fitted to a straight one, or two crooked ones be put together. For the crooked one will not fit another crooked one, and much less the opposite, a crooked with a straight one. So a wicked man is not friendly to a wicked one, nor does he agree with him, and much less with a good man.

XIV

IS MARRIAGE A HANDICAP FOR THE PURSUIT OF PHILOSOPHY?

Again when someone said that marriage and living with a wife seemed to him a handicap to the pursuit of philosophy, Musonius said that it was no handicap to Pythagoras, nor to Socrates, nor to Crates, each of whom lived with a wife, and one could not

13 A connecting sentence seems to have dropped out of the Greek text at this point.
 19 f. Cf. Plato *Lysis* 214D.

ἐκείνων ἐτέρους φιλοσοφῆσαντας. καίτοι γε Κράτης ἄοικός τε καὶ ἄσκευής καὶ ἀκτήμων τέλεον ἦν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔγημεν· εἴτα μὴδ' ὑπόδυσιν ἔχων ἰδίαν ἐν ταῖς δημοσίαις Ἀθήνησι στοαῖς διημέρευε καὶ διενυκτέρευε μετὰ τῆς γυναικός· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπ' οἰκίας ὁρμώμενοι, 5 καὶ οἰκέτας τοὺς ὑπηρετοῦντας ἔχοντες ἔνιοι, τολμῶμεν ὅμως λέγειν ἐμπόδιον εἶναι φιλοσοφίᾳ γάμον; καὶ μὴν ὃ γε φιλόσοφος διδάσκαλος δῆπου καὶ ἡγεμὼν πάντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπων προσηκόντων· κατὰ φύσιν δ', εἴ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ γαμέειν φαίνεται ὄν. ἐπεὶ τοῦ χάριν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργὸς πρῶτον 10 μὲν ἔτεμε δίχα τὸ γένος ἡμῶν, εἴτ' ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ διττὰ αἰδοῖα, τὸ μὲν εἶναι θήλεος τὸ δὲ ἄρρενος, εἴτα δὲ ἐνεποίησεν ἐπιθυμίαν ἰσχυρὰν ἐκατέρῳ θατέρου τῆς θ' ὁμιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ πόθον ἰσχυρὸν ἀμφοῖν ἀλλήλων ἐνεκέρασεν, τῷ μὲν ἄρρενι τοῦ θήλεος τῷ δὲ θήλει τοῦ ἄρρενος; ἂρ' οὖν <οὐ> γινώσκον, ὅτι ἐβού- 15 λετο συνεῖναι τε αὐτῷ καὶ συζῆν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀλλήλοιον συμμηχανᾶσθαι, καὶ γένεσιν παίδων καὶ τροφήν ἅμα ποιεῖσθαι, ὥς ἂν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν αἰδῖον ᾖ; τί δ'; εἰπέ μοι, πότερα προσήκει ἕκαστον ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ τοῦ πέλας, καὶ ὅπως οἴκοι ὦσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅπως ἡ πόλις μὴ ἔρημος ᾖ, καὶ ὅπως τὸ κοινὸν ἔξει 20 καλῶς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ φῆς, ὥς τὸ αὐτοῦ σκεπτέον μόνον, ἀποφαίνεται τὸν ἀνθρώπον λύκου μὴδὲν διαφέροντα μὴδ' ἄλλον θηρίου τῶν ἀγριωτάτων μὴδενός, ἅπερ ἀπὸ βίας καὶ πλεονεξίας πέφυκε ζῆν, μὴ φειδόμενα μὴδενὸς ἀφ' ὅτου μέλλει καρποῦσθαι τι ἡδύ, ἅμοιρα μὲν κοινωνίας ὄντα, ἅμοιρα δὲ συνεργίας τῆς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἅμοιρα 25 δὲ δικαίου παντός. εἰ δ' ὁμολογήσεις τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν μελίσσῃ μάλιστα προσεοικέναι, ἢ μὴ δύναται μόνη ζῆν, ἀπόλλυται γὰρ μονωθεῖσα, πρὸς ἓν δὲ καὶ κοινὸν ἔργον τῶν ὁμοφύλων συν- νέενυκε καὶ συμπράττει καὶ συνεργάζεται τοῖς πλησίον· εἰ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ἔχει, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις κακία μὲν ἀνθρώπου εἶναι 30 ὑπέιληπται ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀγριότης καὶ τὸ τοῦ πλησίον πράττοντος κακῶς ἀφροντιστεῖν, ἀρετὴ δὲ φιλανθρωπία καὶ χρηστότης καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ εὐεργετικὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πέλας· οὕτω καὶ πόλεως ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ φροντιστέον καὶ τῇ πόλει οἶκον περιβλητέον. ἀρχὴ δὲ οἴκου περιβολῆς γάμος. 35 ὥστε ὁ ἀναιρὼν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γάμον ἀναιρεῖ μὲν οἶκον, ἀναιρεῖ δὲ πόλιν, ἀναιρεῖ δὲ σύμπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διαμένει μὴ γενέσεως οὐσης, οὐδ' ἂν γένεσις εἴη μὴ γάμου ὄντος, ἢ γε δικαία καὶ νόμιμος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οἶκος ἢ πόλις οὐτ' ἐκ γυναικῶν

1 Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 22, 76.

mention better philosophers than these. Crates, although homeless and completely without property or possessions, was nevertheless married; furthermore, not having a shelter of his own, he spent his days and nights in the public porticoes of Athens together with his wife. How, then, can we, who have a home to start with and some of us even have servants to work for us, venture to say that marriage is a handicap for philosophy? Now the philosopher is indeed the teacher and leader of men in all the things which are appropriate for men according to nature, and marriage, if anything, is manifestly in accord with nature. For, to what other purpose did the creator of mankind first divide our human race into two sexes, male and female, then implant in each a strong desire for association and union with the other, instilling in both a powerful longing each for the other, the male for the female and the female for the male? Is it not then plain that he wished the two to be united and live together, and by their joint efforts to devise a way of life in common, and to produce and rear children together, so that the race might never die? Tell me, then, is it fitting for each man to act for himself alone or to act in the interest of his neighbor also, not only that there may be homes in the city but also that the city may not be deserted and that the common good may best be served? If you say that each one should look out for his own interests alone, you represent man as no different from a wolf or any other of the wildest beasts which are born to live by violence and plunder, sparing nothing from which they may gain some advantage, having no part in a life in common with others, no part in cooperation with others, no share of any notion of justice. If you will agree that man's nature most closely resembles the bee which cannot live alone (for it dies when left alone), but bends its energies to the one common task of his fellows and toils and works together with his neighbors; if this is so, and in addition you recognize that for man evil consists in injustice and cruelty and indifference to a neighbor's trouble, while virtue is brotherly love and goodness and justice and beneficence and concern for the welfare of one's neighbor—with such ideas, I say, it would be each man's duty to take thought for his own city, and to make of his home a rampart for its protection. But the first step toward making his home such a rampart is marriage. Thus whoever destroys human marriage destroys the home, the city, and the whole human race. For it would not last if there were no procreation of children and there would be no just and lawful procreation of children without marriage. That the home or the city does not depend upon women alone or upon men alone, but upon their

συνίσταται μόνον οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνδρῶν μόνον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους
κοινωνίας, δῆλον· ἀνδρῶν δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν κοινωνίας ἄλλην οὐκ
ἂν εὔροι τις οὐτ' ἀναγκαιοτέραν οὔτε προσφιλεστέραν. ποῖος γὰρ
ἐταῖρος ἐταίρῳ οὕτω προσηγῆς ὡς γυνὴ καταθύμιος τῷ γεγαμηκότι;
5 ποῖος δ' ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ; ποῖος δὲ γονεὺσιν υἱός; τίς δὲ ἀπῶν
οὕτω ποθεινὸς ὡς ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί; τίνος δὲ παρουσία
μᾶλλον ἢ λύπην ἐλαφρύνειν ἢ χαρὰν ἐπαυξήσκειν ἢ συμφορὰν
ἐπανορθώσκειν; τίσι δὲ νεόμισται κοινὰ εἶναι πάντα, καὶ σώματα
καὶ ψυχὰ καὶ χρήματα, πλὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός; ταῦτά τοι καὶ
10 πάντες ἄνθρωποι πρεσβυτάτην νομίζουσι πασῶν τὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ
γυναικὸς φιλίαν· καὶ οὐδὲ μήτηρ ἢ πατήρ νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς ἀξιοῖ
φίλτερος <εἶναι> τῷ ἑαυτοῦ τέκνῳ τοῦ συνεζευγμένου γάμῳ. καὶ ὁ
λόγος δὲ ἐκεῖνος φαίνεται δηλοῦν, ὅσον προτερεῖ τῆς γονέων πρὸς
τέκνα φιλίας ἢ γυναικὸς πρὸς ἄνδρα, ὅτι Ἄδμητος δόσιν ταύτην
15 λαβὼν παρὰ θεῶν, εἰ παράσχοι τὸν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ τεθνηξόμενον,
ζῆσαι διπλασίῳ χρόνον τοῦ τεταγμένου αὐτῷ, τῶν μὲν γονέων οὐκ
ἔτυχεν ἐθελόντων προαποθανεῖν αὐτοῦ καίτοι γεγηρακότων ἢ γυνὴ
δὲ ἢ γαμετὴ Ἀλκηστις, κομιδῇ νέα οὔσα, ἐδέξατο ἐτοίμως τὸν
θάνατον πρὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός.

20 Ὅτι δὲ μέγα καὶ ἀξιοσπούδαστον ὁ γάμος ἐστὶ, καὶ ταύτη
δῆλον. θεοὶ γὰρ ἐπιτροπεύουσιν αὐτόν, καθὼ νομίζονται παρ'
ἀνθρώποις, μεγάλοι· πρώτη μὲν Ἥρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζυγίαν αὐτὴν
προσαγορεύομεν· εἴτα Ἔρως, εἴτα Ἀφροδίτη· πάντας γὰρ τούτους
ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἔργον πεποιῆσθαι τοῦτο, συνάγειν ἀλλήλους πρὸς
25 παιδοποιίαν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. ποῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἔρως παραγένειτ'
ἂν δικαιότερον ἢ ἐπὶ νόμιμον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ὁμιλίαν; ποῦ
δὲ Ἥρα; ποῦ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη; πότε δ' ἂν εὐκαιρότερον εὔξαιτό τις
τοῖς θεοῖς τούτοις ἢ πρὸς γάμον ἰών; τί δὲ καλοῦντες ἀφροδίσιον
ἔργον προσηκόντως ἂν μᾶλλον καλοῖμεν ἢ τὴν γαμετῆς τῷ γεγα-
30 μηκότι σύνοδον; διὰ τί τοιγαροῦν φαίη τις ἂν θεοὺς μὲν οὕτω
μεγάλους ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιτροπεύειν γάμον καὶ παιδοποιίαν, μὴ
προσῆκειν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα; διὰ τί δὲ προσῆκειν μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
ταῦτα, μὴ προσῆκειν δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ; πότερον <ὅτι> κακίῳ εἶναι
χρὴ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν φιλόσοφον; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ, κρείττω δὲ καὶ δικαιό-
35 τερον καὶ καλοκάγαθικώτερον. ἢ ὅτι κακίων οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀδικώτερος
ἀνὴρ τοῦ μὲν κηδομένου τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως ὁ μὴ κηδόμενος, τοῦ
δὲ τὸ κοινὸν σκοποῦντος ὁ τὸ αὐτοῦ μόνον ὀρών; ἢ ὅτι φιλόπολις
καὶ φιλόανθρωπος καὶ κοινωνικὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ὁ μονήρη βίον

14 He refers particularly to lines 282-298 of Euripides' *Alcestis*.

union with each other is evident. One could find no other associa-
tion more necessary nor more pleasant than that of men and
women. For what man is so devoted to his friend as a loving
wife is to her husband? What brother to a brother? What son
to his parents? Who is so longed for when absent as a husband
by his wife, or a wife by her husband? Whose presence would
do more to lighten grief or increase joy or remedy misfortune?
To whom is everything judged to be common, body, soul, and
possessions, except man and wife? For these reasons all men
consider the love of man and wife to be the highest form of love;
and no reasonable mother or father would expect to entertain a
deeper love for his own child than for the one joined to him in
marriage. Indeed how much the love of a wife for her husband
surpasses the love of parents for their children is clearly illus-
trated by the familiar story of how Admetus, receiving from the
gods the privilege of living twice the time allotted to him if he
could get someone else to die in his place, found his parents
unwilling to die for him although they were old, but his wedded
wife Alcestis, though still very young, readily accepted death in
her husband's place.

How great and worthy an estate is marriage is plain from this
also, that gods watch over it, great gods, too, in the estimation of
men; first Hera (and for this reason we address her as the
patroness of wedlock), then Eros, then Aphrodite, for we assume
that all of these perform the function of bringing together man
and woman for the procreation of children. Where, indeed, does
Eros more properly belong than in the lawful union of man and
wife? Where Hera? Where Aphrodite? When would one more
appropriately pray to these divinities than when entering into
marriage? What should we more properly call the work of
Aphrodite than the joining of wife and husband? Why, then,
should anyone say that such great divinities watch over and
guard marriage and the procreation of children, unless these
things are the proper concern of man? Why should one say that
they are the proper concern of man but not the concern of the
philosopher? Can it be because the philosopher is worse than
other men? Certainly he ought not to be worse, but better and
more just and more truly good. Or could one say that the man
who does not take an interest in his city is not worse and more
unjust than the man who does, the man who looks out only for
his own interests is not worse than the one who looks out for
the common good? Or can it be that the man who chooses the
single life is more patriotic, more a friend and partner of his
fellow-man, than the man who maintains a home and rears

αἰρούμενος τοῦ νέμοντος οἶκον καὶ ποιουμένου παῖδας καὶ πόλιν αὖξοντος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἅπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ γαμοῦντι; ὅτι μὲν οὖν προσήκει τὸν φιλόσοφον γάμου καὶ παιδοποιίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, δηλον. εἰ δὲ προσήκει τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, ὃ νεανίσκε, ὁ
 5 λόγος ἐκείνος, ὃν σὺ ἀρτίως ἔλεγες, ὡς ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γάμος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἕτερόν τι φαίνεται ὃν ἢ τὸ ἅ πρέπει καὶ ἅ προσήκει λόγῳ μὲν ἀναζητεῖν, ἔργῳ δὲ πράττειν. Τότε μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶπεν.

XV.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

10

ΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΑ ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ ΤΕΚΝΑ ΘΡΕΠΤΕΟΝ.

Οἱ δὲ νομοθεταί, οἷς αὐτὸ τοῦτο γέγονεν ἔργον ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν, τί μὲν ἀγαθὸν πόλει τί δὲ κακόν, καὶ τί μὲν ὠφελεῖ τί δὲ βλάπτει τὸ κοινόν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πάντες συμφορώτατον μὲν
 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνόμισαν τὸ πληθύνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν οἴκους, βλαβερώτατον δὲ τὸ μειοῦσθαι; καὶ ἀπαιδίαν μὲν ἢ ὀλιγοπαιδίαν τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι ἀλυσιτελές, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν παῖδας καὶ νῆ Δία πολλοὺς ἔχειν εἶναι λυσιτελές; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀμβλίσκειν ἀπείπον ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ ταῖς ἀπειθούσαις ζημίαν ἐπέθεσαν, τοῦτο
 20 δ' ἀτοκία προστίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν κύησιν εἶργειν ἀπηγόρευσαν αὐταῖς, τοῦτο δὲ πολυπαιδίας ἔταξαν γέρα καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί, καὶ τὴν ἀπαιδίαν ἐπιζήμιον κατέστησαν. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἡμεῖς ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα δρῶμεν ἐναντία δρῶντες τῇ βουλήσει τῶν νομοθετῶν, θείων καὶ θεοφιλῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷς ἔπεσθαι νομίζεται
 25 καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον; δρῶμεν δ' ἂν ἐναντία τὴν πολυπαιδίαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν κωλύοντες. πῶς δ' οὐχὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς πατρώους θεοὺς ἔξαμαρτάνοιμεν ἂν καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁμόγνιον Δία ταῦτα πράττοντες; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ περὶ ξένους ἄδικος εἰς τὸν ξένιον ἀμαρτάνει Δία, καὶ ὁ περὶ φίλους εἰς τὸν φίλιον, οὕτως ὅστις εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γένος
 30 ἄδικος, εἰς τοὺς πατρώους ἀμαρτάνει θεοὺς καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁμόγνιον Δία, τὸν ἐπόπτην τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη· ὁ δὲ γε

11 This fragmentary treatise deals with the problem of limiting the size of families by destroying unwanted children.

12-22 Aristotle (*Pol.* II, 9) gives an account of Lycurgus' legislation on the subject. Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* II, 15) comments also upon Augustus's laws. He refers to the *Lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* which

children and contributes to the growth of his city, which is exactly what a married man does? It is clear, therefore, that it is fitting for a philosopher to concern himself with marriage and having children. And if this is fitting, how, my young friend, could that argument of yours that marriage is a handicap for a philosopher ever be sound? For manifestly the study of philosophy is nothing else than to search out by reason what is right and proper and by deeds to put it into practice. Such, then, were the words he spoke at that time.

XV

SHOULD EVERY CHILD THAT IS BORN BE RAISED?

Is it not true that the lawgivers, whose special function it was by careful search to discern what is good for the state and what is bad, what promotes and what is detrimental to the common good, all considered the increase of the homes of the citizens the most fortunate thing for the cities and the decrease of them the most shameful thing? And when the citizens had few or no children did they not regard it as a loss, but when they had children, yes, plenty of them, did they not regard it as a gain? So it was for this reason that they forbade women to suffer abortions and imposed a penalty upon those who disobeyed; for this reason they discouraged them from choosing childlessness and avoiding parenthood, and for this reason they gave to both husband and wife a reward for large families, and set a penalty upon childlessness. How, then, can we avoid doing wrong and breaking the law if we do the opposite of the wish of the lawgivers, godlike men and dear to the gods, whom it is considered good and advantageous to follow? And certainly we do the opposite if we avoid having many children. How can we help committing a sin against the gods of our fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the race, if we do this? For just as the man who is unjust to strangers sins against Zeus, god of hospitality, and one who is unjust to friends sins against Zeus, god of friendship, so whoever is unjust to his own family sins against the gods of his fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the family, from whom

was passed in 18 B.C. and the *Lex Papia Poppaea* passed in 9 A.D. Cf. Suetonius, *Aug.* XXXIV.

περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀμαρτάνων ἀσεβής. καὶ μὴν ὅτι καλὸν καὶ λυσι-
 τελὲς παίδων ἀνατροφὴ πολλῶν μάθοι τις ἂν λογισάμενος, ὡς μὲν
 ἐντὶμος ἐν πόλει πολὺπαις ἀνὴρ, ὡς δ' αἰδῶ παρέχει τοῖς πλησίον,
 ὡς δὲ δύναται πλεον πάντων τῶν ὁμοίων, ἂν γε μὴ ὁμοίως παίδων
 5 εὐπορώσιν. καθάπερ γάρ, οἶμαι, πολὺφίλος ἀφίλου ἀνδρὸς
 δυνατώτερος, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ πολὺπαις τοῦ μὴ ἔμπαιδος
 ἢ τοῦ ὀλίγου κεκτημένου παῖδας, καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ περ
 ἐγγύτερον υἱὸς ἐκάστω ἢ φίλος. ἄξιον δὲ νοῆσαι πόλιν τι καὶ
 10 θεάμα' ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ πολὺπαις ἢ γυνὴ σὺν ἀθροῖς ὁρώμενοι τοῖς
 ἑαυτῶν παισίν· οὔτε γὰρ πομπὴν πεμπομένην θεοῖς οὕτω καλὴν
 θεάσασθαι' ἂν τις οὔτε χορείαν ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς κόσμῳ χορευόντων οὕτως
 ἀξιοθέατον, ὡς χορὸν παίδων πολλῶν προηγούμενων ἐν πόλει
 πατρὸς τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἢ μητρός, <καὶ> χειραγωγούντων τοὺς γονεῖς ἢ
 15 τοῦ θεάματος; τί δὲ τῶν γονέων τούτων ζηλωτότερον, ἄλλως τε
 καὶ ἐπιεικέις ὦσι; τίσι δ' ἂν ἄλλοις οὕτω προθύμως ἢ συνενύξαιτό
 τις ἀγαθὰ παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ συμπράξειεν αὐτοῖς εἰς ὃ τι δέοντο; νῆ
 Δία, φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἂν πέν<η>ς ὦ καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορῶ, <κε>κτῆται
 20 δὲ τὰ μικρὰ τα<ῦτα> ὁρ<νίθια>, πολὺ σοῦ ἀπορώτερα, <αἰ> χελιδόνες
 καὶ ἀηδόνες <καὶ> κορυδοὶ καὶ κόσσυφοὶ τρέ<φου>σι τοὺς νεοττοὺς
 τοὺς ἑαυ<τῶν>; περὶ ὧν καὶ Ὀμηρος λέγ<ει> οὕτως·

ὡς δ' ὄρνις ἀπτήσι <νεο>σοῖσιν προφέρηται
 μά<στακ>' ἐπεὶ κε λάβῃσι, κακῶς <δ' ἄρα> οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ.

25 πότερον <συν>έσει τὰ ζῶα ταῦτα τοῦ ἀν<θρώ>που προτέρ<ε>ι;
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν <εἴποισ>. τί δέ; ῥώμη καὶ ἰσχύι; ἀ<λλὰ> πολὺν> ἔτι
 τοῦτο ἦττον. τί δ'; ἀποτί<θε>ται καὶ φυλάσσει τροφήν; . . .

“Ὁ δέ μοι δοκεῖ δεινότατον, οὐδὲ πενίαν ἔνιοι προφασίζεσθαι
 ἔχοντες, ἀλλ' εὐποροὶ χρημάτων ὄντες, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πλούσιοι,
 30 τολμῶσιν ὅμως τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τέκνα μὴ τρέφειν, ἵνα τὰ προγενό-
 μενα εὐπορῇ μᾶλλον, ἐξ ἀνοσίῳ μηχανώμενοι τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῖς

18 πέν<η>ς ὦ Snell πέν<σ>ω Powell <κε>κτῆται Körte <κέ>κτῆται Snell,
 Powell

19 <πάν>τα Snell <ταῦ>τα Powell

24 μά<στακ>' Snell μά<στακα> Powell

18 The Greek text of the older editions of Musonius breaks off abruptly at this point, but a recently discovered papyrus fragment (*The Rendel Harris Papyri* I) supplies the text for lines 18-27. Cf. Introduction note 12.

23 f. *Iliad* IX, 323 f.

wrongs done to the family are not hidden, and surely one who sins against the gods is impious. And that raising many children is an honorable and profitable thing one may gather from the fact that a man who has many children is honored in the city, that he has the respect of his neighbors, that he has more influence than his equals if they are not equally blest with children. I need not argue that a man with many friends is more powerful than one who has no friends, and so a man who has many children is more powerful than one without any or with only a few children, or rather much more so, since a son is closer than a friend. One may remark what a fine sight it is to see a man or woman surrounded by their children. Surely one could not witness a procession arrayed in honor of the gods so beautiful nor a choral dance performed in order at a religious celebration so well worth seeing as a chorus of children forming a guard of honor for their father or mother in the city of their birth, leading their parents by the hand or dutifully caring for them in some other way. What is more beautiful than this sight? What is more enviable than these parents, especially if they are good people? For whom would one more gladly join in praying for blessings from the gods, or whom would one be more willing to assist in need? Very true, you say, but I am a poor man and quite without means, and if I have many children, from what source should I find food for them all? But pray, whence do the little birds, which are much poorer than you, feed their young, the swallows and nightingales and larks and blackbirds? Homer speaks of them in these words:

“Even as a bird carries to her unfledged young whatever morsels she happens to come upon, though she fares badly herself—”

Do these creatures surpass man in intelligence? You certainly would not say that. In strength and endurance, then? No, still less in that respect. Well, then, do they put away food and store it up? <Not at all, and yet they rear their young and find sustenance for all that are born to them. The plea of poverty, therefore, is unjustified.>

But what seems to me most monstrous of all, some who do not even have poverty as an excuse, and in spite of prosperity and even riches are so inhuman as not to rear later-born offspring

27 A transitional sentence between the end of the new text and the beginning of the second part (XVB) of the traditional text seems to be missing.

παισίν· οἱ γε ἀναιροῦσιν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀδελφούς, ἵν' ἐκεῖνοι μερίδα
 μείζω τῶν πατρῶων ἔχωσι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὅσῳ κρείττον <τὸ>
 πολλοὺς ἔχειν ἀδελφούς τοῦ πολλὰ ἔχειν χρήματα. χρήματα μὲν
 γὰρ ἐπιβουλὰς ἐγείρει παρὰ τῶν πλησίων· οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ τοὺς
 5 ἐπιβούλους ἀνείργουσι. καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ δέεται βοηθείας· οἱ δ'
 ἀδελφοὶ βοηθοὶ εἰσι κράτιστοι. καὶ οὔτε φίλον ἀγαθὸν ἀδελφῷ
 παρα<βάλλειν ἐστὶ, οὔτε τὴν βοηθείαν> ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐτέρων
 ὁμοίων τε καὶ ἴσων τῇ ἀπ' ἀδελφῶν. τί δ' ἂν τις παραβάλοι καλὸν
 εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἐξ ἀδελφοῦ εἰς ἀσφαλείας λόγον; τίνα δὲ κοινωνὸν
 10 ἀγαθῶν εὐμενέστερον σχοίῃ τις ἂν ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἐπιεικῇ; τίνας δὲ
 παρουσίαν ἐν συμφοραῖς μᾶλλον ποθήσειεν ἂν ἢ τοιούτου ἀδελφοῦ;
 ἐγὼ μὲν ἀξιοζηλότατον ἡγοῦμαι τὸν ἐπὶ πλήθει ἀδελφῶν ὁμο-
 νοούντων βιούντα· καὶ θεοφιλέστατον εἶναι νομίζω τὸν ἄνδρα
 τοῦτον οἴκοθεν ἔχοντα τάγαθά. διὸ καὶ νομίζω δεῖν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν
 15 τοῖς αὐτοῦ παισὶ πειραῖσθαι χρημάτων μᾶλλον ἀπολείπειν ἀδελφούς,
 ὥς ἀφορμὰς ἀγαθῶν ἀπολείφοντα μείζοντας.

XVI.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΟΝΕΤΣΙΝ.

20 Νεανίας τις, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ φιλοσοφεῖν βουλόμενον ἐκώλυνεν, ἤρετο
 αὐτὸν ὧδέ πως· Ἐγὼ γάρ γε, ὦ Μουσώνιε, χρὴ πάντα πείθεσθαι τοῖς
 γονεῦσιν, ἢ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ παρακουστέον αὐτῶν; Καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος·
 Πείθεσθαι μὲν, ἔφη, μητρὶ ἢ πατρὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον φαίνεται
 καλόν, καὶ ἐπαινῶ ἐγώ γε. τί μέντοι τὸ πείθεσθαι ἐστὶ, θεασώμεθα·
 25 μᾶλλον δὲ πρότερον τὸ ἀπειθεῖν ὁποῖόν τι, καὶ ὁ ἀπειθὴς ὅστις,
 καταμάθωμεν, εἴθ' οὕτως κρείττον ὁψόμεθα τὸ πείθεσθαι ὁποῖόν τι
 ἐστὶ. φέρε δὴ, εἰ νῦν νοσοῦντι ὁ πατὴρ οὐκ ὦν ἰατρὸς οὐδὲ ἔμπειρος
 ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσερῶν προστάττοι τι ὥς ὠφέλιμον, τὸ δὲ εἴη
 βλαβερόν καὶ ἀσύμφορον, καὶ μὴ λανθάνοι τὸν νοσοῦντα τοιοῦτον
 30 ὅν, ἂρά γε μὴ πράττων ἐκεῖνος τὸ προσταχθέν ἀπειθεῖ τε καὶ
 ἀπειθὴς ἐστίν; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔοικεν. τί δέ, εἴ του ὁ πατὴρ νοσῶν αὐτὸς

7 παρα<βάλλειν ἐστὶ, οὔτε τὴν βοηθείαν> ἀπ' coniecit Peerlkamp παρὰ τὸν
 † ἀπὸ Hense

in order that those earlier born may inherit greater wealth—by such a deed of wickedness planning prosperity for their surviving children. That these may have a greater share of their father's goods, their parents rob them of brothers, never having learned how much better it is to have many brothers than to have many possessions. For possessions inspire intrigue on the part of the neighbors, but brothers discourage intriguers. And possessions need support, but brothers are the strongest supporters. One cannot compare a good friend to a brother nor the help which others, friends and equals, give to that which a brother gives. What good would one compare to the good will of a brother as a pledge of security? What better disposed sharer of common goods could one find than a good brother? Whose presence in misfortune would one desire more than such a brother's? For my part I consider the man most enviable who lives amid a number of like-minded brothers, and I consider most beloved of the gods the man who has these blessings at home. Therefore I believe that each one of us ought to try to leave brothers rather than money to our children so as to leave greater assurances of blessings.

XVI

MUST ONE OBEY ONE'S PARENTS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES?

A certain young man who wished to study philosophy, but was forbidden by his father to do so, put this question to him: "Tell me, Musonius, must one obey one's parents in all things, or are there some circumstances under which one need not heed them?" And Musonius replied, "That everyone should obey his mother and father seems a good thing, and I certainly recommend it. However, let us see what this matter of obedience is, or rather, first, what is the nature of disobedience, and let us consider who the disobedient person is, if in this way we may better understand what the nature of obedience is.

Now then, take this case. If a father who is not a physician and not experienced in matters of health or sickness should prescribe for his invalid son something which was harmful and injurious, and the son was aware of that fact, surely in not following his

20-23 Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* II, 7) tells us that this was a favorite topic for discussion by the philosophers.

οἶνον ἢ τροφήν αἰτοίῃ παρὰ καιρόν, μέλλων εἰ λάβοι μείζω τὴν νόσον ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ παῖς τοῦτο εἰδὼς μὴ διδοίη, ἄρα γε ἀπειθεὶ τῷ πατρί; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. καὶ πολὺ γε τούτου ἥττον ἐκείνου, οἶμαι, φαίη ἂν τις ἀπειθῇ εἶναι, ὅστις πατέρα φιλοκερδῇ ἔχων, 5 κελυόμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κλέπτειν ἢ παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερεῖν, οὐχ ὑπουργεῖ τῷ προστάγματι. ἢ οὐκ οἶει σύ τινος εἶναι πατέρα, οἷ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶ προστάττονσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶδά τινα οὕτω πονηρόν, ὅς γε υἱὸν ἔχων ὥραλον τὴν ὥραν ἀπέδοτο αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν ἐκείνο τὸ μεираκίον τὸ πεπραμένον, πεμπόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ 10 πατρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην, ἀντέλεγε καὶ οὐκ ἀπῆει, πότερον ἀπειθὲς ἂν τὸ μεираκίον ἔφαιμεν εἶναι ἢ σωφρονεῖν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐρωτᾶν τοῦτό γε ἄξιον; καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀπειθεῖν καὶ ὁ ἀπειθῆς λοιδορία ἐστὶ καὶ ὄνειδος· τὸ δὲ μὴ πράττειν ἢ μὴ χρῆ οὐκ ὄνειδος, ἀλλ' ἔπαινος. ὥστε εἴτε πατρὸς εἴτε ἄρχοντος εἴτε καὶ νῆ Δία δεσπότου προστάγ- 15 ματι μὴ ὑπουργεῖ τις κακὰ προστάττοντος ἢ ἄδικα ἢ αἰσχρά, οὐκ ἀπειθεῖ οὐδαμῶς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄδικεῖ οὐδ' ἁμαρτάνει· ἀλλ' ἐκείνος ἀπειθεῖ μόνος ὁ τῶν εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως προσταττομένων ἀφροντιστῶν καὶ παρακούων. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπειθῆς τοιοῦτός τις ἐστίν· ὁ δ' εὐπειθῆς ἔχει μὲν ἐναντίως τούτῳ καὶ ἔστιν ἐναντίος, 20 εἴη δ' ἂν ὁ τῷ τὰ προσήκοντα παραινοῦντι κατήκοος ὢν καὶ ἐπόμενος ἐκουσίως, οὗτος εὐπειθῆς. ὅθεν καὶ γονεῦσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τότε πείθεται τις, ὅταν χρηστὰ παραινούντων αὐτῶν ταῦτα πράττη ἐκῶν. ἐγὼ μέντοι κἂν μὴ παραινούντων τῶν γονέων πράττη τις ἢ χρῆ καὶ συμφέρει αὐτῷ, φημι τοῦτον πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν· 25 καὶ ὅτι ὀρθῶς φημι, σκοπεῖ οὕτως. ὁ γὰρ δὴ πράττων ἢ βούλεται ὁ πατήρ καὶ τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπόμενος πείθεται, οἶμαι, τῷ πατρί· ὁ δὲ πράττων ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ κρεῖττόν ἐστι, τῇ βουλήσει ἔπεται τοῦ πατρός. τίνα τρόπον; ὅτι πάντες οἱ γονεῖς εὐνοοῦσι δήπου τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισίν, εὐνοοῦντες δὲ βούλονται ἢ χρῆ καὶ 30 συμφέρει πράττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν. ὅστις οὖν πράττει τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, πράττει οὗτος ἢ βούλονται οἱ γονεῖς. ὥστε πείθεται τοῖς γονεῦσι ταῦτα πράττων, κἂν μὴ τῷ λόγῳ κελύωσιν αὐτὰ πράττειν οἱ γονεῖς. τοῦτο δὴ μόνον προσήκει σκοπεῖν, ὅστις βούλεται πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἐφ' ἐκάστω τῶν πραττομένων, 35 εἰ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον ὃ μέλλει πράξειν ἐστίν, ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν. ὥς ἂν ὑπάρχη τοιοῦτον εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ πράττοντος αὐτὸ πειθομένου τοῖς γονεῦσιν. μὴ τοῖνυν σύ γε δέισης, ὃ νεανίσκε, ὥς ἀπειθήσεις τῷ πατρί, ἂν ἢ ἢ <μὴ> προσήκει δρᾶν κελύοντος τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπέχη τοῦ ταῦτα δρᾶν, ἢ ἢ προσήκει ἀπαγορεύοντος, <τοῦ> ταῦτα 40 μὴ δρᾶν. μὴδὲ σοι πρόφασις ἔστω τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν ὁ πατήρ ἢ

father's prescription he is not disobeying and is not disobedient, is he? It would not seem so. Or again, suppose the father himself were ill and should demand wine and food which he ought not to have, and which probably would aggravate his illness if he took it, and his son, realizing this, would not give it to him, surely he is not disobeying his father, is he? Certainly one cannot think so. And yet I fancy one would consider far less disobedient than in this case, the man who, having a money-loving father, is ordered by him to steal or make away with money entrusted to him, but does not carry out the order. Or do you think that there are no fathers who give such orders to their children? Well, I know a father so depraved that, having a son conspicuous for youthful beauty, he sold him into a life of shame. If, now, that lad who was sold and sent into such a life by his father had refused and would not go, should we say that he was disobedient or that he was showing purity of character? Surely even to ask the question is scarcely necessary. To be sure, disobedience and the disobedient person are terms of reproach and shame, but refusing to do what one ought not to do merits praise rather than blame. Therefore whether one's father or the archon or even the tyrant orders something wrong or unjust or shameful, and one does not carry out the order, he is in no way disobeying, inasmuch as he does no wrong nor fails of doing right. He only disobeys who disregards and refuses to carry out good and honorable and useful orders. Such is the disobedient man.

But the obedient person behaves in just the opposite way and is completely different from him; he would be the kind of man who listens to anyone who counsels what is fitting and follows it voluntarily. That is the obedient man. Thus in relation to his parents also, one is obedient when he does voluntarily whatever they counsel that is good and fitting. For my part, moreover, I should say that anyone who did what was right and expedient, even when his parents did not counsel it, was obeying his parents, and in support of my reasoning, consider this. In my opinion the man who does what his father desires and follows his father's wishes is obeying his father; and he who does what he ought and pursues the better course is following the wish of his father. How is that? Because surely all parents have the interests of their children at heart, and because of that interest they wish them to do what is right and advantageous. Consequently one who does what is right and useful is doing what his parents wish and so is obedient to his parents in doing it, even if his parents do not order him in so many words to do these things. This one thing only and nothing else should he take into consideration

κελεύων τι τῶν πράττεσθαι μὴ καλῶν ἢ ἀπαγορεύων τι τῶν καλῶν. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη σοι τὰ μὴ εἶδ' προσταττόμενα ὑπουργεῖν· καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀγνοεῖν. οὐκ οὖν ἀνέξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν μουσικοῖς, ἐὰν ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐπαῖων μουσικῆς προσταττή κρούειν
 5 ἀμούσως τὴν λύραν, ἢ ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος κελεύῃ σε γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν μὴ ὡς ἔμαθες, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως· οὐδέ γε ἂν ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν οὐκ ἂν κυβερνητικὸς κελεύῃ σε κινεῖν τὸ πηδάλιον ὡς οὐ προσήκει, οὐ προσέξεις αὐτῷ. τί οὖν; ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῇ ἔχει· ἂν δέ σε κωλύῃ φιλοσοφεῖν ὁ πατὴρ εἰδότα
 10 καὶ ἀκηκότα ὁποῖόν τι φιλοσοφία ἐστίν, αὐτὸς ἀγνοῶν, ἄρα γε προσεκτέον αὐτῷ, ἢ μεταδιδακτέον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ὡς οὐκ εἶδ' σοι παραινεῖ; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ. τάχα μὲν οὖν τις καὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος μόνῳ πείσειεν ἂν τὸν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πατέρα διανοεῖσθαι ἢ προσήκει περὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἂν γε μὴ τέλεον ἢ σκληρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁ πατήρ.
 15 εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ πείθοιτο τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ ἔποιτο, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε ἔργα πάντως τὰ τοῦ παιδὸς ὑπάξεται αὐτόν, εἰ φιλοσοφεῖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ παῖς. ἔσται γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφῶν προθυμότητος μὲν θεραπεύειν τὸν πατέρα θεραπείαν ἅπασαν, κοσμιώτατος δὲ καὶ πραότατος, ἐν τῇ συνουσίᾳ ἡκιστα φίλερις ὢν ἢ φίλαντος καὶ οὔτε προπετῆς οὔτε ταραχώδης
 20 οὐτ' ὀργίλος· ἔτι δὲ ἐγκρατὴς μὲν εἴη ἂν γλώσσης, γαστροῦ, ἀφροδισίων, καρτερικὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τοὺς πόνους· καὶ νοῆσαι μὲν ὅ τι καλὸν ἱκανώτατος, οὐχ ὑπερβαίνων δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν μὲν ἡδέων ὑφήσεται τῷ πατρὶ πάντων ἐκῶν· τὰ δὲ ἐπίπονα πρὸ ἐκείνου δέξεται αὐτός. τοιοῦτον οὖν υἱὸν τίς
 25 μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εὖξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς; τίς δὲ ἔχων οὐκ <ἂν> ἀγαπήσειεν, δι' ὃν ὑπάρξειεν αὐτῷ ζηλωτὸν εἶναι καὶ μακαριστὸν πατέρα παρὰ τοῖς εἶδ' φρονοῦσι πᾶσιν; εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ νεανίσκε, καὶ τοιοῦτος ὢν, ὁποῖος ἔσῃ πάντως ἂν γε ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφῆς, οὐχ ὑπάξῃ τὸν πατέρα τὸν σὸν οὐδὲ πείσεις ἐπιτρέπειν σοι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ταῦτα
 30 πράττειν, ἐκεῖνο λόγισαι· ὁ πατήρ ὁ σὸς κωλύει σε φιλοσοφεῖν· ὁ δέ γε κοινὸς ἀπάντων πατήρ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν Ζεὺς κελεύει σε καὶ προτρέπει. πρόσταγμά τε γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ νόμος ἐστὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι δίκαιον, χρηστόν, εὐεργετικόν, σώφρονα, μεγαλόφρονα, κρείττω πόνων, κρείττω ἡδονῶν, φθόνου παντὸς καὶ
 35 ἐπιβουλῆς ἀπάσης καθαρὸν· ἵνα δὲ συντεμῶν εἴπω, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κελεύει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ νόμος ὁ τοῦ Διός. τὸ δέ γε εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τῷ φιλόσοφον εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ τῷ πείθεσθαι <τῷ> πατρὶ

37 Saint Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologiae* II, 189, 6) treats similarly the problem of the boy who wishes to enter the religious life in opposition to his father's will.

who wishes to obey his parents in each act—whether what he plans to do is good and advantageous. Thus if such a conviction be entertained, whatever a man's action may be, it is the act of one obedient to his parents.

And so you, my young friend, do not fear that you will disobey your father, if when your father bids you do something which is not right, you refrain from doing it, or when he forbids you to do something which is right you do not refrain from doing it. Do not let your father be an excuse to you for wrong-doing whether he bids you do something which is not right or forbids you to do what is right. For there is no necessity for you to comply with evil injunctions, and you yourself seem not unaware of this. You would certainly not submit to your father in musical matters if, with no knowledge of music, he should order you to play the lyre incorrectly, or if he knew nothing of grammar and you did, he should order you to write and read, not as you had learned but otherwise; and if, finally, with no knowledge of how to steer a ship, he should order you who did understand to handle the helm in the wrong way, you would not heed him. Well, then, enough of that.

Now if your father, knowing nothing about the subject, should forbid you who had learned and comprehended what philosophy is to study philosophy, would you be bound to heed him, or would you not rather be obligated to teach him better, since he is giving bad advice? That seems to me to be the answer. Perhaps by using reason alone one might persuade his father to adopt the attitude he ought in regard to philosophy if the father's disposition is not too obstinate. If, however, he should not be persuaded by argument and would not yield, yet even then the conduct of his son will win him over if his son is truly putting his philosophy into practice. For, as a student of philosophy he will certainly be most eager to treat his father with the greatest possible consideration and will be most well-behaved and gentle; in his relations with his father he will never be contentious or self-willed, nor hasty or prone to anger; furthermore he will control his tongue and his appetite whether for food or for sexual temptations, and he will stand fast in the face of danger and hardships; and finally with competence in recognizing the true good, he will not let the apparent good pass without examination. As a result he will willingly give up all pleasures for his father's sake, and for him he will accept all manner of hardships willingly. To have such a son who would not offer prayers to the gods? Who, having one, would not love him because of whom he had become an envied and most blessed father in the eyes of all men of sound judgment?

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπεσθαι μέλλεις, εἰ δὲ φιλοσοφοίης, τῷ Διὶ, δῆλον ὡς φιλοσοφητέον σοι μᾶλλον, ἢ οὐ. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία εἶρξει σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ κατακλείσας ἔξει, ἵνα δὴ μὴ φιλοσοφῇς. ταῦτα μὲν ποιήσει ἴσως, τοῦ δέ γε φιλοσοφεῖν οὐκ ἀπείρξει σε μὴ βουλόμενον· οὐ
 5 γὰρ χειρὶ ἢ ποδὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι, ψυχῇ δὲ καὶ ταύτης ὀλίγῳ μέρει, ὃ δὴ διάνοιαν καλοῦμεν. ταύτην γε μὴν ἐν ὀχυρωτάτῳ ἵδρυσεν ὁ θεὸς ὥστε ἀόρατον εἶναι καὶ ἀληπτον, καὶ ἀνάγκης πάσης ἐκτὸς ἐλευθέραν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. ἄλλως τε
 10 ἐὰν τύχῃ οἷσα χρηστή, οὐ δυνήσεται σε κωλύειν ὁ πατήρ οὔτε χρῆσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ οὔτε ἂν χρῆ διανοεῖσθαι οὔτε ἀρέσκεσθαι μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς, μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι δὲ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς· οὐδ' αὖ τὰ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἐκκλίνειν. ταῦτα μὲν ποιῶν εὐθὺς φιλοσοφοίης ἂν, καὶ οὔτε τρίβωνα πάντως ἀμπέχεσθαι δεήσει σε οὔτε ἀχίτωνα διατελεῖν, οὐδὲ κομᾶν, οὐδ' ἐκβαίνειν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πολλῶν. πρέπει
 15 μὲν γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτοις τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν ἂν χρῆ καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

XVII.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΓΗΡΩΣ ΕΦΟΔΙΟΝ.

20 Αὐθις δέ, ἐπεὶ πρεσβύτης τις ἐπύθετο, τί ἂν εἴη γήρως ἐφόδιον ἄριστον, ταυτόν, εἶπεν, ὅπερ καὶ νεότητος, τὸ ζῆν ὀδῶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτω μάθοις ὅποιόν τί ἐστιν, εἰ ἐννοήσῃς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ὡς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν γέγονεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵππος οὐδὲ κύων οὐδὲ βοῦς, ἅπερ ἀτιμότερα πολὺ ἀνθρώ-
 25 που ἐστίν, οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν γέγονεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ νομισθεῖη ἂν τυγχάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τέλους ἵππος ἐσθίων μὲν καὶ πίνων καὶ ὀχεύων ἀνέδην, πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ὦν ἵππῳ προσήκει· οὐδὲ γε κύων ἡδόμενος μὲν ὥσπερ ὁ ἵππος ἀπάσας ἡδονάς, πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ἀφ' ὧν ἀγαθοὶ νομίζονται εἶναι κύνες· οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλο ζῶον
 30 ὅτιοῦν ἔργου μὲν τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ στερόμενον, ἡδονῶν δ'

12-16 Seneca (*Ep.* V, 1-6) warns his pupil Lucilius against attaching any importance to the conspicuous dress and mannerisms of the group of men who sought to gain attention as philosophers.

If, then, my young friend, with a view to becoming such a man, as you surely will if you truly master the lessons of philosophy, you should not be able to induce your father to permit you to do as you wish, nor succeed in persuading him, reason thus: your father forbids you to study philosophy, but the common father of all men and gods, Zeus, bids you and exhorts you to do so. His command and law is that man be just and honest, beneficent, temperate, high-minded, superior to pain, superior to pleasure, free of all envy and all malice; to put it briefly, the law of Zeus bids man be good. But being good is the same as being a philosopher. If you obey your father, you will follow the will of a man; if you choose the philosopher's life, the will of God. It is plain, therefore, that your duty lies in the pursuit of philosophy rather than not. But, you say, your father will restrain you and actually shut you up to prevent your study of philosophy. Perhaps he will do so, but he will not prevent you from studying philosophy unless you are willing; for we do not study philosophy with our hands or feet or any other part of the body, but with the soul and with a very small part of it, that which we may call the reason. This God placed in the strongest place so that it might be inaccessible to sight and touch, free from all compulsion and in its own power. Particularly if your mind is good your father will not be able to prevent you from using it nor from thinking what you ought nor from liking the good and not liking the base; nor again from choosing the one and rejecting the other. In the very act of doing this, you would be studying philosophy, and you would not need to wrap yourself up in a worn cloak nor go without a chiton nor grow long hair nor deviate from the ordinary practices of the average man. To be sure, such things are well enough for professional philosophers, but philosophy does not consist in them, but rather in thinking out what is man's duty and meditating upon it."

XVII

WHAT IS THE BEST VIATICUM FOR OLD AGE?

At another time when an old man asked him what was the best viaticum for old age, he said, the very one that is best for youth too, namely to live by method and in accord with nature. You would best understand what this means if you would realize that mankind was not created for pleasure. For that matter, neither was the horse or dog or cow created for pleasure, and all of these creatures are much less valuable than man. Certainly a

ἐμπιπλάμενον· οὐδὲν οὖν οὕτως ζῆν ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐμφανίζῃ δι' ὧν πράττει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. ἄγει γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου φύσις ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκείνου· ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰκὸς οὐχ ὅταν ἐν ἡδονῇ βιοί, 5 τότε κατὰ φύσιν βιοῖν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν ἀρετῇ. τότε γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖσθαι δικαίως ὑπάρχοι ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐφ' αὐτῷ καὶ εὐέλπιν καὶ θαρραλέον εἶναι, οἷς εὐφροσύνην τε καὶ χαρὰν βεβαίαν ἔπεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον. καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος μίμημα μὲν θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς· ἐπεὶ 10 μὴδ' ἐν θεοῖς μὴδὲν ὑπονοῆσαι κρεῖττον ἔχομεν φρονήσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἔτι δὲ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀήττητος μὲν ἡδονῆς, ἀήττητος δὲ πλεονεξίας, κρεῖττων δὲ ἐπιθυμίας, κρεῖττων δὲ φθόνου καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, μεγαλόφρων δὲ καὶ εὐεργετικὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος· 15 τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπινοοῦμεν τὸν θεόν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡγητέον, ὅταν ἔχῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁμοίως ἔχειν, καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα εἶναι ζηλωτόν· ὧν δὲ ζηλωτὸς εὐθὺς ἂν εἴῃ καὶ εὐδαίμων· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλους γέ τινας ἢ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ζηλοῦμεν. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἐτέρωθεν ποθεν ταύτας ἐπινοῆσαι τὰς ἀρετάς ἔχομεν ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς 20 τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως, ἐντυχόντες ἀνθρώποις τοιοῖσδε τισιν, οἷους ὄντας αὐτοὺς θεοὺς καὶ θεοειδεῖς ὠνόμαζον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τις τύχοι πρότερον ἔτι νέος ὧν παιδείας ὀρθῆς ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένος, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσα μαθημάτων ἔχεται καλῶν μεμαθηκὼς οὐκ ἐνδεὼς, 25 τὰ δὲ ἀσκητὰ ἡσκηκὼς ἱκανῶς, οὗτος ἂν ἐν γῆρᾳ ταῖς ἐνούσαις ἑαυτῷ χρώμενος ἀφορμαῖς ζῇ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἀλύπως μὲν φέροι τὴν στέρησιν τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἐπὶ νεότητος, ἀλύπως δ' ἔχοι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίᾳ, δυσκολαῖνοι δ' οὐκ ἂν οὔτε καταφρονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πλησίον οὐτ' ἀμελούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν 30 οἰκείων καὶ φίλων, ἅτε πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα ἀλεξιφάρμακον ἔχων καλὸν ἐπὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν παιδείαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν. εἰ δέ τις εἴῃ παιδείας μὲν ἐνδεέστερον μετεσχηκὼς, προθυμίαν δὲ παρέχοιτο πρὸς τὰ κρεῖττω, καὶ πείθεσθαι δύναιτο τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις, οὗτος ἂν εὖ ποιούῃ ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ 35 τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργον εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερά, τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τίνα δὴ τρόπον τὰ μὲν ἐκφεύγοι, τὰ δὲ κτῶτο, καὶ πῶς ἂν τὰ μὴ ὄντα μὲν κακά, δοκοῦντα δέ, προσιόντα πράως δέχοιτο. τούτων δὲ ἀκούων καὶ πειθόμενος (ὥς τό γε ἀκούειν ἀπειθῶς ἀκερδέστατον) διαθείτ' ἂν τὸ γῆρας καλῶς τά τε ἄλλα

horse would not be considered to have fulfilled its purpose by eating and drinking and mating at will, and doing none of the things which are the proper work of a horse; no more would a dog if it simply enjoyed all kinds of pleasures like the horse and did none of the things for which dogs are considered good; nor would any other animal if kept from the functions proper to it and allowed to have its fill of pleasures; in short, according to this, nothing would be said to be living according to nature but what by its actions manifests the excellence peculiar to its own nature. For the nature of each guides it to its own excellence; consequently it is not reasonable to suppose that when man lives a life of pleasure that he lives according to nature, but rather when he lives a life of virtue. Then, indeed, it is that he is justly praised and takes pride in himself and is optimistic and courageous, characteristics upon which cheerfulness and serene joy necessarily follow. In general, of all creatures on earth man alone resembles God and has the same virtues that He has, since we can imagine nothing even in the gods better than prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. Therefore, as God, through the possession of these virtues, is unconquered by pleasure or greed, is superior to desire, envy, and jealousy; is high-minded, beneficent, and kindly (for such is our conception of God), so also man in the image of Him, when living in accord with nature, should be thought of as being like Him, and being like Him, being enviable, and being enviable, he would forthwith be happy, for we envy none but the happy. Indeed it is not impossible for man to be such, for certainly when we encounter men whom we call godly and god-like, we do not have to imagine that these virtues came from elsewhere than from man's own nature. If, then, by good fortune while still young, one had taken pains to get right instruction, and had mastered thoroughly all those lessons which are considered good, as well as their practical application, such a man in old age using these inner resources would live according to nature, and he would bear without complaint the loss of the pleasures of youth, nor would he fret at the weakness of his body, and he would not be irked even when slighted by his neighbors or neglected by his relatives and friends, since he would have a good antidote for all these things in his own mind, namely his past training. If, however, one should have shared less abundantly in early instruction but should show an eagerness for better things and a capacity for following words well-spoken, he would do well if he sought to hear relevant words from those who have made it their business to know what things are harmful and what helpful to men, and in what way one should avoid the former and obtain

καὶ τὸν τοῦ θανάτου φόβον ἐξαίρεθείη ἄν, ὃς μάλιστα θορυβεῖ τε καὶ πιέζει τοὺς γέροντας, ὥσπερ ἐπιλεησμένους ὅτι παντὶ θνητῷ θάνατος ὀφείλεται. καὶ τό γε ἀθλιώτατον ποιοῦν τὸν βίον τοῖς γέρονσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔστιν, ὃ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει
 5 καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ Ἰσοκράτης ἀνωμολογήσατο. φασὶ γὰρ ἐκείνου, ἐρωτήσαντός τινος ὅπως διάγει, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὕτως ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τὸν ἐνενήκοντα μὲν γεγονότα ἔτη, κακῶν δὲ ἔσχατον νομίζοντα εἶναι τὸν θάνατον. καὶ τοι πῶς ἐκείνῳ τι παιδείας μετὴν ἢ γνώσεως τῶν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, ὃς ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι κακὸν τὸ ἐξ
 10 ἀνάγκης ἐπόμενον βίῳ τῷ ἀρίστῳ; εἴ γε ἄριστος βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός, πέρας δὲ καὶ τούτου θάνατος. ὁ δ' οὖν εἶπον, εἰ τοῦτο περιποιήσαιο τις ἐν γήρᾳ, τὸ προσδέχεσθαι τὸν θάνατον ἀφόβως καὶ θαρραλέως, οὐ μικρὸν ἂν μέρος τοῦ ζῆν ἀλύπως καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἴη πεπορισμένους· κτήσαιο δ' ἂν τοῦτο συνὼν τοῖς οὐκ ὀνόματι
 15 μόνον ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν γε καὶ πείθεσθαι θέλῃ αὐτοῖς. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν φημὶ γήρως ἐφόδιον εἶναι κράτιστον, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου εἶπον, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν ἂν χρὴ πράττοντα καὶ διανοοῦμενον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ εὐθυμότατος εἴη ὁ γέρων καὶ ἐπαινετώτατος, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων εὐπότμως καὶ ἐντίμως βιώῃ ἄν. εἰ
 20 δέ τις οἶεται μέγιστον εἶναι παραμύθιον τοῖς γέρονσι τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον αὐτοῖς παρέχειν ἀλύπως βιοῦν, κακῶς οἶεται· πλοῦτος γὰρ ἡδονὰς μὲν οἷός τε παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις ἔστι τὰς ἀπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἄλλων ὁμοίων, οὔτε δὲ εὐθυμίαν οὔτε ἀλυπίαν οὐδαμῶς τῷ κεκτημένῳ παράσχοι ἄν. μάρτυρες δὲ
 25 πολλοὶ τῶν πλουσίων λυπούμενοι καὶ ἀθυμοῦντες καὶ ἀθλίους νομίζοντες εἶναι αὐτούς. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐπικούρημα γήρως καλὸν ὁ πλοῦτος εἴη ἄν.

13 μέρος τοῦ ζῆν coniecit Gesner πρὸς τὸ ζῆν Hense

1 Cicero devotes a large part of his *De Senectate* (XIX-XXII) to a discussion of this subject.

2 This is a paraphrase of Sophocles' *Electra* 1173 (Cf. also Euripides *Alcestis* 782).

the latter, and how one should patiently accept things which befall him that seem to be evils, but are not really so. If he heard these things and acted upon them (for to hear them without acting upon them would be most unprofitable), he would manage old age very well, and in particular he would rid himself of the fear of death which more than all else terrifies and oppresses the aged, as though they had forgotten that death is a debt which every man owes. Yet it is certain that that which renders life most miserable for the aged is this very thing, the fear of death, as even the orator Isocrates confessed. For they tell that when someone asked how he was getting on, he replied that he was doing as well as was reasonable for a man of ninety, but that he considered death the worst of evils. And yet how could there have been any smattering of knowledge or of acquaintance with true good and evil in the man who thought that an evil which is the necessary sequel even to the best life? The best life, you will agree, is that of a good man, and yet the end even of such a man is death. Therefore, as I said before, if one in old age should succeed in mastering this lesson, to wait for death without fear and courageously, he would have acquired no small part of how to live without complaint and in accordance with nature. He would acquire this by associating with men who were philosophers not in name only but in truth, if he were willing to follow their teachings. So it is that I tell you that the best viaticum for old age is the one I mentioned in the beginning, to live according to nature, doing and thinking what one ought. For so an old man would himself be most cheerful and would win the praise of others, and being thus, he would live happily and in honor. But if anyone thinks that wealth is the greatest consolation of old age, and that to acquire it is to live without sorrow, he is quite mistaken; wealth is able to procure for man the pleasures of eating and drinking and other sensual pleasures, but it can never afford cheerfulness of spirit nor freedom from sorrow in one who possesses it. Witnesses to this truth are many rich men who are full of sadness and despair and think themselves wretched—evidence enough that wealth is not a good protection for old age.

10 Cf. Demosthenes *De Corona* 97.

21 This theme is frequently elaborated by the Stoics. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 22, 27.

XVIII A.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ.

Περὶ δὲ τροφῆς εἰώθει μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν καὶ πάνν ἐντεταμένως
 καὶ περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος οὐδ' εἰς μικρὰ διαφέροντος· ὥστε
 γὰρ ἄρχην καὶ ὑποβολὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν εἶναι τὴν ἐν σίτοις καὶ
 ποτοῖς ῥάτειαν. ἅπαξ δὲ ποτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀφόμενος λόγων, οὓς
 ἐκάστοτε διεξήει, τοιάδε τινα εἶπεν· ὡς χρὴ καθάπερ τὴν εὐτελεῆ
 τῆς πολυτελοῦς τροφῆν προτιμᾶν καὶ τὴν εὐπόριστον τῆς δυσπο-
 10 ρίστου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν σύμφυλον ἀνθρώπῳ τῆς μὴ τοιαύτης· εἶναι
 δὲ σύμφυλον ἡμῖν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φυομένων ἐκ γῆς, ὅσα τε σιτώδη
 ὄντα καὶ ὅσα μὴ τοιαῦτα ὄντα δύναται τρέφειν οὐ κακῶς τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον· καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ζώων οὐκ ἀναιρουμένων, ἄλλως δὲ
 χρησιμεύοντων. τούτων δὲ τῶν βρωμάτων ἐπιτηδεύοντα μὲν οἷς
 15 αὐτόθεν χρῆσθαι ὑπάρχει δίχα πυρός, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτοιμότατα· οἷα δὴ
 τὰ τε ὠρεὰ καὶ τὰν λαχάνων ἔνι καὶ γάλα καὶ τυρὸς καὶ κηρία.
 καὶ ὅσα μέντοι δαίται πυρὸς ἢ σιτώδη ἢ λαχανώδη ὄντα, καὶ ταῦτ'
 οὐκ ἀνεπιτηδεύα, ἀλλὰ σύμφυλα ἀνθρώπῳ πάντα. τὴν μέντοι
 κρεῶδη τροφὴν θηριωδεστέραν ἀπέφηνε καὶ τοῖς ἀγρίοις ζώοις
 20 προσφορωτέραν. εἶναι δὲ ταύτην ἔλεγε καὶ βαρυτέραν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν
 τι καὶ φρονεῖν ἐμπόδιον· τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς θολω-
 δεστέραν οὖσαν ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ· παρὸ καὶ βραδυτέρους
 φαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν τοὺς πλείονι ταύτῃ χρωμένους. δεῖν δὲ τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ συγγενέστατον τοῖς θεοῖς τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν,
 25 οὕτω καὶ ὁμοιωτάτα τρέφεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. ἐκείνοις μὲν οὖν ἀρκεῖν
 τοὺς ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀναφερομένους ἀτμούς, ἡμᾶς δ' ὁμοιοτάτην
 ταύτῃ προσφέρεισθαι τροφὴν ἂν εἶπεν τὴν κουφοτάτην καὶ καθαρω-
 τάτην· οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν καθαρὰν τε καὶ
 30 ἁγρὰν, ὅποια οὖσα ἀρίστη καὶ σοφωτάτη εἴη ἂν, καθάπερ
 Ἡρακλείῳ δοκεῖ λέγοντι οὕτως· αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ
 ἀρίστη· νῦν δέ, ἔφη, πολὺ χείρον ἡμεῖς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τρεφό-
 μεθα. τὰ μὲν γάρ, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὥσπερ μάλιστα τι
 ἐλαυνόμενα φέρεται πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, ὅμως τοῦ γε πανουργεῖν

30 Frag. LXXV (ed. Bywater).

XVIII A

ON FOOD

On the subject of food he used to speak frequently and very
 emphatically too, as a question of no small significance, nor
 leading to unimportant consequences; indeed he believed that the
 beginning and foundation of temperance lay in self-control in
 eating and drinking. Once, putting aside other themes such as
 he habitually discussed, he spoke somewhat as follows. As one
 should prefer inexpensive food to expensive and what is abundant
 to what is scarce, so one should prefer what is natural for men to
 what is not. Now food from plants of the earth is natural to us,
 grains and those which though not cereals can nourish man well,
 and also food (other than flesh) from animals which are domesti-
 cated. Of these foods the most useful are those which can be used
 at once without fire, since they are also most easily available;
 for example fruits in season, some of the green vegetables, milk,
 cheese, and honey. Also those which require fire for their prepara-
 tion, whether grains or vegetables, are not unsuitable, and are all
 natural food for man. On the other hand he showed that meat
 was a less civilized kind of food and more appropriate for wild
 animals. He held that it was a heavy food and an obstacle to
 thinking and reasoning, since the exhalations rising from it being
 turbid darkened the soul. For this reason also the people who
 make larger use of it seem slower in intellect. Furthermore, as
 man of all creatures on earth is the nearest of kin to the gods,
 so he should be nourished in a manner most like the gods. Now
 the vapors rising from the earth and water are sufficient for them,
 and so, he said, we ought to be nourished on food most like that,
 the lightest and purest; for thus our souls would be pure and dry,
 and being so, would be finest and wisest, as it seemed to Hera-
 clitus when he said, "The clear dry soul is wisest and best."
 But now, he said, we feed ourselves much worse than the un-
 reasoning brutes. For even if they, driven by appetite as by a
 lash, fall upon their food, nevertheless they are not guilty of
 making a fuss about their food and exercising ingenuity about it,
 but they are satisfied with what comes their way, seeking satiety
 only, nothing more. But we contrive all kinds of arts and devices
 to give relish to eating and to make more enticing the act of
 swallowing. We have come to such a point of delicacy in eating
 and gourmanderie that as some people have written books on

περὶ τὰ βρώματα καὶ τοῦ τεχνιτεύειν ἀπήλλακται, ἀρκούμενα τοῖς
 παραπεσοῦσι καὶ πλησμονὴν θηρώμενα μόνον, προσωτέρω δ'
 οὐδέν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τέχνας καὶ μηχανὰς ποικίλας ἐπινοοῦμεν,
 ὥστε τὴν ἐδωδὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐφηδύνειν καὶ τὴν κατὰποσιν κολα-
 5 κεύειν μειζόνως. εἰς τοῦτο δὲ προεληλύθαμεν λιχνείας καὶ ὀσφοφα-
 γίας, ὥστε καθάπερ μουσικὰ καὶ ἰατρικὰ οὕτω καὶ μαγειρικὰ
 πεποιήνται τινες συγγράμματα, ἃ τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν καὶ πάνν αὔξει
 τὴν ἐν τῷ φάρυγι, τὴν δ' ὑγίειαν διαφθείρει. πολὺ γοῦν κάκιον
 διακειμένους ὁρᾶν ἔστι τὰ σώματα τοὺς περὶ τὰ βρώματα τρυ-
 10 φώντας, ὧν εἰσιν ἔνιοι παραπλήσιοι ταῖς κιττώσαις γυναιξίν· καὶ
 γὰρ οὗτοι, καθάπερ ἐκείναι, τὰ συννηθέστατα τῶν βρωμάτων δυσχε-
 راίνουσι καὶ τοὺς στομάχους διεφθαρμένους ἔχουσιν. ὅθεν ὥσπερ
 ὁ ἀχρεῖος σίδηρος συνεχῶς δεῖται στομώσεως, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων
 στόμαχοι ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν συνεχῆς στομοῦσθαι θέλουνσιν ἢ ὑπὸ
 15 ἀκράτου ἢ ὑπὸ ὀξους ἢ ὑπὸ βρώματός τινος στρυφνοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
 ὁ Δάκων τοιοῦτος, ὃς ἰδὼν τινα, παρακειμένου αὐτῷ ὀρνιθίου τῶν
 πιόνων καὶ πολυτελῶν, ὑπὸ τρυφῆς ἀναινόμενον φαγεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ
 φάσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι, 'ἀλλ' ἐγὼ' ἔφη 'καὶ γυπὸς δύναμαι καὶ
 τόργου.' Ζήνων δέ γε ὁ Κιτιεὺς οὐδὲ νοσῶν ᾤετο δεῖν τροφήν
 20 προσφέρεισθαι τρυφερωτέραν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ θεραπεύων ἰατρὸς ἐκέ-
 λευεν αὐτὸν φαγεῖν νεοττὸν περιστερᾶς, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος 'ὥς
 Μάνην' ἔφη 'με θεράπευε.' ἡξίου γάρ, οἶμαι, μηδὲν μαλακώτερον
 ἐν τῇ θεραπείᾳ γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν δούλων τινὶ νοσοῦντι· καὶ γὰρ
 εἰ ἐκείνοι θεραπεύεσθαι δύνανται δίχα τοῦ τροφήν λαμβάνειν
 25 πολυτελεστέραν, δύνασθαι ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς. δεῖ γὰρ μηδαμῶς τὸν
 ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα δούλου μηδενὸς εἶναι μαλακώτερον. διόπερ ὁ Ζήνων
 εἰκότως ἡξίου εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὴν πολυτέλειαν ἐν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ μηδ'
 ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἐνδιδόναι πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ περ ὁ ἐνδούς ἅπαξ
 30 προέλθοι ἂν ἐπὶ πλείστον, ἅτε τῆς ἡδονῆς πολλὴν ἐχούσης αὔξησιν
 ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν περὶ τροφῆς, ὧν εἰώθει λέγειν ἐκάστοτε.

6 He has in mind Apicius, a celebrated gourmet. Cf. Seneca *Ad Helviam* X, 8 and Columella *De Re Rustica* Praef. 5.

music and medicine, so some have even written books on cooking which aim to increase the pleasure of the palate, but ruin the health. It is at all events a common observation that those who are luxurious and intemperate in food have much less vigorous health. Some, in fact, are like women who have the unnatural cravings of pregnancy; these men, like such women, refuse the most common foods and have their digestion utterly ruined. Thus, as worn-out iron constantly needs tempering, their appetites continually demand being sharpened either by neat wine or a sharp sauce or some sour relish. But no such man was the Laconian who, on seeing a man refuse to eat a young peacock or other expensive bird that was placed before him, and complain that he could not eat because of lack of appetite, remarked, "But I could eat a vulture or a buzzard." Zeno of Citium even when he was ill thought that no unusually delicate food should be brought him, and when the attending physician ordered him to eat squab, he would not allow it, and said, "Treat me as you would treat my slave Manes." For I imagine that he thought there should be nothing more delicate in his treatment than for one of his slaves if he were ill; for if they can be cured without receiving more delicate fare, so can we. Surely a good man should be no more delicate than a slave; and for that reason Zeno very likely thought he ought to beware of delicacy in diet and not yield to it in the least, for if he once yielded he would go the whole way, since in the matter of food and drink, pleasure accelerates its pace alarmingly. The words spoken on that occasion concerning food and nourishment seemed to us more unusual than the customary discourses day by day.

22 Manes was a stock name for a slave. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 26, 37.

XVIII^B.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ.

Αἰσχιστον, ἔφη, γαστριμαργία καὶ ὀψοφαγία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντερεῖ
 5 οὐδείς· σκοποῦντας δὲ ὅπως διαφεύξονται ταῦτα, πάνν ὀλίγους
 ἦσθημαι ἐγώ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ὁρῶ καὶ ἀπόντων ὀρεγομένους
 τῶν τοιούτων βρωμάτων, καὶ παρόντων ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ δυναμένους,
 καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοῖς, ὅταν χρῶνται, ἀφειδῶς, ὡς καὶ πρὸς βλάβην
 χρῆσθαι τὴν τοῦ σώματος. καίτοι γαστριμαργία τί ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἢ
 10 ἀκρασία περὶ τροφήν, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι τὸ ἥδὺ τὸ ἐν σίτῳ τοῦ
 ὠφελίμου προτιμῶσιν; καὶ ὀψοφαγία δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ
 ἀμετρία περὶ χρήσιν ὧν. πανταχοῦ δὲ κακὸν οἶσα ἢ ἀμετρία ἐν
 τοῖς μάλιστα τῇδε τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἐπιδείκνυται φύσιν, παρεχομένη
 τοὺς ὀψοφάγους ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑσὶν ἢ κυσὶν ὁμοιομένους τὴν
 15 λαβρότητα καὶ εὐσχημονεῖν μὴ δυναμένους, οὐ ταῖς χερσίν, οὐ τοῖς
 ὀμμασιν, οὐ τῇ καταπόσει οὕτως ἄρα αὐτοὺς ἐξίστησιν ἢ ἐπιθυμία
 τῆς ἐν ὧσιν ἡδονῆς. ὅτι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τροφήν αἰσχιστόν
 ἐστὶν, γινώσκοντες, ἐν ᾧ γε ζῷοις ἄφροσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις φρονί-
 μοις ὁμοιοῦμεθα. αἰσχιστον δὲ τούτου ὄντος, κάλλιστον ἂν εἴη
 20 τοῦναντίον, τάξει καὶ κοσμίως ἐσθίειν, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην
 ἐνταῦθα ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρῶτον, οὐκ ὃν ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ δεόμενον
 πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως. διὰ τί δὴ τοῦτο; ὅτι πολλῶν
 ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν, αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναπείθουσιν ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ
 ἐνδιδόναι αὐταῖς βιάζονται παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον, δυσμαχωτάτη εἶναι
 25 κινδυνεύει πασῶν ἢ περὶ τροφήν ἡδονή. ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαις
 ἡδοναῖς σπανιώτερον ὁμιλοῦμεν, καὶ ἐνίων γε μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς
 ὅλους ἀπέχεσθαι δυνάμεθα, ταύτης δὲ ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν πάντως
 πειρᾶσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ γε πολλὰ δις ἐκάστης ἡμέρας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἐνὶ ζῇν ἄλλως τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὥσθ' ὅσῳ πλεονάκεις τῆς ἐν
 30 βρώσει ἡδονῆς πειρώμεθα, τοσούτῳ πλείους οἱ ἐνταῦθα κίνδυνοι.
 καὶ μὴν καθ' ἐκάστην προσφορὰν τροφῆς, οὐχ εἰς κίνδυνος ἀμαρτή-
 ματος, ἀλλὰ πλείονες. καὶ γὰρ ὁ παρὰ πλεόν ἢ δεῖ ἐσθίων,
 ἀμαρτάνει, καὶ ὁ κατασπεύδων ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν οὐδὲν ἥττον, καὶ ὁ
 μολυνόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ὧν μᾶλλον ἢ χρή, καὶ ὁ τὰ ἡδίω τῶν
 35 ὑγιεινοτέρων βρώματα προτιμῶν, καὶ ὁ μὴ νέμων τὰ ἴσα τοῖς

XVIII^B

ON FOOD

Thoroughly shameful, he used to say, are gluttony and high
 living, and no one will dare deny it; yet I have observed very
 few aiming to shun these vices. On the contrary I notice that
 the majority of people strive to obtain these same foods when
 they are not available and when they are at hand are unable
 to refrain from them, and they use them so lavishly when they
 have them that they make for the detriment of their health. And
 yet what else is gluttony but intemperance in the matter of
 nourishment, causing men to prefer what is pleasant in food to
 what is beneficial? And high living is nothing but excess in
 table luxury. Now excess is always evil, but here particularly it
 reveals its true nature in these people since it makes them greedy
 like swine or dogs rather than men, and incapable of behaving
 properly with hands, or eyes, or gullet, so completely does the
 desire for pleasure in dainties of the table pervert them. How
 shameful it is to behave toward food in this way we may learn
 from the fact that we liken them to unreasoning animals rather
 than to intelligent human beings. Now if this is shameful, the
 opposite must be altogether good; that is, exercising moderation
 and decorum in eating, demonstrating one's self-control there first
 of all, not an easy thing to do, but one which requires much
 attention and practice. Why should this be? Because although
 there are many pleasures which lure man into wrong-doing and
 force him to yield to them contrary to what is good, pleasure in
 eating is probably the hardest of all to combat. For other
 pleasures we encounter less often, and we can refrain from some
 of them for months and whole years, but of necessity we are
 tempted by this one every day and usually twice a day, since
 it is not possible for man to live otherwise. Thus the oftener we
 are tempted by pleasure in eating, the more dangers there are
 involved. And indeed at each meal there is not one hazard for
 going wrong, but many. First of all, the man who eats more
 than he ought does wrong, and the man who eats in undue
 haste no less, and also the man who wallows in the pickles and
 sauces, and the man who prefers the sweeter foods to the more
 healthful ones, and the man who does not serve food of the same
 kind or amount to his guests as to himself. There is still another
 wrong in connection with eating, when we indulge in it at an

συνεσθίουσιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἁμαρτία περὶ τροφήν, ὅταν
 παρὰ καιρὸν προσφερώμεθα αὐτήν, καὶ δέον ἄλλο τι πράττειν
 ἀφένενοι τούτου ἐσθίωμεν. τοσούτων δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλων ἁμαρτιῶν
 οὐσῶν περὶ τροφήν, δεῖ μὲν ἀπασῶν καθαρεύειν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδεμιᾶ
 5 ἔνοχον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα σωφρονήσειν. καθαρεῖν δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 ἀναμάρτητος εἴη ἀσκῶν καὶ ἐθίζων αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι σίτον οὐχ ἵνα
 ἡδῇται ἀλλ' ἵνα τρέφεται, οὐδ' ἵνα λεαίνηται τὴν κατάποσιν ἀλλ'
 ἵνα ῥωννύηται τὸ σῶμα. καὶ γὰρ γέγονεν ἡ μὲν κατάποσις δίοδος
 εἶναι τροφῆς, οὐχ ἡδονῆς ὄργανον, ἡ δὲ γαστήρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χάριν
 10 οὐπὲρ ἔνεκα καὶ φυτῷ παντὶ ρίζα γέγονεν. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖ
 τρέφει τὸ φυτὸν ἡ ρίζα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν τροφήν λαμβάνουσα,
 οὕτω τρέφει τὸ ζῷον ἡ γαστήρ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰσφερομένων σίτων καὶ
 ποτῶν. ὥσπερ τε αὖ τούτοις διαμονῆς ἔνεκα συμβαίνει τρέφεσθαι
 καὶ οὐχ ἡδονῆς, παραπλησίως καὶ ἡμῖν ζωῆς καὶ φάρμακον ἡ
 15 τροφή ἐστι. διὸ καὶ προσήκει ἐσθίειν ἡμῖν ἵνα ζῶμεν, οὐχ ἵνα
 ἡδῶμεθα, εἰ γε μέλλομεν στοιχεῖν ἀρίστῳ ὄντι τῷ λόγῳ Σωκράτους,
 ὃς ἔφη τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ζῆν ἵνα ἐσθίωσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ
 ἐσθίειν ἵνα ζῇ. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιεικὴς τις βουλόμενος εἶναι ἀνθρώπος
 ἀξιῶσει παραπλησίως τις εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ζῆν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσθίειν,
 20 ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοι, θηρώμενος ἔξ ἅπαντος τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἡδονήν.
 Ὅτι δὲ καὶ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν ἀνθρώπον τοῦ σφῆζεσθαι χάριν,
 οὐχὶ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι, σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ παρεσκεύασεν αὐτοῖς, μάθοι τις
 ἂν ἐκείθεν μάλιστα. ἡ γὰρ δὴ τροφή ὅτε ἐργάζεται μάλιστα τὸ
 ἐαντὴς ἔργον, τότε οὐδαμῶς ἡδεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον κατὰ τε τὴν πέψιν
 25 καὶ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν, ἀλλὰ τρεφόμεθα μὲν τότε ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ῥωννύ-
 μεθα, ἡδόμεθα δὲ τότε οὐδεμίαν ἡδονήν, καίτοι πλείων ὁ χρόνος
 οὗτός ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐσθίωμεν. ἔδει δέ γε, εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἡδονῆς χάριν
 τὴν τροφήν ἐμηχανήσατο ἡμῖν, τὸν πλείω τοῦτον χρόνον ἡδεσθαι
 ἡμᾶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ οὐ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἐκείνον ἐν ᾧ καταπίνομεν.
 30 ἀλλ' ὅμως χάριν ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐλάχιστου χρόνου, ὃν ἡδόμεθα,
 παρασκευὴ μὲν ὅψων γίνεται μυρίων, πλείται δ' ἡ θάλαττα μέχρι
 περάτων μάγειροι δὲ γεωργῶν περισπουδαστότεροί εἰσι· δέλπνα
 δὲ παρατίθενται τινες ἀγρῶν ἀναλίσκοντες τιμάς, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐδαμῶς
 35 πᾶν γὰρ τοῦναντίον οἱ ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις χρώμενοι τροφαῖς
 ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσι. τοὺς γοῦν οἰκέτας τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ τοὺς χωρί-

1 Martial (*Ep.* III, 60) and Juvenal (*Sat.* V) complain bitterly about the ungracious hosts who serve inferior food to guests of lower social standing at the same time that they and their peers gorge themselves upon the finest delicacies. Cf. also Pliny *Ep.* II, 6.

unseasonable time, and although there is something else we ought to do, we put it aside in order to eat. Since, then, these and even more vices are connected with eating, if a man wishes to show self-control, he must be free of all of them and not be guilty of any of them. To keep himself blameless and free from such errors one should by constant practice accustom himself to choosing food not for enjoyment but for nourishment, not to tickle his palate but to strengthen his body. Indeed the throat was designed to be a passage for food, not an organ of pleasure, and the stomach was made for the same purpose as the root was created in plants. For just as the root nourishes the plant by taking food from without, so the stomach nourishes the living being from the food and drink which are taken into it. And again just as plants receive nourishment that they may survive, and not for their pleasure, so in like manner food is to us the medicine of life. Therefore it is fitting for us to eat in order to live, not in order to have pleasure, if, at all events, we wish to keep in line with the wise words of Socrates, who said that the majority of men live to eat but that he ate in order to live. Certainly no reasonable being, whose ambition is to be a man, will think it desirable to be like the majority who live to eat, and like them, to spend his life in the chase after pleasure derived from food.

That God who made man provided him food and drink for the sake of preserving his life and not for giving him pleasure, one can see very well from this: when food is performing its real function, it does not produce pleasure for man, that is in the process of digestion and assimilation. At that time we are being nourished and renew our strength, but we feel no sensation of pleasure; and yet there is a longer time involved in this process than in eating. Surely if God had planned eating as a pleasure for us, He would have had us enjoy it a longer time and not merely the brief moment when we are swallowing. And yet for the sake of that brief moment when we do experience pleasure, countless dainties are prepared, the sea is sailed from end to end, cooks are more in demand than farmers; some even squander the value of their estates to spread their tables, though their bodies are not at all benefited by the costliness of the food. Quite the contrary, people who eat the cheapest food are the strongest. Indeed you may notice that slaves are usually stronger than their masters, country men than city men, the poor than the rich, better able to do hard work, less fatigued by their labor, less

18 This saying is frequently attributed to Socrates, though sometimes to Diogenes. Cf. Aulus Gellius *Noct. Att.* XIX, 2, 7 and Diogenes Laertius *Life* II, 34.

τας τῶν ἀστικῶν καὶ τοὺς πένητας τῶν πλουσίων ἴδοις ἂν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ῥωμαλεωτέρους ὄντας καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν πονεῖν δυναμένους, ἤττον δὲ κάμνοντας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, νοσοῦντας δὲ σπανιώτερον, ἀνεχομένους δὲ εὐκολώτερον κρύος, θάλλπος, ἀγρυπνίαν, πᾶν εἴ τι
 5 τοιοῦτον. καίτοι καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον ἢ τε πολυτελὴς καὶ ἡ εὐτελὴς τροφή ῥωννύη τὸ σῶμα, ὅμως αἰρετέον ἐστὶ τὴν εὐτελή, ὅτι αὕτη σωφρονικωτέρα καὶ πρέπει ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ τὸ εὐπόριστον τοῦ δυσπορίστου, καὶ τὸ ἀπραγμάτευτον τοῦ μετὰ πραγμάτων, καὶ τὸ ἔτοιμον τοῦ ἀνετοίμου πρὸς τροφήν πρεπωδέστερον τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν.
 10 ἵνα δὲ συνελὼν εἴπω περὶ τροφῆς τὸ πᾶν, φημὶ δεῖν σκοπὸν μὲν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι ὑγίειαν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ὥς τούτων μόνον ἔνεκα βρωτέον, ἃ δὴ δέεται πολυτελείας οὐδεμιᾶς· ἐσθίοντα δ' ἐπιμελίσθαι κόσμον τε καὶ μέτρον τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ τοῦ διαφέρειν πλείστον τῷ τε ἀμολύντῳ καὶ τῷ σχολαίῳ.

XIX.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΚΕΠΗΣ.

Ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τροφῆς εἶπεν. ἡξίου δὲ καὶ σκέπην τὴν σώφρονα τῷ σώματι ζητεῖν, οὐ τὴν πολυτελή καὶ περιττήν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐσθῆτι
 20 καὶ ὑποδέσκει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔφη εἶναι χρηστέον, ὅνπερ πανοπλία, φυλακῆς ἔνεκεν τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπιδείξωσ. ὥσπερ οὖν ὅπλα κάλλιστα τὰ ἰσχυρότατα καὶ σφάζειν μάλιστα δυνάμενα τὸν χρώμενον, οὐ τὰ περίβλεπτα καὶ λαμπρά, οὕτως ἀμπεχόνη καὶ ὑπόδεσις ἢ χρησιμωτάτη τῷ σώματι κρατίστη καὶ
 25 οὐχ ἡ δυναμένη τὰς τῶν ἀνοήτων ὄψεις ἐπιστρέφειν. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν σκέπην αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ κρείττον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ σκεπόμενον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσθενέστερόν τε καὶ χείρον. οἱ μὲν οὖν λειώτῃ τε καὶ ἀπαλότητι σαρκὸς διὰ τῶν σκεπασμάτων μηχανώμενοι χείρω τὰ σώματα ποιοῦσιν, εἴ γε τὸ τεθρυμμένον σῶμα καὶ μαλακὸν
 30 πολὺν κάκιον τοῦ σκληροῦ τε καὶ διαπεπονημένου ἐστίν· οἱ δὲ ῥωννύντες καὶ κρατύνοντες τῇ σκέπῃ, οὗτοι τὰ σκεπόμενα μόνον ὠφελοῦσιν. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς καλὸν οὔτε ἐσθῆσι πολλαῖς κατασκέπειν τὸ σῶμα οὔτε ταινίαις κατελεῖν οὔτε χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας περιδέσει πύλων ἢ ὑφασμάτων τινῶν μαλακύνειν, τοὺς γε μὴ νοσοῦντας· οὐδ'

frequently ill, enduring more cheerfully cold, heat, lack of sleep, and every such hardship. Furthermore, even if expensive and cheap food strengthened the body equally well, nevertheless one ought to choose the cheaper food because it is more conducive to temperance and more fitting for a good man. In general for men of sense and reason, in respect of food, what is easy to procure is better than what is hard to obtain, what requires no work than what requires it, what is available than what is not at hand. But to sum up the question of food, I maintain that its purpose should be to produce health and strength, that one should for that purpose eat only that which requires no great outlay, and finally that at table one should have regard for a fitting decorum and moderation, and most of all should be superior to the common vices of filth and greedy haste.

XIX

ON CLOTHING AND SHELTER

Such were his opinions on food. He also thought it best to provide moderate covering for the body, not expensive and superfluous, for he said that one ought to use clothing and shoes in exactly the same way as armour, that is for the protection of the body and not for display. Therefore just as the most powerful weapons and those best calculated to protect the bearer are the best, and not those which attract the eye by their sheen, so likewise the garment or shoe which is most useful for the body is best, and not one which causes the foolish to turn and stare. For the covering should at once render the thing covered better and stronger than its natural condition, rather than weaker and worse. Those, then, who acquire smoothness and delicacy of skin by their clothing make their bodies worse, inasmuch as plainly the pampered and soft body is much worse than one that is sturdy and bears evidence of hard work. But those who strengthen and invigorate the body by the clothing they wear, those, I say, are the only ones who benefit the parts of the body so covered. It does not improve the appearance of the body to cover it completely with many garments, to smother it with tight wrappings, and to soften the hands and feet by close fitting gloves or shoes unless perhaps in case of illness. It is not good to be entirely without experience of cold and heat, but one ought in some degree to feel the cold in winter and likewise the heat of the

ὅλως εἶναι ἀγεύστους καλὸν ψύχους τε καὶ θάλπους, ἀλλὰ ῥιγοῦν
 χρή τὰ μέτρια χειμῶνος καὶ ἡλιοῦσθαι θέρους καὶ σκιατροφεῖσθαι
 ἥκιστα. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐνὶ χρήσθαι χιτῶνι τοῦ δεῖσθαι δυοῖν προτι-
 μητέον, τοῦ δ' ἐνὶ χρήσθαι χιτῶνι τὸ μηδενί, ἀλλὰ ἱματίῳ μόνον.
 5 καὶ τοῦ γε ὑποδεδέσθαι τὸ ἀνυποδετεῖν τῷ δυναμένῳ κρείττον·
 κινδυνεύει γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὑποδεδέσθαι τῷ δεδέσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ἡ δ'
 ἀνυποδησία πολλὴν εὐλυσίαν τινὰ καὶ εὐκολίαν παρέχει τοῖς
 ποσίν, ὅταν ἡσκημένοι ᾧσιν. ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἡμεροδρόμους ὁρᾶν
 ἔστιν οὐ χρωμένους ὑποδήμασιν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς καὶ τῶν ἀθλοῦντων
 10 τοὺς δρομεῖς οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους σῶζειν τὸ τάχος, εἰ δέοι τρέχειν
 αὐτοὺς ἐν ὑποδήμασιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ σκέπης ἔνεκα καὶ τὰς οἰκίας ποιοῦμεθα, φημὶ καὶ ταύτας
 δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ τῆς χρείας ἀναγκαῖον, ὥς ἀπερύκειν μὲν
 κρύους, ἀπερύκειν δὲ θάλπους τὸ σφοδρόν, εἶναι δ' ἡλίου καὶ ἀνέ-
 15 μων ἐπικούρημα τοῖς δεομένοις. καθόλου δὲ ὅπερ ἂν παρέχοι
 σπήλαιον αὐτοφυές, ἔχον μετρίαν ὑπόδυσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦτο χρή
 παρέχειν ἡμῖν τὴν οἰκίαν, τοσοῦτον εἴπερ ἄρα περιττεύουσιν, ὅσον
 καὶ ἀπόθεσιν τροφῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιτηδείαν ἔχειν. τί δ' αἱ
 περίστυλοι αὐαί; τί δ' αἱ ποικίλαι χρίσεις; τί δ' αἱ χρυσόροφοι
 20 στέγαι; τί δ' αἱ πολυτέλειαι τῶν λίθων, τῶν μὲν χαμαὶ συν-
 ηρμωμένων, τῶν δ' εἰς τοίχους ἐγκειμένων, ἐνίων καὶ πάνυ
 πόρρωθεν ἡγμένων καὶ δι' ἀναλωμάτων πλείστων; οὐ ταῦτα πάντα
 περιττὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα, ὧν γε χωρὶς καὶ ζῆν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ἔστι,
 πραγματείαν δ' ἔχει πλείστην, καὶ διὰ χρημάτων γίνεται πολλῶν,
 25 ἀφ' ὧν ἂν τις ἐδυνήθη καὶ δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους
 εὐεργετήσαι; καὶ τοι πόσῳ μὲν εὐκλεέστερον τοῦ πολυτελῶς οἰκεῖν
 τὸ πολλοὺς εὐεργετεῖν; πόσῳ δὲ καλοκάγαθικώτερον τοῦ ἀναλίσκειν
 εἰς ξύλα καὶ λίθους τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀναλίσκειν; πόσῳ δὲ ὠφε-
 λιμώτερον τοῦ περιβεβλησθαι μεγάλῃν οἰκίαν τὸ κεκτησθαι φίλους
 30 πολλούς, ὃ περιγίνεται τῷ προθύμως εὐεργετοῦντι; τί δ' ἂν ὄναιτό
 τις τηλικούτον ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγέθους τε καὶ κάλλους, ἡλίκον ἀπὸ
 τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι πόλει καὶ πολίταις ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

sun in summer and to seek the shelter of shade as little as possible. Wearing one chiton is preferable to needing two, and wearing none but only a cloak is preferable to wearing one. Also going barefoot is better than wearing sandals, if one can do it, for wearing sandals is next to being bound, but going barefoot gives the feet great freedom and grace when they are used to it. It is for this reason that one sees couriers wearing no sandals on the highways and the runners in a contest unable to make the best speed if they have to run in sandals.

Since we make houses too for a shelter, I argue that they ought to be made to satisfy bare necessity, to keep out the cold and extreme heat and to be a protection from the sun and the winds for those who need it. In general, whatever a natural cave would offer, furnishing a moderate shelter for man, this our houses ought to furnish for us, with just enough to spare to make a convenient place for storing away man's food. What good are courtyards surrounded by colonnades? What good are all kinds of colored paints? What good are gold-decked rooms? What good are expensive stones, some fitted together on the floor, others inlaid in the walls, some brought from a great distance, and at the greatest expense? Are not all these things superfluous and unnecessary, without which it is possible not only to live but also to be healthy? Are they not the source of constant trouble, and do they not cost great sums of money from which many people might have benefited by public and private charity? How much more commendable than living a life of luxury it is to help many people. How much nobler than spending money for sticks and stones to spend it on men. How much more profitable than surrounding oneself with a great house to make many friends, the natural result of cheerfully doing good. What would one gain from a large and beautiful house comparable to what he would gain by conferring the benefits of his wealth upon the city and his fellow-citizens?

XX.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΚΕΤΩΝ.

Καὶ μὴν συνῶδὰ καὶ συγγενῇ τῇ περὶ τὰς οἰκίας πολυτελείᾳ καὶ
 5 τὰ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν κατ' οἰκίαν φαίνεται ὄντα, κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι
 καὶ στρώματα καὶ ἐκπώματα καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, πάντως τὴν χρεῖαν
 ὑπερβεβηκότα καὶ προσωτέρω τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐληλυθότα· κλῖναι
 μὲν ἐλεφάντιναι καὶ ἀργυραὶ ἢ νῆ Δία χρυσαί, τράπεζαι δὲ
 παραπλησίας ὕλης, στρωμαὶ δὲ ἀλουργεῖς καὶ ἄλλων χρωμάτων
 10 δυσπορίστων, ἐκπώματα δὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου πεποιημένα, τὰ
 δὲ λίθων ἢ λιθοειδῶν τινων ἀμιλλωμένων τῇ πολυτελείᾳ τοῖς
 ἀργυροῖς καὶ χρυσοῖς. καὶ σπουδάζεται ταῦτα πάντα, τοῦ μὲν
 σκίμποδος οὐδὲν κακίῳ παρεχομένου κατάκλινιν ἡμῖν τῆς ἀργυρᾶς
 ἢ τῆς ἐλεφαντίνης κλίνης, τῆς δὲ σισύρας ἱκανωτάτης οὔσης
 15 ὑπεστρώσθαι ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι πορφυρίδος ἢ φοινικίδος· ἐσθίειν δ'
 ὑπάρχοντος ἡμῖν ἀβλαβῶς ἀπὸ τραπέζης ξυλίνης ὡς μὴ ποθεῖν
 μηδαμῶς τὴν ἀργυρᾶν, καὶ πίνειν γε νῆ Δία ἐκ κεραμεῶν ποτηρίων
 παρόν, ἃ τό τε δῖφος σβεννύειν παραπλησίως πέφυκε τοῖς χρυσοῖς,
 καὶ τὸν ἐγχεόμενον αὐτοῖς οἶνον οὐ λυμαίνεται, ὅσμην δέ γε ἡδίω
 20 τῶν χρυσῶν παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἀργυρῶν. καθόλου δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ
 κακία σκευῶν κριθεῖη ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐκ τριῶν τούτων, τῆς τε κτήσεως
 καὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς τηρήσεως. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἢ κτήσασθαι
 δύσκολά ἐστιν ἢ χρήσασθαι μὴ ἐπιτήδεια ἢ φυλάξαι μὴ ῥάδια,
 ταῦτα χείρω ἢ δὲ καὶ κτώμεθα μὴ χαλεπῶς καὶ χρώμενοι <εὐκόλως>
 25 ἐπαινούμεν καὶ φυλάττομεν ῥαδίως, ταῦτα ἀμείνω. διόπερ τὰ
 κεραμεᾶ καὶ τὰ σιδηρᾶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πολλῶ κρείττω τῶν
 ἀργυρῶν τε καὶ χρυσῶν, ὅτι ἢ κτήσις τούτων εὐμαρεστέρα, ὅσῳ
 καὶ εὐτελεστέρα, ἢ τε χρήσις πλείων, ὅτι καὶ πυρὶ ῥαδίως ταῦτ'
 ἐμβάλλομεν, ἐκεῖνα δὲ οὐ, ἢ τε φυλακὴ ἥττων· τὰ γὰρ εὐτελεῖ τῶν
 30 πολυτελῶν ἐπιβουλεύεται ἥττον. μέρος δέ τι τῆς φυλακῆς οὔσα
 καὶ ἢ ἐκκάθαρσις περὶ τὰ πολυτελεῖ πλείων ἐστίν. ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἵππος ὁ τιμῆς μὲν ἐωνημένος ὀλίγης, χρεῖας δὲ παρεχόμενος
 πολλὰς, αἰρετώτερος τοῦ ὀλίγα μὲν ὑπουργοῦντος, πολλοῦ δ'
 ἡγορασμένου· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ σκεύη τὰ εὐτελέστερα καὶ
 35 πολυχρηστότερα κρείττω τῶν ἐναντίων. τί ποτ' οὖν διώκεται τὰ
 σπάνια καὶ πολυτελεῖ πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ τῶν εὐτελῶν; ὅτι

XX

ON FURNISHINGS

Related to and in harmony with extravagance in houses is all the matter of furnishings within the house—couches, tables, coverlets, drinking cups, and similar objects—completely surpassing all needs and going far beyond necessity. There are ivory and silver, yes, even golden couches, tables of similar materials, coverlets of purple and other colors difficult to obtain, cups made of gold and silver, some of marble or some similar material rivalling gold and silver in costliness. All these things are eagerly sought for, although a pallet furnishes us a place to lie on no worse than a silver or ivory couch, and a rough cloak is quite as suitable to cover it as a purple or crimson coverlet; it is possible for us to eat quite safely from a wooden table without longing for one of silver. Yes, and one can drink from earthenware cups which are quite as good for quenching the thirst as goblets of gold; and the wine which is poured into them is not tainted, but yields a fragrance sweeter than from cups of gold or silver. In general, one would rightly judge what is good and bad in furnishings by these three criteria: acquisition, use, and preservation. Whatever is difficult to obtain or not convenient to use or not easy to protect is to be judged inferior; but what we acquire with no difficulty and use with satisfaction and find easy to keep is superior. For this reason earthenware and iron and similar vessels are much better than those of silver or gold, because their acquisition is less trouble since they are cheaper, their usefulness is greater since we can safely expose them to heat and fire (which cannot be done with others), and guarding them is less of a problem, for the inexpensive ones are less likely to be stolen than the expensive ones. No small part of preserving them too is keeping them clean, which is a more expensive matter with costly ones. Just as a horse which is bought for a small price but is able to fulfill many needs is more desirable than one which does little although he was bought for a great price, so in the matter of furnishings the cheaper and more serviceable are better than the more costly and less serviceable ones. Why is it, then, that the rare and expensive pieces are sought after rather than those which are available and cheap? It is because the things which are really good and fine are not recognized, and in place of them those which only seem good are eagerly sought by the foolish. As

ἀγνοεῖται τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ γαθὰ, καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ δοκοῦντα σπουδάζεται παρὰ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις· ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι πολ-
 λάκις λευκὰ τὰ μέλανα νομίζουσιν· ἄνοια δὲ μανίας συγγενέστατον.
 ἐπεὶ τῶν γε νομοθετῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους, καὶ ἐν πρώτοις Λυκούργον
 5 εὗρομεν ἂν πολυτέλειαν μὲν ἐξελαύνοντα τῆς Σπάρτης, ἀντείσά-
 γοντα δ' εὐτέλειαν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς τῆς διαίτης τοῦ περιττοῦ προτι-
 μῶντα πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν τρυφὴν ὡς λύμην ἐκτρεπόμενον,
 τὸ δ' ἐβελόπονον ὡς σωτήριον ζηλοῦν ἀξιοῦντα. τεκμήρια δὲ τούτων
 αἱ τῶν ἐφήβων ἐκεῖ καρτερήσεις, ἐθιζομένων φέρειν λιμόν τε καὶ
 10 δῦψος, καὶ μετὰ τούτων ῥίγος, ἔτι δὲ πληγὰς καὶ πόνους ἄλλους.
 <οὕτω καλοῖς καὶ> σεμνοῖς ἔθουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
 τραφέντες ἄριστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦσαν τε καὶ ἐνομίζοντο, καὶ τὴν
 πενίαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ζηλωτοτέραν τοῦ βασιλέως πλούτου κατέστησαν.
 ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς δεξαίμην ἂν νοσήσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τρυφήσαι.
 15 τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μόνον βλάπτει τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τρυφᾶν ἄμφω
 διαφθείρει, ψυχὴν τε καὶ σῶμα, σώματι μὲν ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀδυνα-
 μίαν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀνανδρίαν ἐμποιοῦν. καὶ μὴν καὶ
 ἀδικίαν τίκτει τρυφή, ὅτι καὶ πλεονεξίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τρυφῶντά τινα
 δυνατὸν μὴ πολυτελεῖ εἶναι, οὔτε πολυτελεῖ ὄντα ὀλίγα βούλεσθαι
 20 ἀναλίσκειν, βουλόμενον δὲ πολλὰ μὴ καὶ πορίζειν πολλὰ ἐπιχειρεῖν,
 οὐδ' αὖ πορίζειν ἐπιχειροῦντα πολλὰ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν·
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πορίσειέ τις ἐκ δικαίων πολλά. ἔτι καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον
 ἄδικος ἂν εἴη πάντως ὁ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πόλεως τῆς αὐτοῦ
 πονεῖν τοὺς προσήκοντας πόνους ὀκνήσειεν ἂν ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τρυφῇ,
 25 καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων ἢ συγγενῶν κακοπαθῆσαι δέον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειεν·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐάσει αὐτὸν ἢ τρυφῇ. καὶ μὴν καὶ διὰ θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε
 πονητέον τῷ δικαίῳ εἶναι βουλομένῳ πρὸς θεοὺς, ὅτι θυσίας ἢ τελε-
 τὰς ἢ τινα ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν τελέσει τοῖς θεοῖς, ὁ δὲ τρυφῶν ἐνδεήσει
 κἀναυθῆ. διόπερ ἄδικος ἂν εἴη πάντως καὶ περὶ πόλιν καὶ περὶ
 30 φίλους καὶ περὶ θεοὺς, ἃ χρὴ πράττειν αὐτὸν οὐ πράττων. ὡς
 οὖν καὶ ἀδικίας αἰτίαν οὖσαν τὴν τρυφὴν φευκτέον τρόπῳ παντί.

11 οὕτω καλοῖς καὶ coniecit Peerlkamp

3 He refers here to the famous Stoic paradox that all foolish men

madmen often think that black is white, so foolishness is next of kin to madness. Now we should find that the best lawgivers—and I think first of all of Lycurgus, who drove extravagance out of Sparta and substituted frugality, who preferred a life of deprivation as a means of producing courage to a life of excess, and who did away with luxury as a corrupting influence and considered the will to bear hardships the salvation of the state. Testimony to this is the endurance of the Spartan ephebes, who were made accustomed to bear hunger and thirst and cold, and even blows and other hardships. Trained in such noble and austere habits the ancient Lacedaemonians were the best of the Greeks and were so esteemed. Their very poverty they caused to be more envied than the King's wealth. For my part, then, I would choose sickness rather than luxury, for sickness harms only the body, but luxury destroys both body and soul, causing weakness and impotence in the body and lack of self-control and cowardice in the soul. Furthermore, luxury begets injustice because it also begets covetousness. For no man of extravagant tastes can avoid being lavish in expenditure, nor being lavish can he wish to spend little; but in his desire for many things he cannot refrain from acquiring them, nor again in his effort to acquire can he fail to be grasping and unjust; for no man would succeed in acquiring much by just methods. In still another way the man of luxurious habits would be unjust, for he would hesitate to undertake the necessary burdens for his city without abandoning his extravagant life, and if it seemed necessary to suffer deprivation on behalf of his friends or relatives he would not submit to it, for his love of luxury would not permit it. Nay more, there are times when duties to the gods must be undertaken by the man who would be just toward them, by performing sacrifices, initiatory rites, or some such other service. Here, too, the wastrel will be found wanting. Thus he would in all ways be unjust toward his city, toward his friends, and toward the gods, in failing to do what it is his duty to do. So, then, as being also the cause of injustice, luxury and extravagance must be shunned in every way.

are mad (πάντες οἱ μωροὶ μαινονται). Cf. Cicero *Paradoxa* IV and *Tusc. Disp.* III, 5, 10.

4 Cf. Plutarch *Lycurgus* IX.

13 The King of Persia was proverbially the richest man on earth.

XXI.

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΤΡΑΣ.

Ἐφη μὲν παραπλησίως τὸν ἄνδρα χρῆναι τῇ κεφαλῇ προσφέρειν
 κουράν, ὡς ἀμπέλῳ προσφέρομεν τομήν, τοῦ μόνον ἀφαιρεῖν χάριν
 τὸ ἄχρηστον . . . οὕτε γενεῖω πώγωνα, ἀλλ' εἰναί τινα καὶ ταύτην
 5 σκέπην ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῖν πεπορισμένην τὸν δὲ πώγωνα καὶ
 σύμβολον γεγονέναι τοῦ ἄρρενος, ὥσπερ ἀλεκτρυόνι λόφον καὶ
 λέοντι χαίτην ὅθεν τῆς μὲν κόμης ἀφαιρετέον εἶναι τὸ ἐνοχλοῦν,
 τοῦ δὲ πώγωνος οὐδέν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνοχλεῖν αὐτὸν οὐδέν, ἕως ἂν
 10 ὑγιαίνῃ τὸ σῶμα ἢ νόσον μὴ τοιαύτην νοσῇ, ἣς εἵνεκα γένοιτ'
 αὐτὸν ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ γενείου τριχῶν. εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἔφη, τὸ
 τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὅτι τούτου ἕνεκα καρτέον οὐ καὶ κομητέον, τοῦ κατὰ
 φύσιν, ἵνα μὴ βαροῦμενός τις ὑπὸ τῆς κόμης μηδ' ἐνοχλούμενος ἢ
 πρὸς μηδεμίαν ἐνέργειαν. ἡ γὰρ δὴ φύσις τὸ μὲν ἐνδεὲς μᾶλλον
 φαίνεται φυλαξαμένη, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν ἡττον, ἐπὶ τε φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
 15 ζώων, ὅτι τῆς προσθέσεως τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἡ ἀφαίρεσις τοῦ περιττοῦ
 πολὺ ῥάων καὶ εὐπετεστέρα ἐστίν. χρὴ δ' ἐφ' ἐκάτερα τὸν λογισμὸν
 τὸν ἀνθρώπινον τῇ φύσει βοηθεῖν, ὥστ' ἀναμιμπλάναι τὰς ἐνδείας
 ἐφ' ὅσον οἶδον τε ἀναπληροῦν, ἐλαττοῦν δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὰς περιτ-
 20 τότητας. ὅθεν καὶ καρτέον μόνῃς ἕνεκα τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τοῦ περιτ-
 τοῦ καὶ οὐχὶ κόσμου χάριν, ὅπερ οἴονται δεῖν ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν γένεια
 λεαινόμενοι καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἀγενεῖους ἢ νῆ Δία τοὺς ἄρτι
 γενειάσκοντας, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως κειρόμενοι διαφόρως
 δὲ τὰ πρόσω τῶν ὀπίσω. καὶ γὰρ τοι δοκῶν εἶναι κόσμος οὗτος
 25 πολλὴν ἀκοσμίαν ἔχει καὶ διαφέρει οὐδὲν τοῦ καλλωπισμοῦ τοῦ
 τῶν γυναικῶν. ἐκεῖναί τε γὰρ τὰ μὲν τινα μέρη πλέκουσι τῶν
 τριχῶν τὰ δὲ καθιᾶσι τὰ δὲ ἕτερόν τινα σκευάζουσι τρόπον, ἵνα
 φαίνωνται καλλίονες, οἳ τε κειρόμενοι οὕτως ἄνδρες κατάδηλοί
 εἰσι δι' ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι καλοὶ οἷς βούλονται ἀρέσκειν τὰς
 μὲν τέλεον ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν τριχῶν, τὰς δὲ πλάττοντες οὕτως ὡς
 30 αὐτὸν εὐοπτότατα ἢ γυναιξί τε καὶ παισὶν ὑφ' ὧν ἐπαινέσθαι δέονται.
 ἥδη δὲ τινες καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ βαρύνεσθαι τὰς τρίχας κείρονται, καὶ
 λεαίνουσι τὰ γένεια, σαφῶς οὐτοί γε κατεαγότες ὑπὸ τῆς τρυφῆς
 καὶ ἐκνευρισμένοι παντάπασιν, οἳ γε ἀνέχονται ἀνδρόγυννοι καὶ
 γυναικῶδεις ὁράσθαι ὄντες, ὅπερ ἔδει φεύγειν ἐξ ἅπαντος, εἰ δὴ
 35 τῷ ὄντι ἄνδρες ἦσαν. τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ εἰσὶν αἱ τρίχες ἀνθρώποις
 βάρος; εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία καὶ τοῖς ὀρνέοις τὰ πτερὰ φαίη τις αὐτοὺς
 βάρος.

1 This discourse is fragmentary and has many gaps which are not satisfactorily filled.

3 There is obviously a break in the text at this point.

XXI

ON CUTTING THE HAIR

He used to say that a man should cut the hair from the head for the same reason that we prune a vine, that is merely to remove what is useless. <But just as the eyebrows or eyelashes which perform a service in protecting the eyes should not be cut, so> neither should the beard be cut from the chin <for it is not superfluous>, but it too has been provided for us by nature as a kind of cover or protection. Moreover, the beard is nature's symbol of the male just as is the crest of the cock and the mane of the lion; so one ought to remove the growth of hair that becomes burdensome, but nothing of the beard; for the beard is no burden so long as the body is healthy and not afflicted with any disease for which it is necessary to cut the hair from the chin. The remark of Zeno was well made that it is quite as natural to cut the hair as it is to let it grow long, in order not to be burdened by too much of it nor hampered for any activity. For nature plainly keeps a more careful guard against deficiency than against excess, in both plants and animals, since the removal of excess is much easier and simpler than the addition of what is lacking. In both cases man's common sense ought to assist nature, so as to make up the deficiencies as much as possible and fill them out, and to lessen and eliminate the superfluous. Therefore the hair should be cut only to get rid of too much of it and not for looks, as some think they must, who shave their cheeks and imitate the beardless or, would you believe it, boys who are just beginning to grow a beard, and the hair on the head they do not cut all in the same way, but differently in front and behind. In fact that which seems to them good-looking is quite the opposite and does not differ from the efforts of women to make themselves beautiful. For they, you know, plait some parts of their hair, some they let fall free, and some they arrange in some other way in order to appear more beautiful. So men who cut their hair are obviously doing it out of a desire to appear handsome to those whom they wish to please, and so some of their hair they cut off completely, some they arrange so as to be most pleasing to the women and boys by whom they want to be admired. Nowadays there are even men who cut their hair to free themselves of the weight of it and they also shave their cheeks. Clearly such men have become slaves of luxurious living and are completely enervated, men who can endure being seen as womanish creatures, hermaphrodites, something which real men would avoid at all costs. How could hair be a burden to men? Unless, of course, one should say that feathers are a burden to birds also.